Resistance as a calculated choice

African resistance did not follow automatically from European intrusion. Rulers and communities weighed what they might lose, considered whether negotiation was still possible and judged whether armed action had a realistic chance of success. Their decisions could shift with circumstances. A ruler might negotiate to buy time, resist once demands became intolerable, then collaborate after military defeat.

Determination to preserve independence

Resistance became more likely when European demands threatened sovereignty, land, taxation, political authority or control of trade. Menelik II rejected the Italian interpretation of the Treaty of Wuchale, which would have reduced Ethiopia to protectorate status. The Asante resisted repeated British attempts to control Kumasi. In 1900, Governor Frederick Hodgson’s demand to sit on the Golden Stool, a central symbol of Asante nationhood, helped provoke the uprising.

Conduct of the colonizing power

Brutality and inflexibility could leave little room for accommodation. German seizure of land and cattle, settler violence and coercive rule helped provoke the Herero uprising in 1904. Colonial ultimatums also pushed people towards resistance when they demanded disarmament, tribute or the surrender of political authority.

Political structures

Centralized states could mobilize soldiers, supplies and taxation on a large scale. However, subordinate groups might resent the central government, while succession disputes could divide the leadership. Less centralized societies often struggled to coordinate unified action. At the same time, dispersed authority could help sustain prolonged guerrilla warfare.

Military strength and firearms

Leaders had to measure their forces against those of the colonizing power. Large armies and knowledge of local terrain still mattered, but European troops increasingly had machine guns, modern artillery, railways and reliable supply systems. Access to modern rifles and ammunition therefore became crucial. Ethiopia acquired substantial quantities of weapons before Adwa, whereas French pressure progressively restricted Samori Ture's access to firearms.

No single factor decided the outcome. Resistance had the best prospects when political unity, effective leadership, adequate weapons and favourable diplomacy supported one another. It was most likely to fail when internal division combined with European technological and logistical superiority.

The challenge from Italy

Menelik II became emperor of Ethiopia in 1889. That same year, he signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Italy. The dispute centred on Article 17. In the Italian version, Ethiopia had to use Italian diplomatic channels. The Amharic version made this optional. Italy used its translation to claim that Ethiopia was an Italian protectorate. Menelik rejected the claim and repudiated the treaty in 1893.

In 1895, Italian forces moved from Eritrea into northern Ethiopia. Menelik called on regional rulers to mobilize, while Empress Taytu took on an important political and logistical role. On 1 March 1896, Ethiopian forces defeated an Italian army commanded by General Oreste Baratieri at the battle of Adwa. Later that year, the Treaty of Addis Ababa recognized Ethiopian independence.

Reasons for success

• Political leadership: Menelik won the support of major regional leaders and presented the conflict as a defence of Ethiopian independence. This allowed him to assemble a very large army, despite continuing internal rivalries.
• Modern weapons: Ethiopia had imported rifles, ammunition and artillery from several European suppliers. Its forces therefore had more than traditional weapons.
• Diplomacy: Menelik took advantage of rivalries among European powers and secured arms without becoming dependent on a single patron.
• Logistics and preparation: Ethiopian forces organized supplies and prevented the Italians from making an easy advance. Italy, in contrast, was operating at the end of a difficult supply line from Eritrea.
• Italian errors: Baratieri advanced with inadequate maps and split his army into separate columns. Around Adwa, Ethiopian forces could overwhelm these columns one at a time.
• Geography and local knowledge: Ethiopian commanders knew the difficult highland terrain better than the invaders.

Interpreting the victory

Military historians stress Ethiopian numbers, armaments and Italian operational mistakes. Political interpretations give more weight to Menelik's coalition-building and diplomatic skill. Neither explanation is enough on its own. Adwa resulted from effective state leadership, which turned material and geographical advantages into a decisive battlefield victory.

Samori Ture and the struggle against France

Samori Ture established the Wassoulou Empire in West Africa and led Mandinka resistance to French expansion from the early 1880s until 1898. France wanted control of the interior and of the trade routes connecting the upper Niger region with the coast. Samori responded with a mixture of warfare, negotiation and carefully timed withdrawals.

His forces were fighting the French by 1882. The Treaty of Bissandugu, signed in 1887, temporarily set out spheres of control. Neither side, however, treated the agreement as permanent. As French pressure grew, Samori moved his state eastwards, used scorched-earth tactics and rebuilt his power. French troops eventually captured him at Guélemou in 1898. He died in exile in 1900.

Reasons for temporary success

Samori kept a disciplined standing army. Its core troops were known as sofas. Through trading networks, he obtained modern firearms and established workshops that could repair weapons. His forces used mobile tactics and their knowledge of the terrain to avoid defeat. Moving his political centre also stopped France from securing a quick victory.

Diplomacy played a major part too. Samori negotiated when he needed to, used treaties to buy time and tried to avoid fighting all his enemies at once. A centralized administration helped him mobilize soldiers and supplies.

Reasons for eventual failure

French forces had greater long-term resources, artillery and increasingly secure communications. As France expanded towards the coast, Samori found it harder to obtain imported rifles and ammunition. Years of warfare damaged agriculture and reduced the population that supported his army.

Samori also faced resistance from communities absorbed into his empire. He could not build a permanent united front with other African states. His eastward movement brought conflict with new populations and enemies. Once France coordinated its columns and blocked any further retreat, mobility was no longer an effective defence.

Some interpretations focus on France's overwhelming material superiority. Others point to the limits of Samori's state, especially its coercive rule and the difficulty of keeping people loyal across an empire that was expanding and constantly moving. His long resistance shows considerable military and diplomatic success, but he lacked the resources to defeat France permanently.

The Herero uprising

Tensions in German South West Africa grew as settlers took Herero land and cattle. At the same time, colonial authorities imposed a harsher racial order. Samuel Maharero led the Herero uprising in January 1904. Their first attacks disrupted German settlements, but they did not destroy every communication line. Germany was still able to send reinforcements.

General Lothar von Trotha then took command of the German forces. He defeated the Herero at Waterberg in August 1904. German troops forced survivors towards the Omaheke desert and cut them off from water. In October 1904, von Trotha issued an extermination order. It stated that every Herero found in German South West Africa—whether armed or unarmed, and whether they had cattle or not—would be shot. The survivors were later held in concentration camps, where they faced forced labour, disease and extreme deprivation.

Nama resistance

Nama communities began a separate uprising in October 1904. Hendrik Witbooi was their most prominent leader. The Nama used smaller, mobile forces and guerrilla tactics that suited the terrain better. Resistance continued after Witbooi was killed in 1905. Leaders such as Jacob Morenga kept the struggle going, and fighting continued into 1908.

Reasons for failure

• German military superiority: Reinforcements, machine guns, artillery and trained troops gave Germany a decisive advantage in major engagements.
• Communications and supply: German control of ports, railways and telegraph lines allowed sustained campaigning and replacement of losses.
• Water and geography: Control of wells was decisive in an arid environment. The expulsion of the Herero into the desert turned retreat into catastrophe.
• Lack of coordinated action: The Herero and Nama did not begin a unified uprising at the same time. Germany could therefore concentrate first on the Herero and then on the Nama.
• Leadership losses: The deaths or capture of experienced leaders weakened prolonged resistance.
• Extreme colonial violence: Extermination, imprisonment, forced labour and the destruction of livelihoods attacked the civilian population as well as armed fighters.

African military weakness alone does not explain the failure of resistance. Germany relied on industrial resources and communications, as well as a deliberate policy of collective destruction now widely understood as genocide.

Cetshwayo's kingdom

Cetshwayo became Zulu king in 1872. He inherited a centralized kingdom supported by a powerful regimental system. Yet the kingdom stood alongside the expanding British colonies and Boer settlements of southern Africa. British officials increasingly saw an independent, militarized Zulu kingdom as an obstacle to their plans for regional confederation.

In December 1878, High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere issued Cetshwayo an ultimatum. Among its demands was the dismantling of key parts of the Zulu military system. The terms were deliberately framed in a way the king was unlikely to accept. British forces invaded Zululand in January 1879 without authorization from the British government.

Conquest in 1879

On 22 January, the Zulu victory at Isandlwana destroyed a large British column. It showed how disciplined mass attack could defeat a badly deployed enemy. The victory did not end the invasion. Britain sent reinforcements, used more cautious tactics and drew on its advantages in firearms, artillery and supply.

The main Zulu army was defeated at Ulundi on 4 July 1879. Cetshwayo was captured in August. British victory therefore depended less on effortless technological superiority than on Britain's ability to recover from the initial disaster and commit greater imperial resources.

Destruction of the kingdom

The British divided Zululand among thirteen appointed chiefs. This destroyed the kingdom's central authority and encouraged conflict between rival groups. Cetshwayo was allowed to return to part of Zululand in 1883, but civil war continued. He died in 1884. Britain declared Zululand British territory in 1887, and annexed it to Natal in 1897.

Responsibility and significance

One interpretation presents the war as a response to a Zulu military threat. A stronger explanation points to Frere's determination to remove an independent African state that obstructed British confederation. Cetshwayo made efforts to negotiate, while British officials presented the war as a response to a perceived Zulu threat. The kingdom was destroyed through battlefield defeat and the political fragmentation Britain imposed afterwards.

Causes of repeated conflict

Asante resistance centred on defending sovereignty, controlling trade routes and maintaining influence over the Gold Coast. Britain sought secure authority along the coast, protection for allied coastal peoples and greater commercial and strategic control. When the Dutch forts, including Elmina, were transferred to Britain in 1872, Asante lost a trading partner. The dispute then became sharper.

The war of 1873

Asante forces invaded the coast in December 1872 and remained entrenched in the British protectorate throughout 1873. Britain responded by sending an expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley. After defeating Asante forces at Amoaful, British troops occupied and burned Kumasi in 1874. Under the Treaty of Fomena, Asante had to pay an indemnity and withdraw its claims over coastal territories.

The Asante were trying to preserve their southern influence and access to coastal trade. Britain intervened to protect its coastal position and end Asante power south of the Pra River. Britain won the war, but it did not yet impose permanent direct control over the Asante heartland.

The intervention of 1896

By the 1890s, Britain feared French expansion in West Africa and wanted firm control of the interior. Asantehene Prempeh I rejected demands that would have weakened Asante independence. However, internal divisions and memories of 1874 made organized military resistance less likely. British troops occupied Kumasi in 1896, arrested Prempeh and other leaders, and sent them into exile.

The war of 1900

In 1900, Governor Frederick Hodgson demanded the Golden Stool, the sacred embodiment of Asante unity and authority. Yaa Asantewaa, queen mother of Ejisu, led the uprising that followed. Asante forces besieged the British at Kumasi, but imperial reinforcements eventually defeated the resistance. Britain annexed Asante in 1901.

Reasons for resistance and intervention

The Asante resisted to defend their political independence, territory, trade and the Golden Stool. Britain intervened because of coastal security, commercial interests, rivalry with other European powers and its desire to remove an independent state from the colonial interior.

Material explanations focus on Britain's firearms, reinforcements and communications. Political explanations point to the gradual weakening of Asante unity and Britain's use of local rivalries. The three confrontations show a clear progression: Britain limited Asante influence in 1873–74, occupied its capital in 1896, and imposed colonial rule after the 1900 uprising.

Collaboration as political strategy

Collaboration did not always signal approval of colonial rule. African rulers often worked with Europeans to retain as much authority as possible in dangerous circumstances. This could be a deliberate strategy, but agreements made between unequal powers often led to outcomes very different from what African leaders had expected.

Pragmatism

A ruler might decide that European military strength made resistance too costly. Cooperation could postpone annexation, preserve a dynasty or secure recognition against internal rivals. Leaders also turned to one European power for help against another external threat.

Willingness to negotiate

Collaboration became more likely when a colonial power seemed prepared to recognize an African ruler, define protected territory or govern through existing institutions. British protectorate agreements could appear to leave more space for local authority than outright conquest. Their wording, though, could hide the extent of the sovereignty being transferred.

Expected gains

Possible benefits included:

• protection against neighbouring states, settlers or rival European powers;
• confirmation of a ruler's political position;
• access to trade, weapons, education or missionary support;
• economic advantages for rulers, chiefs or merchants;
• support against domestic opponents.

The benefits were not shared equally. Chiefs who gained new offices or land settlements might support cooperation, even when farmers, pastoralists or political rivals paid the costs.

Lack of an alternative

Some rulers collaborated after resistance had failed. Others lacked the army, weapons or political unity required to fight. Their choice was often limited accommodation or immediate dispossession, rather than colonial rule or complete independence.

Historians differ on whether particular collaborators defended their peoples or pursued their own interests. The two motives could exist at the same time. The key issue is the balance between short-term gains—security, office and protection—and long-term consequences such as lost sovereignty, land alienation and dependence on colonial officials.

Lewanika of Barotseland

Lewanika, ruler of the Lozi kingdom in Barotseland, looked to Britain for protection against several threats. These included Portuguese expansion, Ndebele power, European concession seekers and challenges to his authority within the kingdom. He expected an agreement with Britain to safeguard his position and the territory of the Lozi.

In 1890, Lewanika accepted the Lochner Concession, negotiated on behalf of Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company. The agreement gave the company extensive mineral and commercial rights in exchange for promised protection and payments. Language differences and contrasting political assumptions played a crucial role. Lewanika believed he was securing protection, while the company treated the concession as permission for wide-ranging intervention.

Company rule then expanded, and Barotseland became part of North-Western Rhodesia under the Order-in-Council promulgated in November 1899. Lewanika kept his prestige and some local authority, but he did not gain the independent protected relationship he had expected. His collaboration was therefore pragmatic, although it brought a substantial loss of sovereignty.

Khama III of the Bamangwato

Khama III sought British support against Ndebele power, Boer expansion and the possibility that his territory would come under less acceptable outside control. His Christian identity and links with missionaries also made cooperation with Britain seem useful, both politically and culturally.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate was declared in 1885. Khama accepted British protection but opposed transferring control to the British South Africa Company. In 1895, he travelled to Britain with Sebele I and Bathoen I to campaign against company rule. The delegation secured the continuation of imperial, rather than company, administration in the protectorate.

Comparing their collaboration

Both rulers turned to Britain for security while trying to protect their political positions. Neither gave up power without negotiation. Khama was more successful in limiting company control because he combined missionary connections, public campaigning and cooperation with other rulers. Lewanika negotiated from a more isolated position and signed a concession whose terms the company used to justify expanding its authority.

Their experiences show the ambiguity of collaboration. It could preserve leadership and offer protection, but the imbalance of power allowed Britain or its chartered company to reinterpret agreements and reduce African sovereignty.

Mwanga and political instability

Kabaka Mwanga II became ruler of Buganda in 1884. He inherited a centralized kingdom but faced competing Muslim, Catholic and Protestant factions linked to foreign missionaries and traders. He feared that converts placed religious loyalties and outside connections above obedience to the kabaka.

Mwanga's persecution of converts, including the executions remembered as the Uganda Martyrs in 1885–87, strengthened opposition rather than restoring control. In 1888 Muslim chiefs deposed him. He returned in 1889 with Christian assistance, but factional conflict continued.

British intervention and Mwanga's resistance

Captain Frederick Lugard of the Imperial British East Africa Company supported the Protestant faction. In 1892 the company's Maxim gun helped the Protestants defeat their Catholic rivals, making the Protestant chiefs the strongest political group. Britain declared a protectorate over Uganda in 1894.

Mwanga initially accommodated the new order but rebelled against British authority in 1897. The revolt failed, and he was deposed. After further resistance he was captured and exiled in 1899.

Mwanga failed because religious and political divisions prevented a united defence of royal authority. His earlier persecution had alienated influential chiefs, while Britain possessed superior weapons and could rely on local collaborators. His changing course between suppression, alliance, accommodation and revolt also made it difficult to build stable support.

Apolo Kagwa and collaboration

Apolo Kagwa emerged as a leading Protestant chief and became katikkiro, or chief minister. He collaborated with Britain because British support strengthened the Protestant chiefs, offered security after years of civil conflict and allowed Buganda's institutions to survive within the protectorate.

Kagwa helped negotiate the Uganda Agreement of 1900. The agreement recognized the young Kabaka Daudi Chwa II, defined Buganda's administration and distributed land under the mailo system. It gave leading chiefs substantial estates and offices, tying their authority to the colonial order.

Reasons for failure and success

Mwanga's resistance failed because he faced internal factionalism, loss of elite support and British military superiority. Kagwa's collaboration succeeded in the narrower sense that it preserved Buganda's monarchy and gave Protestant chiefs land and administrative power.

That success had limits. Buganda lost external sovereignty, British officials held ultimate authority and the land settlement favoured chiefs over many ordinary cultivators. Political interpretations therefore differ: Kagwa may be viewed as protecting Buganda through compromise, but also as helping create a colonial system from which his faction benefited.