This content can't be printed from the browser. Use Export PDF with Pro for an offline copy.
IB Syllabus Requirements for Emergence of the Americas in global affairs (1880–1929)
HL2.10.1
Reasons for United States expansionism
HL2.10.2
Causes and effects of the Spanish–American War
HL2.10.3
Big Stick, Dollar and moral diplomacy
HL2.10.4
The United States and the First World War
HL2.10.1
REASONS FOR UNITED STATES EXPANSIONISM
Between 1880 and 1929, the United States extended its influence beyond its continental borders through territorial acquisition, naval power, trade, investment and political intervention. Key developments included the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, victory over Spain in 1898, the acquisition of overseas territories, the Open Door policy in China and repeated intervention in the Caribbean and Central America.
Expansion had no single cause. Political, economic, social and ideological motives supported one another, though their importance differed from case to case.
As continental settlement neared its final stages, political leaders began to look outward. They also wanted the United States to be recognised as a major power capable of competing with European empires.
Naval strategists argued that national power required a modern fleet, overseas bases and control of strategic sea routes. The United States expanded its navy during the 1880s and 1890s and pursued overseas bases, including Pearl Harbor and, after the Spanish-American War, Guantánamo Bay. Interest in an isthmian canal reflected commercial as well as military priorities. A canal would allow faster movement between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Security in the western hemisphere provided another motive. US leaders interpreted the Monroe Doctrine more broadly over time, claiming a special responsibility to prevent European intervention in the Americas. The doctrine gradually shifted from a warning against new European colonization to a justification for US regional leadership.
Domestic politics played a role too. Overseas action could unite voters, display presidential authority and draw attention away from economic conflict at home. Expansion was never universally accepted, however, as opposition from the Anti-Imperialist League made clear.
Industrial growth increased demand for raw materials, investment opportunities and overseas markets. The severe depression beginning in 1893 strengthened the argument that foreign commerce could absorb surplus production and safeguard future prosperity.
In many areas, business interests wanted access rather than formal colonies. The Open Door notes of 1899 and 1900 called for equal commercial access to China. In the Caribbean and Central America, US banks and companies invested in railways, mines, plantations and government debt. Strategic policy often moved in afterwards to protect those investments.
Economic explanations cannot be treated as automatic. Trade with some territories was too limited to explain annexation on its own. Strategic and nationalist concerns often influenced where and when economic pressure led to political action.
Supporters presented expansion as evidence of national vitality. Social Darwinist ideas transferred concepts of competition and the “survival of the fittest” from biology to relations between peoples and states. Some Americans therefore saw imperial rivalry as natural. They feared that the United States would decline if it failed to take part.
Racial assumptions allowed expansionists to portray English-speaking, white Americans as especially capable of government. Protestant missionaries and reformers also claimed that US influence could spread Christianity, education and supposedly modern institutions. These arguments gave moral language to policies that also served strategic and commercial aims.
Ideas linked to Manifest Destiny continued after continental settlement. Expansion was presented as the spread of an exceptional political system. Critics, however, argued that ruling overseas peoples without their consent conflicted with republican self-government.
Economic interpretations focus on industrial production, markets and investment. Strategic interpretations place more emphasis on naval development, bases and the canal. Cultural interpretations highlight race, religion and national mission, while political accounts focus on rivalry with European powers and domestic leadership.
The most convincing explanation brings these factors together. Expansion became possible because the United States had growing industrial and naval capacity. Leaders found it attractive because they saw commercial and strategic advantages. Ideas of national superiority and civilizing responsibility then helped make it publicly defensible.
HL2.10.2
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE SPANISH–AMERICAN WAR
The Spanish–American War began in the context of Cuba’s revolt against Spanish rule. Cuban forces renewed their independence struggle in 1895. Spain answered with General Valeriano Weyler’s reconcentration policy, forcing rural civilians into controlled settlements. Disease and hunger spread, and civilian deaths increased US sympathy for the Cuban cause.
US interests in Cuba were significant, though not united. Businesses held investments and trade connections on the island, while instability put property and commerce at risk. Some investors wanted Spain to restore order. Others decided that Spain was unable to secure Cuba.
Humanitarian sympathy and support for Cuban independence put pressure on the US government to intervene. Newspapers linked to William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer used sensational reports to highlight Spanish brutality. This “yellow press” intensified public feeling, but it did not determine government policy on its own.
Strategic and economic concerns also influenced US leaders. Cuba controlled approaches to the Gulf of Mexico and lay near the route of a possible Central American canal. They wanted to avoid prolonged instability and did not want another European power intervening so close to the American mainland.
The publication of the de Lôme letter in February 1898 caused outrage. In it, the Spanish minister Enrique Dupuy de Lôme had criticized President William McKinley. The explosion of the battleship USS Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February had a greater impact. Although its cause remained uncertain, the deaths of 266 men led to demands for war and accusations against Spain.
McKinley first tried to negotiate. Spain offered concessions, but it did not provide an immediate settlement acceptable to the United States. In April 1898, Congress passed the Teller Amendment, which disclaimed any intention to annex Cuba, and authorized intervention. Spain declared war, and the United States followed with a declaration made retroactive to 21 April.
The war grew out of several connected pressures: the Cuban rebellion, humanitarian and nationalist feeling, strategic and commercial interests, and the collapse of diplomacy. The Maine explosion hastened the crisis, but it did not create all of its underlying causes.
The fighting took place in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. On 1 May 1898, Commodore George Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in the Philippines. US forces later worked with Filipino revolutionaries against Spanish rule.
In Cuba, US forces landed near Santiago. Fighting at El Caney and San Juan Heights in July helped force the Spanish fleet out of Santiago harbor, where US forces destroyed it. Spain soon sought peace. Disease killed more US troops than combat did, exposing serious weaknesses in military organization despite the rapid victory.
The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 December 1898, ended the war. Spain relinquished Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. The United States purchased the Philippines for $20 million.
Cuba became formally independent in 1902, but the Platt Amendment of 1901 limited its sovereignty. The amendment gave the United States a basis for intervention, restricted Cuba’s freedom to make treaties and manage its finances, and allowed the leasing of Guantánamo Bay. US forces occupied Cuba again from 1906 to 1909.
Puerto Rico became a US possession. The Jones Act of 1917 granted its inhabitants US citizenship, but the island did not become a state. Spanish authority had therefore been replaced by different forms of US control.
The annexation of the Philippines created a major colonial commitment. Filipino nationalists had expected independence, so they resisted US rule in the Philippine–American War beginning in 1899. The conflict exposed the contradiction between supporting Cuban independence and refusing to grant immediate independence to the Philippines.
Guam and the Philippines drew the United States deeper into Pacific and Asian affairs. Along with Hawaii’s annexation in 1898, these acquisitions created a chain of strategic positions across the Pacific.
The victory made the United States an overseas imperial power and strengthened its position in the Caribbean. It also encouraged demands for a canal linking the oceans.
The acquisition of the Philippines sparked a major debate in the United States. Expansionists argued that the islands had strategic and commercial value and that the United States had a duty to govern them. Anti-imperialists responded that colonial rule violated consent of the governed and could draw the republic into costly foreign conflicts.
Spain lost the main remaining parts of its American and Pacific empire. The defeat prompted national reflection on political weakness and imperial decline.
Historians disagree about whether 1898 represented a sudden imperial departure or an extension of earlier continental expansion. The acquisition of distant colonies was new in scale and form, but it built on older beliefs in Manifest Destiny, strategic expansion and racial hierarchy.
HL2.10.3
BIG STICK, DOLLAR AND MORAL DIPLOMACY
The presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson are linked to the Big Stick, Dollar Diplomacy and moral diplomacy. Their language and methods differed, but each administration asserted a leading US role in the Caribbean and Central America.
Big Stick diplomacy combined negotiation with the clear threat or use of military power. Roosevelt believed diplomacy worked best when backed by credible force.
The creation of Panama showed this approach in action. Colombia rejected a canal treaty, and Panamanian separatists declared independence in November 1903. US naval forces stopped Colombia from suppressing the revolt. The United States quickly recognized Panama, while the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty gave the United States control of the Canal Zone. Construction began in 1904, and the Panama Canal opened in 1914.
Announced in 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine claimed that chronic instability or failure to meet international obligations could justify US intervention. Roosevelt presented the policy as a way to prevent European powers from intervening to collect debts.
In the Dominican Republic, the United States took control of customs collection in 1905 to supervise debt payments. US involvement helped keep European creditors out, but it reduced Dominican financial sovereignty. Roosevelt also intervened in Cuba from 1906 under the authority claimed through the Platt Amendment.
The policy tightened US control of the approaches to the Caribbean and protected the canal route. Latin American critics saw it differently. To them, it was coercive imperialism and proof that the Monroe Doctrine served US domination rather than collective hemispheric defence.
Dollar Diplomacy used loans, investment and financial supervision to advance US strategic and political influence. Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox hoped private capital would promote stability and reduce the need for direct military action.
Nicaragua exposed the coercive side of the policy. The United States opposed President José Santos Zelaya and supported his removal in 1909. US bankers then gained influence over customs, banking and transport. Political conflict returned, and US Marines landed in 1912. Apart from a short interruption, they remained until 1933.
Taft also encouraged US participation in foreign loans outside the Caribbean. This included efforts to join the international banking consortium financing railway construction in China. Dollar Diplomacy produced uneven results. US investors did not always accept the risks policymakers expected, and financial penetration often needed military protection.
Its impact was contradictory. The policy expanded US economic influence, but it did not reliably create stability or remove the need for armed intervention. Recipient states could view loans and customs supervision as limits on their sovereignty.
Moral diplomacy favoured governments Wilson considered constitutional and democratic instead of supporting regimes simply because they protected US interests. Wilson initially promised a more principled relationship with Latin America.
In practice, his moral judgments led to extensive intervention. Wilson refused to recognize General Victoriano Huerta after Huerta seized power in Mexico in 1913. Following the Tampico incident, US forces occupied Veracruz in 1914, which increased Mexican hostility. After Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916, General John J. Pershing led a punitive expedition into Mexico. The expedition failed to capture Villa and strained relations with the government of Venustiano Carranza.
Wilson ordered the occupation of Haiti in 1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916. US authorities controlled finances, influenced government and used Marines to suppress resistance. Wilson also maintained US involvement in Nicaragua.
| Policy | Preferred instrument | Main objective | Principal impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Big Stick | Naval pressure and military intervention | Strategic control and regional order | Canal construction and a broader US claim to intervene |
| Dollar Diplomacy | Loans, investment and financial supervision | Stability favourable to US commerce and security | Greater financial influence, often backed by Marines |
| Moral diplomacy | Diplomatic recognition and intervention justified by political principles | Promotion of governments acceptable to Wilson | Intervention in Mexico and prolonged occupations in the Caribbean |
These policies changed the emphasis rather than forming separate systems. Roosevelt used strategic language, Taft focused on finance and Wilson appealed to constitutional morality. Even so, all three administrations placed the sovereignty of smaller states below US definitions of order, stability and responsible government.
Supporters argued that intervention limited European influence, protected trade and restored financial order. Critics pointed to resentment, armed resistance and lasting suspicion of the United States. The main consequence was the consolidation of US regional predominance alongside deepening anti-US nationalism in Latin America.
HL2.10.4
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR
When war broke out in Europe in August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson declared US neutrality. This reflected the country’s long-standing wish to avoid European wars. The US military was also unprepared, and taking sides risked dividing a population that included German, Irish and other European communities.
Neutrality did not make US trade impartial. British naval power restricted trade with the Central Powers, while trade with the Allies increased sharply. American banks, particularly J. P. Morgan and Company, provided Britain and France with substantial loans and credits. By 1917, Allied purchasing had helped the US economy recover and had tied American financial interests to an Allied victory.
Germany’s submarine campaign challenged US claims to neutral trading and travel rights. On 7 May 1915, the sinking of the British liner Lusitania killed 128 US citizens. Wilson protested, but he did not enter the war. Germany later issued the Sussex Pledge in 1916, promising to restrict attacks on passenger and merchant shipping.
Wilson campaigned for re-election in 1916 as the leader who had kept the country out of war. Meanwhile, the preparedness movement pushed for military expansion. The National Defense Act of 1916 enlarged both the army and the National Guard.
Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917. German leaders calculated that they could defeat Britain before US intervention became effective. The policy put American ships and citizens at direct risk and challenged the principle of freedom of the seas.
The Zimmermann Telegram made the case for war stronger. Published in the United States in March 1917, it disclosed a German proposal for an alliance with Mexico if the United States entered the conflict. Germany promised Mexico support in recovering territory lost to the United States. The telegram’s effect was psychological and political rather than military, since Mexico was poorly placed to wage such a war.
The Russian Revolution of March 1917 and the fall of the tsar made it easier for Wilson to present the conflict as a defence of democracy. Submarine attacks then sank several US merchant vessels. Wilson asked Congress to declare war on 2 April, and the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917.
Germany’s decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare was the chief reason for US entry. Economic links and sympathy for the Allies formed the wider background. The Zimmermann Telegram and Wilson’s democratic language then helped mobilize public and congressional support. The claim that bankers alone caused intervention is too narrow: financial interests mattered, but Germany’s immediate actions turned pressure into war.
The Selective Service Act of May 1917 introduced conscription. Commanded by General John J. Pershing, the American Expeditionary Forces grew quickly and fought as a distinct US force. American troops became increasingly important in 1918, including at Saint-Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.
US industry, food production, credit and shipping greatly increased Allied resources. American forces entered large-scale combat relatively late, but their arrival raised Allied morale and convinced German leaders that time was against them.
Wilson presented the Fourteen Points to Congress on 8 January 1918. The programme called for more open diplomacy, freedom of navigation, reduced trade barriers and armaments, adjustments to colonial claims, national self-determination in specified European cases and a League of Nations.
These ideals aimed to create a peace based on international rules rather than a traditional balance of power. Their application was inconsistent. Self-determination was neither defined universally nor extended equally to colonized peoples.
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Wilson personally headed the US delegation. He secured the inclusion of the League of Nations Covenant in the Treaty of Versailles. He also accepted compromises demanded by Britain and France, including German territorial losses, military restrictions and reparations arrangements. Critics at home argued either that Wilson had given up too much of his programme or that the treaty involved the United States too deeply in international commitments.
The Constitution required approval by two-thirds of the Senate. Republicans had taken control of the Senate in the 1918 elections. Wilson had also weakened bipartisan cooperation by leaving leading Republicans off the peace delegation.
Opposition to the treaty was divided. A small group of “irreconcilables” rejected League membership in principle. Reservationists, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, were willing to accept the treaty with conditions. Their main concern was Article X of the League Covenant. It required members to respect and preserve one another’s territorial integrity and political independence. Critics feared that this could weaken Congress’s constitutional authority to decide on war.
Lodge proposed reservations to limit US obligations. Wilson refused to accept changes that he believed would undermine the League. He then undertook a national speaking tour from September 4 to October 2, 1919. On October 2, he suffered a severe stroke, which reduced his ability to negotiate.
The Senate rejected the treaty in November 1919 and again in March 1920. Neither Wilson’s preferred version nor the treaty with the Lodge reservations gained the required two-thirds majority. The United States therefore made a separate peace with Germany in 1921 and never joined the League of Nations.
The failure was not simply caused by “isolationism.” Many senators supported international involvement but disagreed over its constitutional form. Wilson’s inflexibility, Lodge’s political opposition, partisan conflict and genuine concern about Article X all played a part.
The war altered the balance of power in the Americas. As European financial power weakened, the United States became a major creditor. Its industrial output, navy and overseas influence expanded, while Britain and other European states were less able to challenge US predominance in the western hemisphere.
The conflict also widened Washington’s security role. The United States coordinated hemispheric trade, shipping and diplomacy. It expected neighbouring states to support its interpretation of neutrality and, later, belligerency. Its wartime strength reinforced earlier claims to Caribbean leadership.
Refusing to join the League did not mean withdrawing from world or hemispheric affairs. During the 1920s, the United States remained active through finance, naval agreements and diplomacy. The war therefore confirmed US hemispheric predominance, even though the country rejected Wilson’s preferred system of permanent collective security.
HL2.10.5
CANADA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Canada entered the First World War after Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914. As a self-governing dominion, Canada decided the form and extent of its contribution. However, it still lacked the constitutional authority to make a separate decision about war and peace.
Several factors encouraged Canada to become heavily involved. Many English-speaking Canadians maintained close cultural and political ties with Britain. They viewed defending the empire as a national duty, and participation became a way to demonstrate loyalty to the British Empire.
Strategic and ideological motives mattered too. Germany was presented as a danger to British institutions and the international order. Taking part in the war also gave Canada an opportunity to show that it was becoming a mature nation. Support was weaker among French Canadians. Many felt little attachment to Britain or France and rejected the idea that Canada had an unlimited obligation to the empire.
Canada formed the Canadian Expeditionary Force from volunteers. The first contingent sailed in October 1914 and trained in Britain before moving to the Western Front. Canadian troops fought at the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915, on the Somme in 1916 and at Vimy Ridge in April 1917.
Vimy Ridge later became central to Canadian national memory. All four Canadian divisions fought together under Canadian Corps command. The victory showed that Canadian forces were becoming more effective, although it was part of the wider British-led Battle of Arras rather than a separate Canadian campaign.
Canadian forces went on to fight at Passchendaele in 1917 and in the offensives of 1918, including actions that began at Amiens. Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie became commander of the Canadian Corps in 1917. He stressed careful preparation, coordination with artillery and limited objectives.
Canada also provided naval patrols and air personnel. The small Royal Canadian Navy guarded coastal waters, while thousands of Canadians served in British flying services. Merchant shipping and railway connections helped move food, equipment and troops.
Canada supplied wheat, timber, metals and manufactured munitions. The federal government set up new bodies to coordinate production and finance. War bonds and new taxation helped cover expenditure. More women entered munitions, clerical and other paid work, although these changes did not end established gender inequalities.
As casualties increased, voluntary enlistment fell. Borden decided that conscription was needed to maintain the Canadian Corps and introduced the Military Service Act in 1917. The measure sharply divided the country. Much of English-speaking Canada strongly supported it, while Quebec opposed it intensely. Critics there argued that the government was forcing Canadians to fight an imperial war.
The 1917 election focused on conscription. Borden formed a Union government with pro-conscription Liberals and won a large majority. Quebec, however, overwhelmingly rejected the policy. The dispute revealed linguistic, cultural and regional divisions that voluntary participation had partly hidden.
Canada provided troops, food, raw materials, ships, credit and industrial production. Its involvement developed from a mainly voluntary imperial expedition into comprehensive, state-directed mobilization, with conscription and extensive economic regulation.
Military success and sacrifice strengthened demands for a more independent international position. Borden insisted on separate Canadian representation at the Paris Peace Conference. Canada signed the Treaty of Versailles and entered the League of Nations in its own name. It remained linked to the British Empire, but participation in the war accelerated its move towards greater diplomatic autonomy.
HL2.10.6
WARTIME IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The United States and Canada provide a useful comparison of the First World War’s impact. Both experienced industrial mobilization, a larger federal role and social conflict. However, Canada had been fighting since 1914 and suffered proportionately greater military losses, while the United States entered in 1917 and emerged with far greater financial power.
| United States | Canada |
|---|---|
| Allied demand helped end the depression that had begun in 1913–14. Exports of food, weapons and manufactured goods increased before formal entry. | Demand for wheat, timber, metals and munitions expanded production and tied the economy more closely to the imperial war effort. |
| The United States shifted from being a net debtor towards becoming a major international creditor. New York grew in financial importance as European states borrowed heavily. | War expenditure increased public debt and encouraged new federal revenue, including the 1917 income tax and taxes on business profits. |
| Federal agencies coordinated transport, food, fuel and industrial output. After 1918, the government dismantled these controls quickly, which contributed to difficult readjustment. | The state supervised munitions, transport and food more closely than before. Manufacturing expanded, especially in central Canada, although the benefits varied by region. |
| Wartime prosperity was followed by inflation, labour unrest and a sharp depression in 1920–21. Expansion returned in the later 1920s, but agriculture remained in prolonged difficulty. | Inflation and unemployment contributed to post-war unrest. Because the economy depended on exports, it remained vulnerable to changes in world demand during the 1920s. |
In both countries, mobilization expanded the federal government’s economic role. The main difference was scale. The United States became the hemisphere’s leading creditor and industrial power, while Canada increased its productive capacity but carried a heavier relative burden of debt and casualties.
In the United States, the federal government took on extensive temporary powers. The Selective Service Act introduced conscription, while agencies such as the War Industries Board coordinated mobilization. The Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918 restricted opposition to the war. Socialist leader Eugene V. Debs was imprisoned after giving an anti-war speech.
The war also triggered a political reaction. Republicans gained control of Congress in 1918, the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles, and voters elected Warren G. Harding in 1920 on a promise of a “return to normalcy.” Overseas activity did not end, but support for Wilson’s model of collective security weakened.
In Canada, the conscription crisis reshaped party politics. Borden’s Union government won the 1917 election, although the campaign widened the divide between Quebec and much of English-speaking Canada. Wartime measures also increased federal authority through censorship, internment, conscription and economic regulation.
Canada’s contribution strengthened its claim to political autonomy. Separate representation at Paris, its own signature on the Treaty of Versailles and membership in the League of Nations gave Canada a more distinct international personality, even though its constitutional ties to Britain remained.
US mobilization accelerated internal migration. Large numbers of African Americans moved from the rural South to industrial cities in the North and Midwest during the Great Migration. They found more employment opportunities, but also faced housing discrimination, hostility at work and racial violence, including the “Red Summer” of 1919.
Demand for labour also encouraged migration from Mexico. At the same time, wartime nationalism created suspicion of German Americans. Government propaganda encouraged conformity, while German-language teaching and cultural activities came under pressure.
Women’s wartime employment and public service strengthened the campaign for political rights. Ratified in 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment prohibited denying the vote on grounds of sex. Discriminatory state laws still prevented many African American women in the South from voting.
Canada also saw work patterns change as women entered munitions factories, offices and voluntary organizations. Their wartime service strengthened the suffrage cause. Most women gained the federal vote in 1918, although racial exclusions remained and the change did not create full social or economic equality.
Conscription deeply divided Canadian society. French-English tension grew sharper and culminated in anti-conscription violence in Quebec City in 1918. The government also interned thousands of people classified as enemy aliens, many of them immigrants from territories ruled by the Central Powers.
Labour conflict grew after the armistice. The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 reflected inflation, poor working conditions and demands for collective bargaining. Its suppression showed how governments and employers often viewed labour militancy through fears of revolutionary radicalism.
For the United States, the war brought greater financial and diplomatic influence, but the country showed an uneven willingness to accept permanent obligations. The rejection of the League limited Wilson’s programme, although the United States remained internationally active. It hosted the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22, pursued repayment of Allied debts and used private loans to support European stabilization.
In the Americas, weaker European influence combined with greater US financial strength to reinforce US predominance. Investment and intervention in the Caribbean and Central America continued. During the 1920s, however, the language of policy gradually became less openly coercive.
Canada’s foreign policy became more separate from Britain’s. League membership offered a distinct diplomatic forum. In 1923, Canada negotiated and signed the Halibut Treaty with the United States without a British counter-signature. The King–Byng crisis of 1926 and the Balfour Report of the same year further confirmed the equality in status of Britain and the dominions.
The war expanded state power and disrupted both societies. It encouraged industrial production, women’s political participation and a larger international role. It also produced repression, racial or linguistic division and labour unrest.
The international results were different. The United States emerged as the dominant economic and strategic power in the hemisphere. Canada gained greater autonomy and diplomatic recognition, but not comparable material power. The war therefore raised both countries’ international standing while preserving a clear hierarchy between them.