Explain how the characteristics of public goods may result in the free rider problem.
Using real-world examples, evaluate the effectiveness of direct government provision in responding to the market failure associated with public goods.
Explain why a good provided by the government is not necessarily a public good.
Using real-world examples, evaluate the view that governments should directly provide all goods that have public-good characteristics.
Explain why an unregulated market may provide less than the socially desirable quantity of a public good.
Using real-world examples, discuss whether contracting out production to the private sector is the best government response to the underprovision of public goods.
Explain how non-excludability affects the ability of private firms to earn revenue from a public good.
Using named real-world examples, discuss the extent to which voluntary private financing can overcome the free rider problem.
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Explain why non-rivalry does not mean that a public good is costless to provide.
Using real-world examples, evaluate whether taxation is an appropriate way to finance public goods.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Montara experiences destructive forest fires. A proposed network of cameras would publish fire-location data openly. One person's use would not reduce its availability to others, while excluding non-payers could delay evacuation. The information is therefore a public good.
A charity sought voluntary household subscriptions. Many residents became free riders, expecting to receive the information even if they did not subscribe. The government is considering financing the service through taxation.
Proposed voluntary financing of the wildfire detection service in Montara.
| Households | Expected subscription rate / % | Annual subscription / montars per household | Annual service cost / montars |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50000 | 40% | 12 | 600000 |
Under direct provision, the national forestry agency would own and operate the cameras. Alternatively, the government could contract production to a specialist firm while requiring open access.
Contracting out could provide technical expertise, but monitoring camera reliability would be costly. Direct provision could improve accountability, although the agency might experience bureaucratic delays and weak cost control.
Estimated annual values under direct provision
| Item | Annual value / montars |
|---|---|
| Estimated economic benefit | $1,400,000 |
| Direct-provision cost | $600,000 |
Define the term public good indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 1.
Define the term free rider indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate the expected annual subscription revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why voluntary financing may result in underprovision of the wildfire detection service (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of directly providing the wildfire detection service (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how taxation could allow the government to provide open access to the service (Texts A and B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how the government could retain responsibility for access while using private production (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate whether Montara should use direct provision or contracting out to provide the wildfire detection service.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Seluna plans to install pollution sensors and publish neighbourhood air-quality readings. Once produced, the data can be used simultaneously by all residents without reducing its availability. The information is therefore non-rivalrous.
Preventing non-paying residents from observing public alerts would be impractical. This non-excludable service is unlikely to obtain sufficient voluntary finance.
Business sponsorship proposal for the air-quality information service.
| Eligible business sponsors | Expected participation / % | Annual payment per sponsor / seluns | Annual service cost / seluns |
|---|---|---|---|
| 80 | 65 | 4000 | 500000 |
The city could use direct provision through its environmental department. The service could improve public health decisions and reduce disruption to outdoor work.
A private technology firm has also offered to operate the sensors under contract. Competitive tendering may lower costs, but sensor accuracy is difficult for residents to observe and the city would need to monitor performance.
Annual estimates for direct city provision of air-quality information in Seluna.
| Item | Annual value / seluns |
|---|---|
| Health and productivity benefits | 950000 |
| Direct-provision cost | 500000 |
Define the term non-rivalrous indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 1.
Define the term non-excludable indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate expected annual sponsorship revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why the air-quality information may be underprovided by voluntary business sponsorship (Texts A and B).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of direct city provision (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how Seluna's environmental department could provide the information (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain the role of monitoring when a private technology firm operates the sensors (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss whether Seluna should directly provide the air-quality service or contract its production to a private firm.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Arandia's universities collect seismic data. Open publication allows engineers, households and businesses to use the same information simultaneously. Charging every beneficiary is not feasible, creating a free rider problem.
The absence of reliable payment means that private firms expect insufficient revenue, even though society values the information. This is an example of market failure.
Voluntary donations for seismic data network
| Potential donors / number | Predicted donation rate / % | Annual donation per donor / arans | Annual network cost / arans |
|---|---|---|---|
| 300 | 2500 | 720000 |
The government could expand a public geological agency and finance the network from general taxation. This would be direct provision.
It could instead contract sensor maintenance to several engineering firms. Tendering might reduce costs, but failures may only become visible after an earthquake, making contract design and monitoring difficult.
Annual estimates for provision by the public geological agency.
| Estimate | Annual amount / arans |
|---|---|
| Expected earthquake damage avoided | 1800000 |
| Public-agency cost | 720000 |
Define the term free rider problem indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 1.
Define the term market failure indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate expected annual donation revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of provision by the public geological agency.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain how the free rider problem creates market failure in seismic information (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the cost to Arandia of expanding the public geological agency (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how a public geological agency could overcome the financing problem (Texts A and B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain why contract monitoring would be important for seismic sensor maintenance (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate whether Arandia should directly provide the seismic network or contract out its maintenance.
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Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Port Sola proposes mapping mosquito breeding sites and publishing the maps freely. One additional user imposes almost no marginal cost once the maps have been produced, although collecting and checking the information remains costly.
Because all residents can access the maps, private providers cannot reliably collect payment. The government is considering direct provision to address underallocation of resources to this public good.
Proposed voluntary household contributions for mosquito-surveillance maps in Port Sola.
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Number of households | 120000 |
| Predicted contribution rate | 25% |
| Contribution per household / solars per year | 5 |
| Annual mapping cost / solars | 420000 |
Contracting out would involve the city financing the service while purchasing data collection from a private laboratory. It would not mean leaving finance to the market.
The laboratory may use specialist technology more efficiently. However, the quality of field sampling is difficult to specify, and monitoring would use scarce city funds.
Annual values for direct provision of mosquito-surveillance maps in Port Sola.
| Item | Annual value / solars |
|---|---|
| Expected health benefits | 1050000 |
| Direct-provision cost | 420000 |
Define the term direct provision indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term contracting out indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 1.
Using Table 1, calculate expected annual household contributions and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why the mosquito maps may receive insufficient voluntary finance (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain why the maps are not costless even though additional use is non-rivalrous (Text A).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how Port Sola could produce and distribute the maps (Text A).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how private production could be combined with public finance (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss whether Port Sola should directly provide the mosquito maps or contract out data collection.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Veloria broadcasts an accurate national time signal used by transport operators, broadcasters and households. One user's reception does not interfere with another's, and receivers cannot feasibly be restricted to contributors.
A voluntary industry levy has raised less than the service costs. The government argues that taxation could overcome the free rider problem, although tax revenue has an opportunity cost.
Voluntary industry levy data for the national time signal.
| Measure | Value | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Eligible firms | 1500 | firms |
| Expected participation rate | 60 | % |
| Annual levy per participating firm | 300 | velors per year |
| Annual service cost | 450000 | velors per year |
The government communications agency currently maintains the atomic clock. Direct provision offers clear public accountability and continuity.
Private electronics firms claim that contracting out would encourage innovation and lower operating costs. However, only two firms have suitable equipment, and service interruptions would disrupt railway and communications systems.
Annual estimates for direct provision of the national time signal.
| Item | Annual value / velors |
|---|---|
| Benefits to transport and communications | 900000 |
| Direct-provision cost | 450000 |
Define the term free rider problem indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term opportunity cost indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate annual levy revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why the voluntary industry levy may not finance the time signal (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of maintaining the signal through direct provision (Text A).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how the communications agency can maintain universal access (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how limited competition could affect private production of the signal (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate whether Veloria should continue direct provision or contract out the national time signal.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Lydon's coastal authority tests seawater and publishes contamination reports. Open reports are non-excludable, and one fisher or swimmer using a report does not reduce its usefulness to others.
Advertising on the report website has not covered testing costs. Because the reports are openly available, users and businesses can benefit from them without paying for testing. Some potential advertisers may therefore free ride rather than contribute to finance the reports.
Advertising finance for coastal water-quality reports
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Potential advertisers | 200 |
| Participation rate | 45% |
| Annual payment per advertiser | 1000 lydons per year |
| Annual testing costs | 260000 lydons per year |
Direct provision could guarantee testing in low-income and remote communities. However, officials may not know how frequently residents want beaches to be tested.
Under a proposed contract, a private laboratory would perform tests while the authority published the results. This may lower laboratory costs, but incomplete contracts and weak monitoring could produce government failure.
Annual estimates for direct provision of coastal testing
| Item | Annual estimate / lydons per year |
|---|---|
| Health and fishing benefits | 620000 |
| Direct-provision costs | 260000 |
Define the term non-excludable indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 1.
Define the term government failure indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate expected advertising revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why advertising may not provide sufficient finance for the reports (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of extending testing to remote communities (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how the coastal authority could guarantee open access and geographical coverage (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how weak monitoring could cause government failure (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss how Lydon should produce and finance its coastal water-quality reports.
Navora's main shipping channel is bordered by dangerous reefs. A lighthouse signal can be observed by every ship in the channel, including ships that have not paid for it. One ship observing the signal does not reduce its availability to other ships.
A shipping association has proposed financing the lighthouse through voluntary subscriptions. The government is also considering direct provision. Table 1 provides relevant annual information.
Annual shipping and lighthouse information for Navora.
| Quantity / unit | Value | |
|---|---|---|
| Ship visits / year | 8000 | |
| Voluntary subscription / ship visit | 900 | |
| Expected proportion of ship visits subscribing / % | 35 | |
| Annual lighthouse cost / million navors | 4.00 | |
| Serious accidents without lighthouse / year | 6 | |
| Serious accidents with lighthouse / year | 2 | |
| Average economic cost per serious accident / million navors | 1.2 |
The government estimates that the average economic cost of each serious shipping accident includes damage to ships and cargo, emergency services and disruption to the port.
Explain why the lighthouse signal has the two characteristics of a public good.
Calculate the expected annual subscription revenue and the resulting financing shortfall.
Calculate the annual economic benefit from the accidents avoided by the lighthouse and its annual net benefit.
Calculate the annual lighthouse cost per ship visit if the cost were divided equally across all ship visits.
Explain why the voluntary subscription proposal is likely to raise less funding than the lighthouse's total economic benefit to the wider economy.
Explain one advantage and one possible source of government failure associated with direct government provision of the lighthouse.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend whether the government of Navora should directly provide the lighthouse or rely on voluntary private provision.
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Public goods are generally financed collectively because charging each beneficiary may be impractical or restrict access, while non-excludability creates incentives to free-ride. Production, however, may be undertaken by government agencies or private contractors. Answer both parts, using appropriate diagrams and, in part (b), real-world examples.
Explain how contracting out can preserve open access to a public good while using private-sector production.
Using real-world examples, discuss whether a combination of direct government provision and contracting out is the most effective response to public goods.
Explain how the free rider problem prevents market prices from accurately revealing the value consumers place on a public good.
Using real-world examples, evaluate whether government decision-making can identify the socially desirable level of public-good provision more accurately than the market.
Explain how direct government provision may correct the underallocation of resources to public goods.
Using real-world examples, discuss the view that direct government provision replaces market failure with government failure.
Explain why contracting out the production of a public good does not, by itself, eliminate the free rider problem.
Using real-world examples, evaluate whether the efficiency gains from contracting out public goods are likely to exceed the costs of writing and monitoring contracts.
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Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Meridia's agricultural institute proposes an open crop-pest forecasting platform. Once a forecast has been produced, use by an additional farmer does not meaningfully increase the cost or reduce availability. Preventing non-paying farmers from receiving radio forecasts would be impractical.
Although the platform has public-good characteristics, collecting field observations, employing scientists and maintaining computer systems use scarce resources. Voluntary farmer payments may therefore leave the service below the socially desirable quantity.
Refer to Table 1 for the voluntary farmer scheme estimates.
Voluntary farmer scheme estimates
| Measure | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Farms | 90,000 |
| Predicted payment rate | 35% |
| Annual payment per paying farm | 8 merids |
| Annual platform cost | 540,000 merids |
This creates market failure, which is a situation in which an unregulated market does not allocate resources in a way that maximizes social welfare. Society may value protection from a regional flood-monitoring network, but each resident would prefer others to finance it. If everyone reasons that way, the network may not be supplied at all, or it may be provided below the socially desirable level.
The government could use direct provision through the agricultural institute. Forecasts may reduce crop losses and stabilize rural incomes, but taxation would have opportunity costs.
Alternatively, a private analytics company could operate the platform under contract. Its specialist expertise may lower costs, although the accuracy of forecasts and rural coverage would require monitoring.
Refer to Table 2 for the direct-provision estimates.
Table 2: Direct-provision estimates
| Item | Annual estimate / merids |
|---|---|
| Expected crop losses avoided | 1 350 000 |
| Direct-provision cost | 540 000 |
Define the term socially desirable quantity indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term direct provision indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 1.
Using Table 1, calculate expected annual farmer payments and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why farmers may not reveal their true willingness to pay for the forecasting platform (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain why non-rivalry does not make the forecasting platform costless (Text A).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how taxation could increase provision toward the socially desirable quantity (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain why measurable performance standards would be important for the private analytics company (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate whether Meridia should directly provide the crop-pest platform or contract out its production.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Norland proposes a database containing genetic information about newly identified pathogens. Researchers can use the same records simultaneously, so the database is non-rivalrous. Restricting access could slow the detection of dangerous outbreaks.
Donations from laboratories have been unreliable because laboratories expect to use records uploaded by others. The database may therefore be underprovided despite benefits to public health.
Laboratory donations and annual database costs in Norland.
| Item | Value / unit |
|---|---|
| Eligible laboratories | 600 |
| Expected donation rate | |
| Annual donation per donor | 1200 norins |
| Annual database costs | 750000 norins |
A public health agency could directly operate the database, maintaining democratic accountability and national continuity. However, public procurement may be slow.
The government could instead contract software development to private firms. Competitive tendering might promote innovation, but cybersecurity quality is difficult to observe and poor contract design could lead to government failure.
Annual estimates for direct operation of the disease-genome database.
| Item | Annual estimate / norins |
|---|---|
| Expected public-health benefits | 1 650 000 |
| Direct-provision costs | 750 000 |
Define the term non-rivalrous indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 1.
Define the term government failure indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate annual donation revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why laboratory donations may result in underprovision of the database (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of operating the database through a public health agency (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how direct government production could preserve open access and accountability (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how poor cybersecurity specifications could produce government failure (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss whether Norland should directly operate the database or contract out its software development.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Eridia plans an online map showing wheelchair-accessible routes and public facilities. After the map is created, an additional user can consult it without significantly increasing costs. The map's information will be released openly, and preventing non-payers from accessing or sharing it would be impractical and costly.
A charity currently finances updates through donations. Because contributions are voluntary, funding is unstable, and the charity is concerned about the number of free riders.
Charity finance for the accessibility map
| Measure | Value / unit |
|---|---|
| Regular map users | 240000 users |
| Expected donation rate | 15% |
| Annual donation per donor | 4 erids per donor |
| Annual map-update costs | 390000 erids per year |
Government direct provision could ensure nationwide coverage, including rural locations that attract few donations. However, central officials may collect outdated information.
Contracting regional surveys to mapping firms may improve local expertise and speed, but fragmented contracts could produce inconsistent standards and administrative costs.
Annual estimates for direct government provision of the accessibility map in Eridia.
| Item | Annual estimate / erids |
|---|---|
| Mobility and employment benefits | 880000 |
| Direct-provision costs | 390000 |
Define the term free rider indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term direct provision indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 1.
Using Table 1, calculate annual donation revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why charity funding may lead to outdated or incomplete accessibility information (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of extending map coverage to rural areas (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how government provision could improve nationwide access (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how fragmented regional contracts could affect the quality of the national map (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate how Eridia should ensure reliable nationwide provision of the accessibility map.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Kambara has several active volcanoes. A proposed service would publish volcanic-ash forecasts used by airlines, airports and nearby communities. One user's access does not reduce availability to another user, and excluding non-paying communities would undermine safety.
Airlines have offered voluntary contributions, but each airline has an incentive to rely on payments made by competitors. The service therefore has the potential to be underprovided by the market.
Airline contributions to volcanic-ash forecasting service
| Eligible airlines | Expected contribution rate | Annual contribution per airline / kambars | Annual service costs / kambars |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | 70% | $10,000 | $800,000 |
The meteorological agency could undertake direct provision, financed from taxation. This may ensure continuity, although public-sector wages make it difficult to recruit specialist scientists.
Contracting out forecasting models could give access to international expertise. However, a contractor might reduce testing that is difficult to observe, and business failure could transfer risks back to taxpayers.
Annual estimates for direct provision of volcanic-ash forecasts.
| Item | Annual value / kambars |
|---|---|
| Expected aviation and community benefits | $2,000,000 |
| Direct-provision costs | $800,000 |
Define the term direct provision indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 1.
Define the term contracting out indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate annual airline contributions and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why voluntary airline contributions may understate the value of the ash-forecasting service (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of expanding the meteorological agency (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how the meteorological agency could maintain universal access and continuity (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how contractor business failure could transfer risk back to taxpayers (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss whether Kambara should use direct provision or contract out parts of the ash-forecasting service.
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Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Tavira proposes a national database showing changes in wild pollinator populations. Farmers, researchers and the public can use the same data without reducing its availability. Once published, it is impractical to prevent non-contributors from benefiting.
Agricultural associations attempted voluntary finance, but many firms withheld payment. The resulting underprovision may reduce society's ability to respond to falling pollinator numbers.
Association finance estimates for the pollinator-monitoring network.
| Measure | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Agricultural associations / number | 400 |
| Predicted participation rate / % | 55% |
| Annual contribution per participating association / tavirs per year | 1500 |
| Annual monitoring costs / tavirs per year | 680000 |
A government conservation agency could operate field stations directly. This would strengthen accountability but might involve bureaucratic delay and inaccurate estimates of the amount of monitoring society wants.
Alternatively, private ecological consultancies could collect observations under contract. Competitive tendering may reduce cost, while difficult-to-observe sampling quality may create a risk of government failure.
The direct-provision estimates are shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2 — Direct-provision estimates
| Measure / unit | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Agricultural and research benefits / tavirs per year | 1 500 000 |
| Direct-provision costs / tavirs per year | 680 000 |
Define the term underprovision indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term government failure indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate annual association contributions and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain why agricultural associations may contribute less than the total benefit they receive (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of operating additional field stations (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how public operation could improve accountability (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how difficult-to-observe sampling quality could create government failure (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, evaluate how Tavira should provide its pollinator-monitoring network.
Read the extracts and answer the questions that follow.
Soland's observatories identify asteroids that may pass close to Earth. Once observations are published, simultaneous use by scientists, insurers and other countries does not reduce their availability. Foreign users cannot feasibly be excluded.
Domestic insurers proposed voluntary subscriptions, but each insurer can benefit from publicly announced observations without paying. This international free rider problem weakens expected private revenue.
Insurer subscription estimates for open asteroid observations.
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Eligible insurers | 100 |
| Expected subscription rate | 40% |
| Annual subscription per insurer | 20 000 solars |
| Annual observation costs | 1 600 000 solars |
The government could finance and operate observatories directly. National control may strengthen continuity and accountability, but borrowing could increase public debt and future servicing costs.
Private aerospace firms could instead be hired under contract. Specialist expertise and innovation may improve detection, but only a few firms can compete and the government would remain responsible if a contractor failed. This separation of public finance from private production is contracting out.
Annual estimates for direct government provision of near-Earth-object observations in Soland.
| Item | Annual estimate / solars |
|---|---|
| Expected scientific and risk-reduction benefits | 3,800,000 |
| Direct-provision costs | 1,600,000 |
Define the term free rider problem indicated in bold in Text A, paragraph 2.
Define the term contracting out indicated in bold in Text B, paragraph 2.
Using Table 1, calculate annual subscription revenue and the financing shortfall.
Using Table 2, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Using a causal-chain diagram, explain how foreign access may increase the free rider problem (Text A).
Using a production possibilities curve diagram, explain the opportunity cost of expanding government observatories (Text B).
Using a direct-provision flowchart, explain how taxation or borrowing could support open access to astronomical observations (Text B).
Using a contracting-out flowchart, explain how weak competition among aerospace firms could affect taxpayers (Text B).
Using information from the texts/data and your knowledge of economics, discuss how Soland should finance and produce its near-Earth-object observation service.
Bellaria is exposed to severe coastal storms. A warning system would provide siren and mobile-phone alerts to all households in the coastal region. Once an alert has been issued, one household receiving it does not reduce its availability to other households, and households cannot feasibly be excluded from receiving the warning.
The government is considering either direct provision by its national emergency agency or contracting production and maintenance to a private firm. Relevant information is shown in Table 1.
Information about storm damage, households and the costs of each warning-system provision option.
| Information | Common to both options | Direct provision | Contracted provision |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coastal households | 240,000 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Annual probability of a severe storm | 0.25 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Storm damage without a warning system / million bellars | 96 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Storm damage with a warning system / million bellars | Not applicable | 24 | 30 |
| Initial construction cost / million bellars | Not applicable | 18 | Not applicable |
| Operating life / years | Not applicable | 10 | Not applicable |
| Annual operating cost / million bellars | Not applicable | 4 | Not applicable |
| Annual contract and monitoring costs / million bellars | Not applicable | Not applicable | 6.5 |
Under either option, warnings would remain freely available to all households. Government officials are concerned that the quality of maintenance under a private contract may be difficult to observe until a severe storm occurs.
Define the term public good.
Calculate the annual expected value of storm damage avoided under direct provision.
Assuming the initial construction cost is spread evenly over ten years, calculate the annual net benefit under each provision option and identify which option has the greater annual net benefit.
If the annual cost of direct provision were financed by an equal annual tax on all coastal households, calculate the tax per household.
Explain why leaving the warning system to voluntary private provision may result in market failure.
Explain two possible advantages and one possible limitation of contracting out the warning system rather than using direct provision.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend whether the government of Bellaria should use direct provision or contracting out to provide the coastal storm-warning system.
Estara is considering a national cyber-threat bulletin that would publish warnings about newly detected malicious software. Once produced, the bulletin could be accessed simultaneously by all businesses without reducing its usefulness to any one business. Because the warnings must be disseminated rapidly and may be copied or forwarded, preventing non-paying businesses from accessing them would be impractical or prohibitively costly; exclusion would also undermine the rapid sharing needed to limit cyberattacks.
Table 1 shows estimates for businesses that would benefit from the bulletin.
Estimated cyberattack risks and losses for businesses in Estara, with and without direct provision of the national bulletin.
| Business size | Number of businesses | Annual attack probability (no bulletin) / % | Annual attack probability (direct provision) / % | Average loss per successful attack / estaras |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Small | 40,000 | 8 | 5 | 30,000 |
| Large | 10,000 | 4 | 2.5 | 200,000 |
Table 2 compares direct provision by Estara's national cybersecurity agency with contracting the technical work to a private firm. All figures are annual. For this question, assume that contracting out would produce a bulletin with the same effectiveness as direct provision, including the same attack probabilities shown in Table 1.
Annual costs and access conditions for the two bulletin provision options.
| Provision option | Technical production cost / million estaras per year | Government monitoring cost / million estaras per year | Total annual cost / million estaras per year | Access |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct provision | 24 | 0 | 24 | Open to all; rapid sharing and copying make exclusion impractical |
| Contracting out | 18 | 2 | 20 | Open to all; rapid sharing and copying make exclusion impractical |
Define the term free rider.
Calculate total expected annual cyberattack losses without the national bulletin.
Calculate the expected annual reduction in cyberattack losses under direct provision.
Calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Calculate the annual net benefit of contracting out and compare it with direct provision.
Explain why the cyber-threat bulletin may be classified as a public good.
Explain one possible advantage and one possible limitation of contracting out the bulletin's technical production.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend how the government of Estara should provide the national cyber-threat bulletin.
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Darsenia is considering a flood-monitoring service for two river districts. Sensor data and evacuation warnings would be freely broadcast throughout both districts. Residents could not feasibly be excluded from receiving the information, and additional users would not significantly increase the cost of supplying it.
A survey elicited households' stated annual willingness to pay, meaning their stated monetary valuation, for the service. Table 1 presents the survey results and selected income information.
Survey estimates of household benefits and income by river district.
| District | Households / number | Average annual benefit / dars per household | Average annual income / dars per household |
|---|---|---|---|
| North | 60000 | 90 | 30000 |
| South | 40000 | 50 | 15000 |
Table 2 compares two methods of government-financed provision.
Annual costs and access conditions for the two flood-monitoring provision options.
| Provision option | Production or operation arrangement | Annual production/operation cost / million dars | Annual government monitoring cost / million dars | Access |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct provision | Government operates sensors and broadcasts | 6.0 | — | Openly accessible in both districts |
| Contracting out | Private production by contractor | 4.8 | 0.7 | Openly accessible in both districts |
The government is considering financing direct provision through a uniform annual household levy.
Distinguish between a public good and a good that is merely provided by the public sector.
Calculate the estimated total annual household benefit from the flood-monitoring service.
Calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision and contracting out.
Calculate the uniform annual household levy needed to finance direct provision and the levy as a percentage of average household income in each district.
Explain why the survey estimates of stated willingness to pay may not reveal households' true willingness to pay for the service.
Explain two issues the government should consider when deciding whether to contract out the service.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend a method by which the government of Darsenia should provide and finance the flood-monitoring service.
Orinthia launches commercial and scientific satellites. A proposed tracking service would publish collision warnings openly. Once the information is produced, one operator's use does not reduce its availability to another operator. Operators outside Orinthia could also use the warnings without contributing to their production.
The government invited voluntary contributions from domestic satellite operators before deciding whether to fund the service. Table 1 shows the results.
Voluntary annual contributions offered by domestic satellite operators in Orinthia.
| Operator group | Number of operators | Contribution per operator / orins per year |
|---|---|---|
| Willing to contribute 80,000 orins | 25 | 80,000 |
| Willing to contribute 200,000 orins | 15 | 200,000 |
| No contribution | 80 | 0 |
Table 2 shows estimated annual collision risks and government provision costs.
Estimated annual collision risks and provision costs for space-debris tracking options.
| Provision option | Annual collision probability | Average loss if collision / million orins | Annual cost / million orins per year | Private contract fee / million orins per year | Government monitoring cost / million orins per year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without tracking service | 0.12 | 150 | 0 | — | — |
| Direct government provision | 0.04 | 150 | 10 | — | — |
| Contracting to private firm | 0.05 | 150 | — | 8 | 1.5 |
Under contracting, a private aerospace firm would operate the tracking equipment, while the government would finance the service and publish the warnings openly.
Calculate total expected annual voluntary contributions and the shortfall relative to the annual cost of direct provision.
Calculate the expected annual collision loss without the tracking service.
Calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Calculate the annual net benefit of contracting out, including monitoring costs.
Explain why the tracking information is likely to be underprovided if it relies only on voluntary contributions.
Explain why government financing does not require the government itself to produce the tracking service.
Explain one possible advantage and one possible limitation of contracting production to a specialist aerospace firm.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend how the government of Orinthia should ensure provision of the space-debris tracking service.
Explain how changes in excludability or rivalry may alter whether a good is classified as a public good.
Using real-world examples, examine whether technological change reduces the need for government intervention in the provision of public goods.
Explain how the scale of the free rider problem may affect private provision of different public goods.
Using real-world examples, to what extent should the method used to provide a public good depend on its geographical scale and required reliability?
Build a Practice Exam — Economics HL
Test your knowledge with a custom paper containing questions from selected topics.


Explain how government financing and private production can address different aspects of the market failure associated with public goods.
Using real-world examples, evaluate the view that the success of government intervention in public goods should be judged mainly by cost to taxpayers.
Calida's mountain region has 120000 households. A network of sensors and radio transmitters would warn residents and visitors about avalanches. Everyone within the broadcast area can receive a warning, regardless of whether they have paid.
A charity has attempted to finance the network through donations. The government is considering replacing this arrangement with direct provision or a contract with a specialist private firm. Relevant information is shown in Table 1.
Funding, avalanche-risk and provision estimates for Calida's warning network.
| Item | Value / unit |
|---|---|
| Households in mountain region | 120000 households |
| Expected donor rate | of households |
| Average annual donation | 80 calids per donor per year |
| Annual probability of a damaging avalanche | 0.30 |
| Damage without an effective warning | 20 million calids per damaging avalanche |
| Damage when the warning system works | 8 million calids per damaging avalanche |
| Direct provision: annual cost | 3.6 million calids per year |
| Direct provision: system failure probability | 0.02 |
| Contracting: annual cost including monitoring | 2.8 million calids per year |
| Contracting: system failure probability | 0.10 |
The damage figures are conditional on a damaging avalanche: if one occurs, damage is 20 million calids without an effective warning and 8 million calids when the system works. If the system fails, damage is 20 million calids. Assume system failure is independent of the occurrence of a damaging avalanche, and that the stated failure probabilities apply during any damaging avalanche.
Calculate the charity's expected annual donation revenue and its financing shortfall relative to the annual cost of direct provision.
Calculate the expected annual avalanche damage without an effective warning system.
Taking account of the probability of system failure, calculate the annual net benefit of direct provision.
Taking account of the probability of system failure, calculate the annual net benefit of contracting out.
Draw a causal-chain diagram showing how non-excludability may lead to underprovision of the avalanche-warning network by the private market.
Explain why the lower expected failure rate under direct provision does not necessarily mean that direct provision is the better policy.
Using the text/data provided and your knowledge of economics, recommend how the government of Calida should ensure provision of the avalanche-warning network.