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2.5: Early Modern states (1450–1789)

Master IB History 2.5: Early Modern states (1450–1789) with notes created by examiners and strictly aligned with the syllabus.

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IB Syllabus Requirements for Early Modern states (1450–1789)

2.5.1

Ascendancy and decline of states

2.5.2

Government, political organization and subjects

2.5.3

Rulers, ideology and legitimacy

2.5.4

Territorial expansion and integration

2.5.1

ASCENDANCY AND DECLINE OF STATES

Understanding ascendancy and decline

A state was in ascendancy when its rulers expanded their authority, territory, resources or influence. Decline wasn’t always followed by immediate collapse. A state could lose military or financial strength while its institutions and dynasty remained intact.

Several connected measures can be used to judge rise and decline:

  • control over territory and provincial elites
  • military effectiveness and access to firearms, ships or fortified positions
  • taxation, trade and the ability to obtain credit
  • political stability and orderly succession
  • legitimacy among subjects and influential groups
  • relations with neighbouring states

Spain: rapid ascent and uneven decline

When Isabella of Castile married Ferdinand of Aragon in 1469, they formed a dynastic partnership, not a fully unified state. Their reign increased the monarchy’s resources, strengthened royal justice and secured religious conformity. Charles V ruled Spain from 1516. Under him, and then Philip II, who succeeded in 1556, the monarchy took on extensive commitments in Europe and overseas.

Expansion brought vulnerability with it. Warfare depended on heavy borrowing, while revenues from silver encouraged reliance on imported goods and foreign creditors. Royal bankruptcies began recurring from 1557. The revolt in the Netherlands, war with England and continuing commitments across Europe placed the monarchy under further strain. Spain lost influence relative to rival powers during the 17th century, though the state and its overseas possessions endured. Decline, then, was comparative and prolonged rather than a single event.

Oyo: institutions behind expansion

From the 17th century, the Oyo Empire expanded in West Africa. Its ascendancy rested on cavalry, control of trade routes and tribute paid by subordinate communities. The Alaafin ruled with the help of powerful political bodies, including the Oyo Mesi, which also restrained his authority. This division of power helped organize the state, but it could create conflict at the centre too.

By the later 18th century, central control had weakened as officeholders struggled for power and the provinces became increasingly independent. Oyo shows how institutions that once balanced authority could later drive fragmentation.

Maratha power

Shivaji’s coronation in 1674 consolidated a Maratha kingdom in western India. Expansion relied on forts, mobile forces and systems for collecting revenue. After Shivaji died in 1680, Maratha resistance continued through a long conflict with imperial armies. Power passed increasingly to the peshwas and regional chiefs during the 18th century, producing a confederated political order. The Marathas continued to expand, but decentralization made united action harder.

2.5.2

GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND SUBJECTS

Methods and models of government

Early Modern governments took several forms, from centralized monarchy to composite monarchy and confederation. Even when rulers formally claimed supreme authority, they didn’t govern alone. Policy was shaped and carried out by courts, councils, provincial governors, religious authorities, landholders and corporate bodies.

A composite monarchy brought several territories under one ruler while leaving many of their separate laws and institutions in place. Spain followed this model. Castile and Aragon shared monarchs, but each retained different legal and fiscal arrangements.

Why political structures changed

Warfare, territorial growth, succession disputes, religious conflict and the need for revenue all drove changes in political organization. As states expanded, rulers often had to delegate authority because courts couldn’t directly administer distant provinces. Rebellion or military defeat, by contrast, might lead to tighter supervision, new taxes or administrative reform.

In Spain, royal councils, viceroys and local officials governed on behalf of the monarchy. Castile bore a particularly heavy fiscal burden because its representative institutions granted the crown more reliable taxation than those in several other territories. Efforts to spread military and financial obligations more evenly provoked resistance, including the Catalan Revolt beginning in 1640.

Maratha government followed a different path. Shivaji appointed central officers and organized land-revenue collection, though forts and local powerholders remained essential. During the 18th century, the peshwas emerged as the leading executive authorities. Meanwhile, chiefs such as the Holkars and Scindias gained substantial regional autonomy. The result was a confederated model rather than a single centralized bureaucracy.

In Oyo, the Oyo Mesi, along with religious and military officeholders, balanced the Alaafin’s authority. Provincial rulers paid tribute while retaining local authority. Government depended on negotiation as well as coercion.

Domestic policy and treatment of subjects

Domestic policies show whom a state protected, taxed or excluded. Governments regulated religion, property, labour, trade and public order. A subject’s treatment varied according to legal status, faith, occupation, gender and place of residence.

The Spanish monarchy worked through religious institutions and royal courts to enforce conformity and obedience. Restrictions on converts and religious minorities increased over time, culminating in the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609. Maratha rulers governed populations with several faiths and languages, so they generally kept existing local officers and negotiated revenue arrangements. In both cases, day-to-day administration could differ from the ruler’s public ideology.

2.5.3

RULERS, IDEOLOGY AND LEGITIMACY

What to examine in an individual ruler

Assess a ruler by looking at ideology, methods of rule, ambitions, achievements and failures. Legitimacy meant the accepted right to govern. It might come from dynasty, religion, conquest, coronation, law, ancestry or recognition by influential groups.

Legitimacy wasn’t merely ceremonial. Even a ruler with a strong hereditary claim could lose authority if they failed to reward supporters, defend territory or collect revenue.

Isabella I of Castile

Isabella claimed the throne of Castile in 1474, then defeated the supporters of a rival claimant in the War of the Castilian Succession. Her authority drew on hereditary right, her marriage to Ferdinand of Aragon, backing from important nobles and the monarchy’s religious presentation.

She strengthened royal justice and reduced some noble disorder, but worked through established institutions rather than abolishing them. Religious unity became central to royal ideology. The establishment of the Spanish Inquisition in 1478 and the expulsion of Jews in 1492 show both the coercive power and the human cost of this programme. Isabella strengthened the crown, though political unity remained incomplete because the component kingdoms kept separate institutions.

Shivaji

Shivaji gained power through warfare, alliances, control of forts and revenue administration. His coronation in 1674 turned military success into a public claim to sovereign kingship. Court ritual and Hindu political symbolism reinforced his legitimacy. At the same time, his state relied on pragmatic cooperation with officials and soldiers from varied backgrounds.

He created a durable political base and resisted larger neighbouring powers. Yet stable succession proved difficult, and the state continued to depend on military expansion and local commanders.

Afonso I of Kongo

Afonso I ruled Kongo from 1509 to 1542. Christianity supported both his legitimacy and his diplomatic relationship with Portugal. He promoted literacy, religious institutions and participation in Atlantic diplomacy while preserving the monarchy’s African political foundations.

His reign also revealed the limits of royal control. Portuguese traders and local interests took part in an expanding slave trade that the king couldn’t fully regulate. Afonso’s record may therefore be seen as cultural and diplomatic adaptation, but it also shows how engagement with overseas powers created serious internal pressures.

Judging success and failure

Rulers rarely deserve a simple verdict. A policy could strengthen the dynasty while harming subjects. Short-term expansion might lead to a succession crisis. An assessment should separate personal ambition from institutional change, and immediate achievement from long-term consequence.

2.5.4

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION

Assimilation and unification

Assimilation brought conquered or incorporated peoples into the political, legal or cultural practices of an expanding state. Unification placed territories under shared authority, though local laws and identities could survive.

States usually expanded for several overlapping reasons:

  • political security, prestige and control of strategic frontiers
  • access to taxation, farmland, labour and trade routes
  • defence or promotion of a religion
  • the ruler’s personal or dynastic ambition

These motives rarely operated separately. Religious language, for example, could justify campaigns that also brought revenue and strategic gains.

Dynastic unification in Spain

Uniting the Castilian and Aragonese crowns did not produce a uniform system of government. The territories kept many of their own laws, representative bodies and tax systems. To govern this collection of lands, the monarchy relied on councils and locally appointed officials. Shared dynasty and policy created unification, but not complete institutional assimilation.

Military conquest, marriage and inheritance all extended royal authority. The crown used Catholic conformity as a foundation for political unity, yet coercive religious policies alienated or displaced parts of the population. Spain shows how stronger territorial unity could exist alongside legal diversity.

Saadi Morocco

During the 16th century, the Saadi dynasty expanded its control across Morocco. At the same time, it resisted Portuguese coastal expansion and rival domestic claimants. Victory at the Battle of the Three Kings in 1578 strengthened the dynasty’s prestige and secured Ahmad al-Mansur’s rule.

Political and religious claims supported each other. The dynasty portrayed itself as a defender of Islam while pursuing control over trade and taxation. Even so, provincial administration still depended on governors, military forces and negotiated relationships with tribal and urban elites. The depth of territorial control therefore varied.

Maratha incorporation

Maratha expansion mixed direct government in core territories with tribute and negotiated authority elsewhere. Forts protected strategic points. Revenue demands—such as payments claimed from territories outside direct Maratha administration—spread Maratha influence without complete assimilation. During the 18th century, regional chiefs gained increasing autonomy within the broader Maratha political order.

Government after expansion

Conquering territory was often easier than integrating it. States had to survey land, collect revenue, settle disputes and manage cultural or religious differences. Some introduced uniform institutions, while others kept local elites and customs in place. Distance, the number of available officials and the risk of rebellion shaped this choice.

2.5.5

COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL EXPANSION

Rationales for overseas expansion

Colonial expansion brought overseas territories and populations under external control, often alongside settlement and economic exploitation. Imperial expansion pushed a state’s authority beyond its original territory through direct conquest, commercial control, tribute or dependent rulers.

Political rivalry often overlapped with the pursuit of commercial profit and religious ambition. Rulers wanted ports, naval bases and prestige. Merchants pursued commodities and protected markets, while missionaries sought converts. At times, private companies and settlers moved faster than governments could regulate them.

Portuguese Brazil

Portugal’s presence in Brazil began with coastal trading contacts and later developed into plantation colonization. In the 1530s, the crown introduced hereditary captaincies. When private administration proved uneven, it appointed a governor-general in 1549. Even so, municipal councils and large landowners kept considerable local influence.

Sugar production connected Brazil to Atlantic commerce and encouraged the forced transportation of enslaved Africans. Missionaries tried to convert Indigenous communities, while settlers demanded Indigenous land and labour. As colonial expansion continued, it reshaped settlement, labour systems and cultural relations. Crown authority still relied on negotiations with planters, officials, clergy and local militias.

The Dutch commercial empire in maritime Asia

Chartered in 1602, the Dutch East India Company held both commercial and governmental powers. It could make treaties, maintain armed forces, construct forts and administer conquered territory. Rather than pursuing uniform settlement across Asia, the company aimed to control strategic ports and profitable commodity networks.

Company officials relied on naval force, agreements with local rulers and restrictions on rival traders. Batavia, founded in 1619, became the centre of the system. Its government shows how a state could delegate imperial power to a commercial corporation. However, distance, corruption and the cost of warfare limited that control.

Portuguese Angola

In Angola, Portuguese authority developed around coastal settlements and military alliances with African political groups. Officials pursued captives, taxes and access to interior trade; missionaries promoted Christianity. Beyond the coast, control remained inconsistent and depended heavily on local allies and intermediaries.

This case warns against treating colonial rule as complete domination. Europeans often had superior maritime connections without secure control over inland societies.

Organization and effects

Colonial systems brought together governors, chartered companies, settler councils, military commanders, missionaries and local intermediaries. Their interests competed and shaped policy. Expansion redistributed land and redirected trade, producing new social hierarchies. Cultural exchange and religious change also followed, often under conditions marked by coercion, enslavement and demographic disruption.

2.5.6

MAINTAINING POWER AND SUPPRESSING OPPOSITION

Instruments of control

Early Modern rulers kept their authority through both consent and coercion. Their methods included:

  • armies, militias, forts and control of weapons
  • taxation and paid officeholding
  • patronage, honours and marriage alliances
  • courts, policing and surveillance
  • religious institutions and public ritual
  • censorship, exile, imprisonment and execution
  • negotiation with provincial and social elites

The balance between these methods mattered. Repression might remove an immediate opponent, but it could also create martyrs, deepen resentment or provoke rebellion.

Spain: institutions and conformity

The Spanish monarchy governed through royal councils, corregidores, courts and provincial officials. Noble cooperation was secured through offices and patronage at court. The Inquisition investigated religious nonconformity and enforced the boundaries of acceptable belief. Fear supported its authority, as did the cooperation of local informants and officials.

The monarchy didn't treat every opponent in the same way. Some disputes ended through negotiation or the recognition of legal privilege, while armed revolt led to military punishment. After the Comuneros were defeated at Villalar in 1521, Charles V consolidated his authority in Castile. Even so, he continued to govern with the cooperation of towns and elites. Coercion worked because political accommodation followed it.

Maratha methods

Maratha rulers depended on strategically located hill forts, mobile cavalry and intelligence networks. Revenue collection paid for military power. Grants and appointments bound commanders to the state, while local elites were often kept in place because their knowledge and influence were essential.

The system resisted invasion effectively and allowed rapid expansion. Yet it also left military chiefs with independent resources. A method that preserved power in the short term could therefore contribute to later decentralization.

Oyo and constitutional restraint

The Alaafin of Oyo exercised power through palace officials, provincial tribute and military authority. Royal power was checked by the Oyo Mesi. This wasn't opposition from outside the state; it was built into the political system. However, when relations between the institutions broke down, constitutional restraint could turn into a struggle for dominance.

Treatment of opponents

Rulers could incorporate, pardon, displace or destroy their opponents. Their choice depended on an opponent's resources and social position. Powerful nobles were often reconciled because rulers still needed them. Marginalized religious or ethnic groups, by contrast, were more exposed to collective punishment. The treatment of opposition reveals both the strength of state authority and its limits.

2.5.7

SUPPORT, OPPOSITION AND CHALLENGES TO POWER

Sources of support and opposition

Support usually came with conditions. Nobles, merchants, soldiers, clergy, local communities and officeholders backed rulers if they expected security, profit, status or religious protection. Yet those same groups could resist policies that threatened their privileges or brought new taxation.

Threats to power took several forms, including court conspiracies, tax revolts, provincial separatism, religious resistance and conflict among governing institutions. Whether they succeeded depended on their leadership and resources, how well they coordinated, and whether they could gain outside allies.

Revolt in Portuguese Brazil

The Beckman Revolt broke out in Maranhão in 1684. Settlers objected to a crown-backed trading company and to restrictions connected with Indigenous enslavement. Although the rebels removed local authorities, they failed to build wider or lasting support. Royal power returned and the leaders were punished. Even so, the crown altered aspects of the disputed arrangements.

The revolt failed, but it still shaped policy. It also exposed divisions in colonial society, since settlers, missionaries, officials and Indigenous communities pursued different interests.

The War of the Mascates was fought in Pernambuco from 1710 to 1711. It grew out of rivalry between indebted landowners in Olinda and merchants in Recife. Crown intervention eventually favoured Recife. The monarchy overcame the challenge partly because its opponents were divided by region and did not reject Portuguese rule as a whole.

Crisis in Kongo

Kongo was defeated at the Battle of Mbwila in 1665, where King António I was killed. His death intensified succession disputes. Rival noble factions, operating from different provincial bases, competed for the kingship and drew Kongo into a prolonged civil war. External commercial interests and the Atlantic slave trade made the conflict more destructive.

Royal power was restored in the early 18th century, but the monarchy’s reach remained weaker than before. Overcoming a challenge, then, did not necessarily restore the earlier political order.

Why challenges succeed or fail

Challenges had a better chance of success when they brought different groups together, gained military leadership, controlled revenue and presented a credible alternative government. Rulers survived when their opponents stayed divided. They could also use concessions to separate moderate critics from committed rebels.

Success needs careful measurement. A ruler might crush a rebellion while conceding its central demand. Rebels, meanwhile, could suffer military defeat yet weaken central authority for decades.

2.5.8

RIVALRIES, TENSIONS AND SUCCESSION

Rivalries within and between states

Territory, trade and religion all caused rivalries, as did competition for court influence and access to the ruler. Tensions at home often became entangled with those abroad. A disputed succession might draw in foreign powers, while war overseas could deepen factional conflict within a state.

Succession referred to the transfer of ruling authority after a ruler’s death, deposition or abdication. Hereditary systems reduced uncertainty, but only if the heir’s identity and legitimacy were widely accepted.

The Spanish succession crisis

In 1700, Charles II of Spain died without children. His will named Philip of Anjou as heir. Philip was a grandson of Louis XIV of France, and other European states feared that the French and Spanish crowns would become too closely connected. War followed: the War of the Spanish Succession lasted from 1701 to 1714.

The settlements associated with Utrecht in 1713 recognized Philip V as king of Spain, but required the French and Spanish crowns to remain separate. Spain gave up several European possessions. The Bourbon dynasty later reorganized the government, introducing measures that reduced some regional institutional differences. The crisis therefore changed the international balance as well as Spain’s internal political structure.

Maratha succession and faction

After Shivaji died in 1680, his descendants and rival court factions competed for power. His son Sambhaji succeeded him, but was captured and executed in 1689. Rajaram carried on the resistance. When Rajaram died, Tarabai governed on behalf of her son. Shahu’s later release introduced a rival claimant.

Even Shahu’s victory didn’t end the rivalry. Instead, it strengthened the peshwas, who became the main managers of state power. Through the succession conflict, practical authority shifted away from the royal house.

Morocco after Ahmad al-Mansur

Ahmad al-Mansur died in 1603, with no uncontested transfer of power. His rival sons and regional factions fought for authority, weakening the Saadi state. The fragmentation that followed shows how a ruler’s personal prestige could hide weak succession arrangements.

Managing succession

To reduce uncertainty, states used designated heirs, dynastic marriage, primogeniture, coronation and elite oaths. None of these guaranteed stability. Court rivalry could develop into civil or international war when rulers left minor heirs, had multiple marriages or died without an heir. Rival branches of a dynasty created the same danger.

2.5.9

RESISTANCE TO COLONIAL RULE AND COLONIAL COMPETITION

Forms of resistance

Colonized peoples resisted in many ways, from armed revolt, flight and sabotage to legal petitions, alliances with rival powers and the preservation of forbidden practices. They challenged taxation, forced labour, land seizure, religious interference or political subordination.

Complete independence wasn’t always the goal. Communities might instead try to restore local autonomy, remove an abusive official or protect their access to land.

Palmares and resistance in Brazil

Palmares grew in north-eastern Brazil from settlements founded largely by people who had escaped slavery. It survived through much of the 17th century despite repeated expeditions against it. Its communities farmed and traded while defending fortified settlements. Resistance, then, could involve building alternative political and social orders rather than simply opposing colonial authorities.

Portuguese and colonial forces destroyed the principal settlement in 1694, and Zumbi, an important leader, was killed in 1695. Although this defeat removed a major centre of resistance, escape, localized rebellion and opposition to slavery continued.

The Inconfidência Mineira conspiracy emerged in 1789 among members of the colonial elite in Minas Gerais. Resentment over taxation and debt prompted plans to separate from Portugal, but the conspiracy was exposed before an uprising could begin. A limited social base and internal divisions contributed to its failure.

Resistance to Dutch expansion in Java

Through treaties, military intervention and control of commerce, the Dutch East India Company expanded its power. Local rulers and communities responded differently. Some resisted; others allied with the company against regional rivals. Conflict with Banten reached a turning point when the Dutch intervened in an internal succession struggle in the early 1680s. By supporting Sultan Haji, the company helped reduce Banten’s independence and commercial influence.

Colonial power could therefore grow through the exploitation of local divisions, rather than through direct conquest alone.

The colonial race

European powers competed over ports, shipping routes, plantations and commodities. In the 1630s, the Dutch seizure of parts of Portuguese Brazil formed one part of a wider Portuguese–Dutch struggle across the Atlantic, Africa and Asia. Portuguese settlers and forces had recovered the Brazilian territories by 1654, though the Dutch kept important positions elsewhere.

This colonial rivalry encouraged fortification and naval warfare, as well as alliances with local rulers. It also opened opportunities for resistance because communities could seek help from a rival empire. A different colonial ruler, however, did not necessarily mean less exploitation.

Impact of rebellion and competition

Resistance made colonial governments spend money on troops, adjust policies and depend more heavily on local allies. Failed rebellions still exposed weaknesses and sometimes became symbols for later movements. Colonial wars shifted trade and transferred territories, but rarely created simple or permanent supremacy.

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2.4 Societies in transition (1400–1700)

2.6 Causes and effects of Early Modern wars (1500–1750)