Technology shapes who can take part in politics and how fast information moves. It also affects which actors control essential infrastructure. As a result, power can shift among governments, international organizations, businesses and citizens, creating new forms of interdependence.

Case study: India’s solar-energy transition, 2010–2024

India’s rapid economic development has driven up demand for reliable electricity. At the same time, concerns have grown over air pollution, carbon emissions and dependence on imported fuels. The government has treated solar technology as an environmental measure and a route to development. In 2010, it began the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. India and France then launched the International Solar Alliance in 2015.

Actors, positions and power

• India’s national government sets renewable-energy targets, runs competitive auctions and uses public policy to attract investment. Its regulatory power is considerable, though it must balance climate commitments with energy security, industrial growth and continued coal use.
• State governments and local authorities approve land, transmission infrastructure and projects. Their cooperation matters because implementation differs across India.
• The International Solar Alliance encourages cooperation among solar-rich states, particularly in the Global South. By placing India at the centre of a multilateral technology initiative, it increases the country’s diplomatic influence.
• International organizations and development lenders, including the World Bank, have supplied finance and technical support for solar generation, grids and rooftop installations.
• Private businesses such as ReNew and Adani Green Energy contribute capital, technology and construction capacity. Investment and technical expertise give them power, although they still rely on government contracts and regulation.
• Communities, farmers and environmental groups may welcome cleaner, more reliable energy. However, they may also challenge land acquisition, local consultation and how benefits are distributed.

Action and effects

Through government auctions, international finance and private investment, India expanded solar generation and lowered the cost of new projects. Solar technology has also supported India’s claim to leadership among developing states seeking climate finance and access to clean technology.

Yet the outcomes expose unequal power. Large solar parks can concentrate ownership while placing land costs on rural communities. Because generation is intermittent, India needs expanded transmission, storage and grid management. Its continued dependence on coal shows that technological capacity alone does not guarantee a complete political or economic transition.

Possible courses of action

One recommendation would be to invest more in electricity storage, modern transmission networks and decentralized rooftop or community solar. Such measures would improve reliability and distribute ownership more widely, but they require finance, skilled workers and coordination among national and state institutions.

A second course would be a just transition for coal-dependent regions, combining worker retraining, social protection and local investment. This would be difficult because coal supports employment and government revenue, as well as existing energy infrastructure. Affected industries and regional governments therefore have reasons to resist rapid change.

Links to other HL topic areas

• Environment: solar power is part of India’s response to climate change and air pollution.
• Poverty: affordable, reliable electricity can support education, health services and local livelihoods, but the benefits depend on access and pricing.
• Equality: access to land, finance and electricity shapes which social groups benefit from the transition.
• Security: a more diversified domestic energy supply can reduce exposure to imported-fuel disruptions.

Political communication can cross borders through the internet without depending entirely on governments or established news organizations. Social media links dispersed groups and helps protest tactics circulate. It can also build transnational solidarity, though platforms and states still hold significant power over access and visibility.

Case study: the Milk Tea Alliance, 2020–2024

The Milk Tea Alliance grew out of online exchanges in 2020 among users associated with Thailand, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Over time, it became a loose transnational network that supported democracy and resisted authoritarianism. After Myanmar’s military coup of February 2021, activists in Myanmar adopted its symbols and hashtags as well.

Actors, positions and power

• Young activists and protest movements shared hashtags, images and translated material, connecting struggles with different national causes. Their power came from numbers, speed and decentralized participation rather than formal authority.
• Diaspora communities spread information beyond the reach of domestic censorship and organized solidarity events.
• Among others, the governments of Thailand, China and Myanmar tried to defend their political authority and control public narratives. Unlike activists, they could draw on legal, coercive and surveillance powers.
• Social media companies determined moderation, account suspension and algorithmic visibility. Private platforms therefore acted as important political gatekeepers, even when they claimed to apply neutral rules.
• Human-rights organizations and international media verified some material and brought it to a wider audience. Their involvement gave anonymous posts credibility they might otherwise lack.

Action and effects

Participants circulated protest artwork and safety information, as well as news, across linguistic and territorial boundaries. Shared symbols helped activists present separate national disputes as part of a broader conflict over democracy and authoritarian power. International attention followed, and movements learned from one another.

Yet online solidarity didn’t produce a unified organization that could negotiate with states. Governments could block services, monitor accounts or arrest domestic organizers. At the same time, misinformation and anonymous participation made verification more difficult. The alliance showed both the reach and the fragility of digitally networked power.

Possible courses of action

One recommendation would be for participating groups to build secure, multilingual networks that don’t rely on a single commercial platform. Training in encryption, account security and evidence preservation could make them less vulnerable. However, sophisticated security practices may shut out participants with limited technology or digital literacy.

Another option would involve working more closely with trusted journalists and human-rights organizations so that claims are verified before circulating widely. This would strengthen legitimacy, although slower checks may weaken the speed that makes social-media mobilization effective.

Links to other HL topic areas

• Borders: online networks link movements across territorial boundaries, while states try to regain control through censorship and internet restrictions.
• Identity: shared democratic symbols can build solidarity across different national identities.
• Security: surveillance, arrests and digital attacks make communication platforms sites of political insecurity.
• Equality: differences in access to secure devices, connectivity and international audiences shape who can participate safely.

Online protests and social-media campaigns let citizens publicize grievances, document state action and coordinate collective activity at great speed. Their political influence rests on whether online attention leads to sustained organization, institutional reform or shifts in public legitimacy.

Case study: Nigeria’s #EndSARS movement, 2020–2021

Protests spread across Nigeria in October 2020, targeting the Special Anti-Robbery Squad, a police unit repeatedly accused of extortion, abuse and unlawful violence. The #EndSARS hashtag linked earlier campaigning with large street demonstrations. It also drew support from the Nigerian diaspora and international public figures.

Actors, positions and power

• Young Nigerian protesters called for the dissolution of SARS, accountability for abuses and wider police reform. Through social media, geographically dispersed participants developed a shared campaign identity.
• The Feminist Coalition, a Nigerian civil-society group, helped organize donations and practical support for protesters, including legal and medical assistance. Its work showed how online networks could build real organizational capacity.
• Nigeria’s federal government and police authorities maintained that they had to preserve public order and control crime. The state held formal authority, policing powers and control over reform processes.
• Technology companies controlled the platforms used to circulate evidence, raise funds and share campaign messages.
• Diaspora groups, journalists and human-rights organizations brought greater international scrutiny and challenged official accounts of events.

Action and effects

On 11 October 2020, the Nigerian government announced that SARS would be dissolved; a replacement unit was announced later. Protesters responded that simply renaming or reorganizing a unit wouldn’t address impunity across the police system. The demonstrations continued.

Security forces confronted protesters at the Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos on 20 October. The number of casualties and responsibility for particular deaths remained disputed. Video recordings, witness testimony, official statements and later investigations produced competing accounts. The episode shows that digital evidence can challenge state narratives, but it doesn’t automatically settle disagreements over facts.

The campaign gained global attention and was followed by the government’s announcement that SARS would be dissolved, although broader police reform remained incomplete. Several states established judicial panels to investigate police abuses and compensation claims. Yet implementation and accountability remained uneven, showing that visibility doesn’t necessarily produce durable institutional change.

Possible courses of action

An analyst could recommend independent police-complaints institutions with the authority to investigate abuses, protect witnesses and publish outcomes. These institutions would rely on adequate funding, political independence and cooperation from security agencies to work effectively.

Activists and civil-society organizations could also create secure systems to preserve verified digital evidence. Such systems would support investigations and reduce manipulation, though participants would still face surveillance risks and difficult questions about consent, privacy and the authenticity of recordings.

Links to other HL topic areas

• Security: the case raises questions about the balance between crime control, public order and protection from abusive state power.
• Equality: young people and economically marginalized citizens reported unequal exposure to police harassment.
• Identity: generational identity and diaspora connections helped form a shared movement.
• Borders: hashtags and diaspora activism carried a domestic campaign into global political discussion.

Advanced cyber capabilities let states conduct espionage, cause disruption and communicate strategically without conventional military occupation. Networks cross borders, while those behind an operation can hide their involvement. As a result, cyber power complicates sovereignty, attribution and the boundary between war and peace.

Case study: cyber operations against Ukraine, 2015–2024

Ukraine has faced sustained cyber operations alongside its wider conflict with Russia. In 2015 and 2016, attacks on Ukraine’s electricity grid showed that malware could disrupt critical infrastructure. NotPetya then spread from Ukraine into international business networks in 2017. The 2022 Russian invasion was accompanied by destructive malware and disinformation, as well as disruption of the Viasat KA-SAT satellite network.

Actors, positions and power

• Ukraine’s government and infrastructure operators aimed to protect public services and preserve state authority. Experience gained since 2014 led them to strengthen cyber-defence capabilities.
• Ukraine and several Western governments accused the Russian state and military intelligence of responsibility for major operations. Russia rejected a number of Western cyberattack allegations, so attribution became part of the political confrontation.
• The European Union, NATO members and the United States provided technical assistance, intelligence and diplomatic support. Their role shows how heavily cyber defence depends on alliances.
• Private companies, including Microsoft, ESET and Viasat, investigated attacks and defended systems. Since they controlled infrastructure and threat data, they gained an unusually direct role in national security.
• Civilians, hospitals, energy users and international firms were also stakeholders. Disruption and malware spillover reached beyond military targets.

Action and effects

Ukraine improved incident response and strengthened coordination with foreign governments and technology companies. It also moved some data and services to more resilient systems. These steps helped maintain government communications and essential functions after the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

Even so, cyber operations caused disruption and economic damage. NotPetya affected companies far beyond Ukraine, demonstrating interdependence: malware aimed at one state can spread through global supply chains. The case also reveals the limits of cyber power. Digital attacks supported broader Russian pressure, but they did not independently secure political control over Ukraine.

Attribution still carried political weight. The EU attributed the February 2022 KA-SAT attack to Russia and considered further coordinated steps in response. Yet attribution depends on classified intelligence and technical judgments, both of which other actors may contest.

Possible courses of action

An analyst could recommend investing further in redundant infrastructure and offline backups, while improving rapid information sharing and joint public-private response exercises. Such measures reduce vulnerability, but they cost money and cannot remove weaknesses created by employees, suppliers and older systems.

Another option would be coordinated sanctions and legal action after independently supported attribution. A collective response may deter future attacks. However, uncertain evidence and fears of escalation can leave states reluctant to act.

Links to other HL topic areas

• Security: cyber operations form part of military conflict and efforts to protect critical infrastructure.
• Borders: attacks cross territorial boundaries, challenging the state’s ability to control threats entering through global networks.
• Health: disrupted electricity or communications can put hospitals and emergency services at risk.
• Identity: propaganda and manipulated information can exploit linguistic, national and political divisions.

Cyberwarfare creates difficult questions. Which international rules apply? How should responsibility be established, and what would count as a proportionate response? International norms set out shared expectations, yet enforcement remains difficult when states disagree about attribution, sovereignty or control of information.

Case study: the Albania–Iran cyber confrontation, 2022

A major cyberattack disrupted Albania’s online government services in July 2022. In September, another attack affected border-management systems. Albania blamed Iran and severed diplomatic relations with it on 7 September 2022. Iran denied responsibility.

Actors, positions and power

• Albania’s government viewed the attack as state-sponsored aggression and a threat to public administration. Because Albania is a small state, it relied heavily on international technical and diplomatic support.
• Iran’s government rejected Albania’s attribution. Wider political tensions shaped the dispute, including Albania’s decision to host members of the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq.
• NATO and allied governments condemned the attack and helped Albania strengthen its cyber defence. Acting collectively raised the political cost for the alleged attacker.
• The United States placed sanctions on Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security and its minister in September 2022, using economic pressure to pursue accountability.
• Microsoft and other cybersecurity specialists provided technical expertise for the investigation. Private expertise therefore helped shape state attribution and the international response.
• Albanian residents and users of public services felt the effects directly, since digital government infrastructure had become essential to their everyday dealings with the state.

Action and effects

Albania took affected systems offline, investigated the attacks with foreign and private-sector assistance, then restored services. It also used diplomatic action to show that it regarded the incident as more than an ordinary crime. NATO expressed solidarity and discussed further support, including possible collective responses, but did not announce a collective military response.

The case revealed gaps in global cyber governance. United Nations processes have created voluntary expectations for responsible state behaviour, such as protecting critical infrastructure and cooperating over malicious activity. These norms have no automatic enforcement mechanism, however. States may challenge the evidence or disagree about how a rule applies.

Albania imposed diplomatic costs through its response and gained international support. Even so, it did not secure a universally accepted legal judgment. Political attribution may persuade allies without carrying the authority of a court ruling.

Possible courses of action

One recommendation would be to create a standing international mechanism that provides independent technical assistance to states and publishes evidence-based assessments after serious cross-border incidents. Such a mechanism could strengthen legitimacy, particularly for states with limited investigative capacity. Governments might still refuse to share classified intelligence or accept findings that limit their freedom of action.

Another option is for states to negotiate clearer commitments not to disrupt civilian public services. Coordinated sanctions or other consequences could follow well-supported violations. Enforcement remains the main obstacle: powerful states can reject attribution, block consensus or apply standards selectively to allies and rivals.

Links to other HL topic areas

• Security: cyberattacks can shut down state services without using conventional armed force.
• Borders: digital operations can enter a state remotely, reducing the protective value of territorial boundaries.
• Identity: the conflict was linked to disputes involving an exiled Iranian opposition movement.
• Equality: smaller states often have fewer technical and financial resources available for attribution, defence and recovery.