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IB Syllabus Requirements for Environmental ethics
HL.c.1
Ethics and moral principles
HL.c.2
Environmental ethics
HL.c.3
Ethical frameworks and beliefs about nature
HL.c.4
Instrumental value
HL.c.1
ETHICS AND MORAL PRINCIPLES
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that focuses on moral principles and what behaviours are right and wrong. It offers ways to judge what people ought to do, rather than simply describing what they do.
An ethical code is a set of moral principles that guides decisions and behaviour. These codes are shaped by:
As a result, people may accept the same scientific evidence but still disagree about the morally appropriate response.
Ethical reasoning takes place in many settings around the world. Questions may involve:
Detailed knowledge of specific examples isn’t required here; ethical positions vary both among societies and within them.
Worked example: A community must decide whether to permit logging in a forest. Both sides accept evidence that logging would remove habitat and provide local employment. Explain how different ethical codes could lead to different decisions despite agreement about the evidence.
Answer: Agreement about the evidence does not guarantee agreement about what ought to be done. A code prioritizing livelihoods could support permitting logging, while a code prioritizing protecting organisms could support rejecting it.
HL.c.2
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Environmental ethics is a branch of ethical philosophy that addresses environmental issues. It considers how humans should act towards organisms, species, ecosystems, landscapes and other environmental entities.
During the 1960s and 1970s, environmental ethics gained prominence as awareness grew around pollution, species loss and other environmental problems. Many Western ethical traditions had focused mainly on duties between people. As a result, they didn’t always offer adequate ways to consider the moral status of non-human organisms or non-living environmental entities.
The question therefore shifts from “What environmental outcome benefits people?” to the broader issue of “Which entities deserve moral consideration, and why?” This change can shape approaches to conservation, pollution control and long-term sustainability.
HL.c.3
ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS AND BELIEFS ABOUT NATURE
An ethical framework is an organized approach that uses moral principles to judge actions or decisions. Frameworks and values don’t always lead to the same conclusions. They start from different beliefs about how humans relate to nature.
These perspectives don’t map neatly onto real people, who often combine ideas from more than one. Even so, the starting belief has a strong influence on the judgement reached. A person who views a forest as a community with worth of its own may support protecting the entire habitat. Someone who sees that forest mainly as a human resource may prefer managed extraction. A technocentric response might instead use monitoring, engineered restoration or off-site conservation.
Take a proposal to flood a valley for water storage. An ecocentric judgement may focus on the intrinsic value of the valley ecosystem. From a stewardship-based position, human need may be weighed against the duty to minimize damage. An extreme anthropocentric or technocentric judgement may favour the outcome with the greatest overall human benefit, trusting technology to compensate for any losses.
Environmental ethics shapes sustainability by deciding what is valuable, whose interests count and which solutions are acceptable. Ethical disagreements aren’t just about scientific facts. They also reflect the moral assumptions people use when interpreting those facts.
HL.c.4
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE
Instrumental value is the usefulness an entity has for humans. People value the entity because it provides a human benefit.
Instrumental value may come from:
A mangrove, for instance, has instrumental value when it supplies fish, reduces coastal erosion or supports local livelihoods. This doesn’t necessarily justify careless exploitation. Recognizing that humans depend on an ecosystem over the long term can support strong conservation, though the argument is still based on the ecosystem’s usefulness to people.
HL.c.5
INTRINSIC VALUE
Intrinsic value is the value one may attach to something simply for what it is. It doesn’t depend on providing humans with a useful product or service.
A non-living landscape might be valued for being wild, beautiful or culturally significant. A living organism may have value because the organized structures, processes and behaviour that make up its life allow it to survive and reproduce. On this view, its continued existence and well-being deserve respect.
Example: A remote landscape is valued intrinsically when its continued existence matters independently of human use or appreciation. Valuing the same landscape for visitors’ enjoyment of its beauty or for its cultural benefits to people is an instrumental, human-benefit argument. The reason for valuing the landscape—not the landscape itself—determines the category.
Arguments based on intrinsic value are usually linked to ecocentric perspectives. Environmental concern then extends beyond entities with a clear market price or an immediate use for humans.
HL.c.6
INSTRUMENTAL AND INTRINSIC VALUE ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE
Instrumental and intrinsic value aren't mutually exclusive. The same entity can be valued for what it is and for the benefits it provides to people. These labels describe different reasons for valuing something, rather than separate categories of entity.
Take a coral reef. It may have intrinsic value as a complex living community, while also having instrumental value through coastal protection and food provision. Tourism, education and scientific research add further instrumental value.
The distinction affects how policy is evaluated. Two groups might support the same protected area for different reasons. One wants to respect the ecosystem's own worth; the other wants to preserve its benefits for people. So, agreement over action doesn't always mean agreement over ethics. Different ethical starting points can also lead to the same sustainable response.
HL.c.7
MORAL STANDING
An entity has “moral standing” if it is to be morally considered with regard to how we ought to act towards it. Put more simply, an entity with moral standing must be considered in its own right, not treated merely as a tool for someone else.
To ask whether an entity has moral standing is to ask whether it can make a moral claim on others. The answer sets the boundaries of ethical responsibility:
Aldo Leopold's land ethic shows this broader ecocentric view. Conduct should be judged by whether it maintains the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. Here, the community itself is morally considerable, rather than only the humans who currently use it.
How far human moral responsibility towards the environment extends depends on which entities receive standing and which ethical framework is used. If only present human welfare matters, responsibility remains relatively narrow. It widens when animals, all organisms, ecological communities, non-living nature and future people are included.
Human power matters as well. Since human actions can transform ecosystems and affect people far into the future, many ethical positions give humans corresponding duties of restraint, stewardship or repair. The main disagreement is usually not whether humans have any responsibility, but how far it reaches and what should happen when claims conflict.
HL.c.8
THREE MAJOR APPROACHES OF TRADITIONAL ETHICS
Traditional ethics has three major approaches: virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics and rights-based (deontological) ethics.
The main difference is where each approach places moral judgement:
| Approach | Focus of moral judgement | Question to apply |
|---|---|---|
| Virtue ethics | The character and virtues of the person acting | What would a compassionate and responsible person do? |
| Consequentialist ethics | The results of the action | How do the overall harms compare with the benefits? |
| Rights-based ethics | Whether the action respects the rights of the entities involved | Does the action violate relevant rights? |
These approaches may lead to different answers to the same environmental dilemma. When deciding whether to remove an introduced predator, for example, a virtue ethicist might ask what a compassionate and responsible person would do. A consequentialist would weigh the overall harms against the benefits. A rights-based ethicist might consider whether killing the predator, or allowing native animals to be harmed, violates relevant rights.
A label alone doesn’t settle the issue. The framework needs to be applied clearly: identify what is being judged—character, consequences or rights—then explain how this leads to the conclusion.
Worked example: Explain why a consequentialist might support non-lethal removal of an introduced predator. Assume that removal protects native animals and causes less overall harm than either killing the predator or leaving it in place.
Answer: A consequentialist might support non-lethal removal because it protects native animals without killing the predator. Under the stated assumption, this produces a better overall balance of benefits over harms than the alternatives.
Worked example: Compare and contrast how virtue ethics and consequentialist ethics could support non-lethal removal in the same dilemma.
Answer: Both approaches could support non-lethal removal of the introduced predator. However, virtue ethics could justify it as expressing compassion and responsibility, whereas consequentialist ethics could justify it as producing the best overall balance of benefits over harms.
Common mistake: Naming a framework without applying its criterion leaves the reasoning undeveloped. “A consequentialist would remove the predator” needs an explanation of which consequences matter and why their balance supports removal.
HL.c.9
VIRTUE ETHICS
Virtue ethics focuses on the character of the person doing the action. It assumes that good people will do good actions and bad people will do bad actions. So the central question is “What kind of person should I be?” rather than just “Which rule should I follow?” or “Which outcome should I produce?”
In a person's relationship with the natural world, respect, compassion and responsibility may count as virtues. For instance, a responsible land manager would avoid preventable damage even if weak regulation made it legal. Here, the judgement rests on the character shown through the decision.
Sometimes virtues point in different directions. Compassion for an individual animal may clash with responsibility for an ecological community. Virtue ethics therefore still calls for careful reasoning about what virtuous conduct looks like in context.
HL.c.10
CONSEQUENTIALIST ETHICS
Consequentialist ethics is the view that the consequences of an action determine the morality of the action. If an action produces good consequences, it is judged good; if the consequences are bad, the action is judged bad.
A utilitarian approach is a form of consequentialist ethics that seeks the greatest common good. This involves weighing the likely benefits against the harms for everyone affected. In environmental decisions, the interests counted may include human health, animal welfare, ecosystem condition and effects on future people.
For a strictly consequentialist judgement, outcomes determine morality rather than intentions. A restoration project based on good intentions could still be judged wrong if it causes greater overall damage. By contrast, an unpleasant intervention could be justified when it prevents substantially greater harm.
Predicting and comparing those consequences is difficult. Outcomes may be uncertain, unfold over different timescales or affect entities whose well-being cannot easily be compared. These practical limits complicate how consequentialism is applied, but they do not alter its definition.
Worked example: In a hypothetical island reserve, invasive rats eat the eggs and chicks of threatened seabirds. Should managers leave the rats or attempt targeted removal using traps? Compare the likely consequences and justify a decision.
| Option | Affected entities | Likely benefits | Likely harms | Timescale | Uncertainty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No control | Rats, seabirds, future visitors | Avoids suffering caused by trapping; avoids control costs | Continued egg and chick losses could threaten the seabird colony | Immediate avoidance of trapping; repeated losses over breeding seasons | Whether the colony will persist |
| Targeted rat removal | Rats, seabirds, non-target animals, reserve managers | Reduced predation could allow seabird recovery | Rat suffering and deaths; accidental trapping of other animals; control costs | Immediate trapping harms; recovery over several breeding seasons | Removal may fail; rats may return; recovery is not guaranteed |
Compare the severity, duration and likelihood of these consequences, rather than simply counting how many benefits each option has. Animal suffering and the persistence of a seabird colony cannot automatically be converted into a single numerical total.
Answer: Targeted removal is preferable if it is likely to prevent the colony’s loss while keeping rat suffering and non-target harm as low as possible, because its expected long-term benefits outweigh the harms of intervention. This judgement acknowledges that killing rats causes suffering and remains conditional on uncertain removal success and seabird recovery.
HL.c.11
RIGHTS-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS
Rights-based ethical systems focus on the actions and whether they conflict with the rights of others. There is debate about what these rights might be. Another name for this approach is deontological ethics. In this category of ethics, actions are judged by duties or rules, rather than solely by their outcomes.
A rights-based judgement considers whether an action respects the relevant claims. For example, if a moral or religious rule gives animals a right not to be killed, killing them for food may be judged wrong—even when it benefits people. Similarly, if future generations have a right to a habitable environment, societies today may have a duty not to cause irreversible damage that affects them.
The main dispute concerns who or what can hold rights, and how to settle conflicts between those rights. Human rights to food, housing or development may clash with proposed rights of animals, species, rivers or future people. Rights-based ethics doesn’t eliminate these conflicts. Instead, it offers a particular basis for analysing them.
HL.c.12
THE APPEAL TO NATURE FALLACY
Some people hold the view that whatever is natural is correct or good. This position is contentious and is described as the “appeal to nature” fallacy. A fallacy is an error in reasoning that makes an argument unreliable.
“Natural” tells us about something’s origin or condition. On its own, it says nothing about moral goodness. Harmful diseases and toxins occur without human manufacture, as do predation and destructive natural hazards. By the same logic, an artificial intervention isn’t automatically wrong just because people created it.
Consider a native organism that transmits a serious disease. Being natural doesn’t prove that it must be protected, nor does it prove that it may be destroyed. Ethical judgement needs another framework, such as consequences, rights, virtues, moral standing or some combination of these.
Keep the reasoning separate. Evidence may establish that something is natural, but an ethical principle is still needed to decide what ought to be done about it.
HL.c.13
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS
Environmental movements and social justice movements arose from different histories. Increasingly, though, they pursue a shared goal: societies that are both equitable and just.
Social justice is a principle concerned with the fair distribution of rights, opportunities, resources and burdens within society. Environmental justice is an approach that seeks fair treatment and meaningful participation in environmental decisions and in the distribution of environmental benefits and harms. Equality gives each person the same allocation. Equity accounts for differences in needs, risks or power, recognizing that fair outcomes may require different levels of support.
Example: In a flood-adaptation programme, equality could mean giving every household the same grant for flood protection. Equity could mean providing more support to households with greater flood exposure, lower incomes or mobility barriers, such as funding accessible evacuation arrangements. Different allocations can pursue fairer protection because households do not face the same risks or have the same capacity to respond.
Some environmental thinkers draw parallels between claims of human superiority over nature and forms of human exploitation. In both cases, a supposedly superior group may use its power to dismiss the interests or rights of others. Similar patterns appear in sexism, racism and the disenfranchisement of social groups, although their histories and experiences aren’t identical.
The effects of environmental harm aren’t evenly shared. Communities affected by poverty, political exclusion or racial discrimination may have little influence over decisions, yet face greater pollution, dangerous work, displacement or reduced access to land and water. As a result, an environmental policy may improve an ecological indicator while still being socially unjust.
Example: In 1982, residents and civil-rights activists protested against a landfill for soil contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in a predominantly Black community in Warren County, North Carolina. The protests challenged the unequal burden of hazardous-waste disposal and demanded that affected residents have a meaningful voice in decisions. The case became a landmark in the US environmental justice movement, connecting civil-rights activism against racial discrimination with demands for fair environmental protection and community participation.
These movements increasingly overlap. Both challenge unequal power and seek to prevent vulnerable groups from bearing disproportionate costs. Their common goals include:
Environmental ethics shapes approaches to sustainability because it determines whose interests count and which values are considered. A policy concerned only with immediate human utility may favour short-term resource use. Recognizing intrinsic value can support protection regardless of profit, while granting moral standing to future generations supports long-term restraint. Virtue, consequences and rights offer different grounds for justifying particular actions.
A sustainable future has social as well as environmental dimensions. Policies are more likely to endure if they protect ecological systems and distribute responsibilities and benefits fairly. Ethical reasoning can’t replace scientific evidence. Instead, it guides how society uses that evidence, which trade-offs it accepts and who has a voice in the decision.
Worked example: Evaluate the claim that a protected area is a sustainable policy if it improves habitat condition but restricts local communities’ access to resources.
Answer: Improved habitat condition supports the protected area, but does not alone establish that the policy is sustainable, because restricting resource access may impose unfair costs on local communities. The policy is more defensible if affected groups meaningfully shape decisions and effective mitigation protects their livelihoods without undermining ecological gains.