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IB Syllabus Requirements for Security
HL.7.1
Security across global politics
HL.7.2
Sovereignty, armed power and non-state actors
HL.7.3
The wider dimensions of security
HL.7.4
Insecurity, human rights and political advantage
HL.7.1
SECURITY ACROSS GLOBAL POLITICS
Security connects with power, sovereignty, legitimacy and interdependence. Political actors disagree about whose security counts, which threats should come first and when exceptional measures are justified. Such debates also tie security to conflict, rights, development and political participation.
In March 2012, the US-based organization Invisible Children released Kony 2012. The online film called for the arrest of Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army. The LRA had originated in northern Uganda and was accused of killings, abductions and the forced recruitment of children. By 2012, however, Kony and the remaining LRA forces were operating mainly beyond Uganda, particularly in parts of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
A long-running regional security issue suddenly became a highly visible global cause. The campaign revealed social media’s agenda-setting power: a non-state actor could focus international attention on an armed group and encourage people far from the conflict to demand action.
The film attracted exceptional worldwide attention and increased public pressure to sustain international action against the LRA. Yet it did not lead to Kony’s arrest. US-supported operations continued until the United States ended its counter-LRA mission in 2017. By then, the organization’s operational capacity had been substantially reduced.
The case shows both the reach and the limits of digital mobilization. Social media can quickly raise visibility, attract resources and shape official agendas. But visibility does not guarantee informed participation or lasting change. Critics said the campaign simplified the conflict, centred an external organization and gave too little agency to those directly affected.
One option would be to support locally led documentation, victim services and reintegration programmes alongside attempts to arrest alleged perpetrators. This approach would tackle the wider consequences of insecurity, though funding long-term work is less politically dramatic than running a global media campaign.
A second option would require international advocacy organizations to involve affected communities when designing campaigns and to publish clear evidence about context, expenditure and intended outcomes. The challenge lies in maintaining accountability without blocking rapid advocacy during an urgent crisis.
The case links to Technology because digital platforms made rapid transnational mobilization possible while promoting a simplified, emotionally charged account. It connects with Borders because the LRA’s movement among several states made jurisdiction and military coordination more difficult. It also relates to Identity, as representations of African victims, armed actors and Western campaigners influenced whose voices were seen as authoritative.
HL.7.2
SOVEREIGNTY, ARMED POWER AND NON-STATE ACTORS
Security depends on claims to sovereignty, the distribution of military power, armed conflict, weapons proliferation and the actions of non-state actors. A state may assert exclusive authority over a territory, even when rivals dispute the claim or challenge its control in practice. Efforts by one actor to become more secure can leave others feeling threatened, creating a security dilemma.
The South China Sea is the site of a regional maritime-security dispute. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have overlapping claims there. Its waters contain major shipping routes, fishing grounds and potential energy resources. The disputes cover islands and reefs, as well as surrounding waters and the legal rights created by maritime features.
From the 2010s, China built and militarized artificial islands, increasing its ability to monitor the region and operate across it. Confrontations around contested locations have continued. These included repeated encounters between Chinese and Philippine vessels near Second Thomas Shoal during 2023 and 2024.
In 2013, the Philippines started arbitration proceedings under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The tribunal issued its award in 2016, rejecting the legal basis for extensive maritime rights derived from China’s “nine-dash line” and clarifying the status of several contested features. China rejected the ruling. This showed how legal authority can lack enforcement power when a major state withholds consent.
Claimant states have increased coast-guard patrols and defence cooperation as well. The United States and the Philippines strengthened their alliance, while China continued building its maritime presence. Such actions may deter unilateral control, but they increase the chance that a collision or confrontation could escalate. Fishing fleets are non-state actors, while maritime militia operate as state-linked or quasi-state actors, making it harder to establish responsibility. They also allow pressure to continue below the threshold of open war.
ASEAN and China could agree on a binding code of conduct with incident-reporting rules, communication channels and protections for civilian fishers. The main obstacle is disagreement about whether the rules should be legally binding and which waters they should cover.
Another option would be for claimants to set up joint fisheries-management arrangements without asking any state to give up its sovereignty claim. This could protect livelihoods and reduce encounters at sea. At home, however, governments may face accusations that cooperation concedes sovereign rights.
The case connects to Borders because maritime boundaries shape access, jurisdiction and sovereign rights. It relates to Environment through overfishing, reef damage and competition for marine resources. There is also a link to Technology: surveillance systems, coast-guard equipment and military capabilities influence deterrence and the likelihood of escalation.
HL.7.3
THE WIDER DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY
Security is closely tied to peace and conflict, but military threats are only part of the picture. People’s sense of security can also depend on cultural belonging, social cohesion and economic stability. Food, water and energy systems carry real political consequences: shortages, unequal access and dependence can make communities and states more vulnerable.
The Syrian conflict began in 2011 and displaced millions of people both inside and outside Syria. In 2015, large numbers travelled through Türkiye and the western Balkans towards European Union states. Germany became a major destination. It temporarily suspended the return of many Syrian asylum seekers to their first EU country of entry under the Dublin system.
This situation widened debates about what security involves. Refugees were seeking protection from war and persecution. In Germany, discussion focused on border management, public services, employment, cultural identity, social cohesion and terrorism. However, treating all displaced people as a security threat risked confusing their migration status with responsibility for violence.
In September 2015, Germany introduced temporary border controls. It later adopted measures designed to speed up asylum decisions and integration. The 2016 Integration Act expanded integration courses and training opportunities and imposed participation obligations, with sanctions in some cases. Germany also backed EU cooperation with Türkiye to reduce irregular movement into the EU.
The effects are still politically contested. Over time, many refugees entered education and employment, while municipalities and civil society built considerable capacity for integration. Yet housing, administration and public services came under pressure. Migration also became a major issue in German electoral politics. Some actors used terrorist attacks and individual crimes to portray migration as an existential threat, even though these claims often generalized from specific events to a diverse population.
The case shows securitization: an issue is presented as an exceptional security threat, making measures outside ordinary political practice appear necessary. Such framing can mobilize resources. It can also push humanitarian and rights-based perspectives aside.
Germany and the EU could create more predictable legal routes for asylum, family reunification and labour migration. They could also distribute reception responsibilities more consistently among member states. The main difficulty is securing agreement between governments that hold sharply different views on migration and sovereignty.
Germany could continue investing in housing, language education, schools and access to employment in municipalities receiving newcomers. These policies would address the social and economic security of refugees and established residents. However, they need long-term funding and may attract political opposition if people believe resources have been allocated unfairly.
This case connects directly to Borders, as national and EU border rules determine asylum responsibilities and freedom of movement. It also relates to Identity through debates over belonging, citizenship and cultural change. The links to Equality and Poverty are clear too: legal status and access to housing, education and employment shape refugees’ vulnerability and opportunities.
HL.7.4
INSECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGE
Human rights violations undermine personal security when they expose people to arbitrary detention, violence or exclusion. Governments may claim that some rights must be restricted to restore public order, but this creates conflict over proportionality, accountability and legitimacy. Political leaders may also build support by heightening fears about insecurity and portraying themselves as the only ones capable of ending it.
El Salvador has faced prolonged gang-related violence, particularly from MS-13 and Barrio 18. Previous governments relied on punitive “mano dura” policies. President Nayib Bukele went much further after a surge of killings in March 2022, adopting an extensive emergency strategy. On 27 March 2022, the Legislative Assembly declared a state of exception, which it then renewed repeatedly.
Under the emergency, certain constitutional protections were suspended or limited. This allowed the mass arrest of alleged gang members and collaborators. In 2023, a large new prison—the Terrorism Confinement Center—began receiving detainees. The policy became central to the government’s security narrative.
The government credits its emergency strategy with a dramatic fall in homicide. Independent observers generally accept that public violence declined substantially, as did the gangs’ visible territorial power. However, the transparency and comparability of official crime data remain disputed.
Those security gains have brought serious concerns about rights. Mass detention makes arrests based on weak evidence more likely. At the same time, restricted access to lawyers and due-process violations weaken protections against state error. Secrecy and overcrowding in detention facilities pose additional risks to physical security and health.
The strategy also strengthened Bukele politically. It boosted his popularity and reinforced his image as an effective leader. His re-election in February 2024 followed a constitutional controversy over presidential re-election, showing how reduced public insecurity could translate into electoral and institutional power. Gang violence clearly threatened security. The central question is whether indefinite emergency government remains necessary and proportionate.
El Salvador could continue targeted investigations into gang leadership while restoring individual judicial hearings, access to defence lawyers and independent review of detention. Doing so would separate public safety from indiscriminate punishment. However, the courts would need substantial capacity to review such a large volume of cases.
Another option would combine policing with witness protection, youth employment, education and community-based prevention in areas that gangs previously controlled. These policies may limit recruitment and tackle structural causes. They take longer to deliver visible results, though, so they provide fewer immediate political rewards.
The case connects to Equality because people in poorer communities face gang violence while also being more exposed to coercive policing. It relates to Poverty through exclusion, restricted employment opportunities and gang recruitment. There are links to Health as well: detention conditions and the psychological impact of violence affect individual well-being. The connection to Technology comes from the role of state messaging and social media in constructing the government’s security narrative.