The rise of the Zulu

Shaka became ruler of the Zulu in 1816. He rose to power during a period of competition among the chiefdoms of south-eastern Africa, especially the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo and the Ndwandwe under Zwide. After Dingiswayo died, Shaka defeated rival groups and absorbed many of their people into an enlarged Zulu state.

Shaka strengthened royal power by reorganizing institutions that already existed instead of creating a completely new military system. Young men were placed in age-based regiments, or amabutho. They lived in royal settlements and served under commanders loyal to the king. Military service weakened the independence of local chiefs and gave Shaka a force capable of campaigning over greater distances.

Zulu tactics relied on disciplined formations, rapid movement and close combat. The short stabbing spear and large shield became closely associated with this way of fighting. Intelligence and logistics also mattered, as did the incorporation of defeated communities. Cattle captured in war enabled Shaka to reward supporters and strengthen relationships of dependence.

The Zulu kingdom rested on coercion as well as integration. Some conquered groups kept their local leaders under Zulu authority. Others were dispersed or placed directly under royal officials. Shaka’s methods created a powerful state, but repeated campaigning and the concentration of royal authority also caused resentment. He was assassinated in 1828 and succeeded by Dingane.

The Mfecane/Difaqane

Mfecane/Difaqane refers to the period of warfare, migration and political reconstruction that affected much of southern Africa during the early 19th century. “Mfecane” comes from a Nguni term, while “Difaqane” is the corresponding Sotho usage.

Historians still dispute its causes. Older interpretations placed Zulu expansion at the centre of a chain reaction in which communities displaced by Shaka attacked or displaced others. This accounts for part of the violence, but it becomes misleading when every regional development is treated as a consequence of one ruler.

A broader explanation brings together several pressures:

• competition among expanding African states for cattle, land and followers;
• population movement and local environmental stress;
• demand for ivory and enslaved people through coastal trading networks;
• the ambitions of leaders who used military reorganization to build states;
• pressure from European settlers and raiders moving beyond the Cape frontier.

The consequences varied just as much. Some communities lost population, cattle and settlements. Migrating groups founded new states, including the Ndebele and Gaza kingdoms. Other rulers gathered refugees into more defensible political communities. The period was destructive, but it also brought state formation and social recombination.

Historians disagree about the balance between African political competition and external commercial or colonial pressures. The strongest interpretation connects these forces: Zulu expansion mattered, but it operated in a region already being reshaped by trade, migration and settler intrusion.

Moshoeshoe and the rise of the Sotho

Moshoeshoe emerged as a Sotho leader during the upheavals of the 1820s. He first established a defended community at Butha-Buthe, then moved to the mountain stronghold of Thaba Bosiu in 1824. Its defensible position helped his followers withstand raids, while access to the surrounding pasture supported cattle keeping.

His state expanded through inclusion as well as conquest. Moshoeshoe accepted refugees, incorporated displaced groups and often allowed subordinate chiefs to keep local authority. Under the mafisa system, cattle were lent to dependants. This helped rebuild livelihoods and strengthened political loyalty at the same time.

Moshoeshoe also relied on diplomacy. He kept in contact with neighbouring African rulers, welcomed missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society in 1833 and used their literacy and external connections during negotiations. Rather than depending on continuous warfare, he sought to balance relations with the Zulu, British authorities, Griqua communities and Boer settlers.

Conflict with the Orange Free State over land intensified during the 1850s and 1860s. The Sotho retained Thaba Bosiu but lost substantial territory. Moshoeshoe requested British protection, and Basutoland became a British protectorate in 1868. This restricted complete independence, but it prevented annexation by the Orange Free State and preserved a distinct Sotho political territory.

Shaka and Moshoeshoe represent contrasting yet overlapping forms of state building. Both used military organization and control of cattle. Shaka relied more heavily on centralized regimental power, while Moshoeshoe’s authority rested more on defensive geography, incorporation and diplomacy.

Conditions before the jihad

Usman Dan Fodio was a Fulani Muslim scholar and preacher, born in 1754. He worked in the Hausa state of Gobir, where he criticized rulers for taxation, corruption, warfare and religious practices he considered inconsistent with Islam. His teaching drew in Fulani pastoralists, Hausa peasants, scholars and members of the commercial classes.

Several causes came together. Religious reformers wanted a government based more closely on Islamic law. Pastoral Fulani communities opposed the taxes and restrictions imposed by Hausa rulers. Peasants and other dependants had material grievances. At the same time, Yunfa, the ruler of Gobir, increasingly persecuted Usman’s followers.

Jihad and state formation

In 1804, Usman and his followers left Gobir in a migration that gave the movement a clear political identity. Usman was proclaimed commander of the faithful, and the jihad against Gobir and other Hausa rulers began. Supporters received flags authorizing them to conduct campaigns in different regions.

Between 1804 and 1808, the movement captured major Hausa centres. Gobir’s capital, Alkalawa, fell in 1808, while Sokoto became the political centre of the new caliphate. Expansion continued through a network of emirates that stretched across much of what is now northern Nigeria and into neighbouring regions.

The caliphate was not a tightly centralized modern state. Emirs governed their own territories, collected taxes and administered justice, while acknowledging the caliph’s religious and political authority. Usman divided major responsibilities between his brother Abdullahi and his son Muhammad Bello. When Usman died in 1817, Bello became caliph at Sokoto. Abdullahi exercised authority from Gwandu in the west.

Government and society

The rulers tried to apply Islamic law through judges, scholars and officials. Taxes included the zakat required by Islam, along with levies on land, livestock and trade. Written correspondence linked the centre to the emirates, though practical authority depended heavily on local rulers and military power.

The caliphate supported scholarship and produced works on theology, law, government and education. Usman’s daughter Nana Asma’u became an important scholar and organizer of women’s religious education. Sokoto and the emirate capitals grew into centres of learning and manuscript production.

Agriculture, craft production and long-distance commerce expanded under the security provided by the emirate system. Kano remained an especially important manufacturing and trading centre. Commercial routes connected the caliphate with the Sahara, the Niger region and other parts of West Africa.

Effects and limitations

The jihad replaced many Hausa dynasties with Fulani-led emirates, although Hausa officials, merchants and social practices continued to influence the region. It created the most populous polity in 19th-century West Africa and inspired related reform movements elsewhere.

Its effects were not uniformly liberating. Warfare created large numbers of captives, and enslaved labour became fundamental to agriculture and elite wealth. Taxation and local inequalities continued, while some emirates remained considerably independent from Sokoto.

Interpretations vary according to the emphasis placed on different causes. Religious interpretations present the jihad mainly as a campaign for Islamic reform. Social and economic interpretations highlight pastoral grievances, taxation and the interests of disadvantaged groups. Political interpretations focus on the replacement of fragmented Hausa states by a more extensive emirate system. The movement succeeded because its religious, social and political aims reinforced one another.

Commerce and political organization

In the 19th-century Niger Delta, the interior of West Africa was linked to Atlantic commerce. Once the overseas slave trade declined, palm oil and palm kernels became the principal exports. European firms wanted to reach producers directly. African brokers, meanwhile, tried to keep control of inland routes and prices.

Politics in the Delta often revolved around trading “houses”. These were more than family groups. They were commercial and political organizations that included relatives, dependants, clients and enslaved people. A successful house controlled canoes, armed retainers and warehouses, and maintained links with producers inland. Trade wealth could then be turned into political and military power.

Jaja of Opobo

Jaja was born in the Igbo interior and taken to Bonny as an enslaved child. He rose through the Anna Pepple House to become one of Bonny’s leading palm-oil merchants. His career shows that the house system allowed exceptional social mobility, even though it remained built on hierarchy and dependence.

Commercial rivalry led to civil conflict in Bonny. In 1869, Jaja and his supporters left and founded Opobo in a strategically valuable position near the palm-oil markets of the Imo River. By controlling access to producers, Jaja diverted trade away from Bonny and turned Opobo into a major commercial state.

Jaja tried to trade directly with European buyers while stopping them from bypassing his agents. This strengthened Opobo, but it also brought him into conflict with British officials and merchants who supported “free trade” on terms that favoured European firms. In 1887, a British consul invited Jaja aboard a warship, arrested him, and sent him for trial and exile. Opobo’s independence was severely weakened as a result. Jaja died in 1891 while returning from exile.

Nana Olomu and the Itsekiri

Nana Olomu became a leading Itsekiri merchant in the western Niger Delta and was appointed governor of the Benin River in 1884. He led a trading organization that connected European firms on the coast with Urhobo and other producers in the interior. His fleet of war canoes, along with his network of dependants, helped him control access to these markets.

Like Jaja, Nana depended on keeping the middleman’s role in African hands. British traders and officials accused him of obstructing commerce and breaking agreements. Disputes over customs, prices and access to the interior led to a British military expedition in 1894. British forces attacked Nana’s settlements, and he surrendered before being exiled to the Gold Coast.

Significance

The careers of Nana and Jaja show that Niger Delta states acted as commercial powers. They were not passive participants in European trade. African rulers adapted existing political institutions to the palm-oil economy, built up naval power and negotiated directly with foreign merchants.

Their defeat also signalled a change in European involvement. At first, British merchants relied on African brokers. By the late 19th century, imperial officials were increasingly using treaties, gunboats and military expeditions to remove those brokers and impose direct political control.

Economic explanations focus on competition for market access and profit. Political explanations stress Britain’s determination to end independent African control of strategic waterways. These explanations cannot be separated: commercial disputes became the justification for imperial intervention.

Background to unification

In the early 19th century, Ethiopia was divided among regional nobles during the period known as the Zemene Mesafint, or “Era of the Princes”. Emperors still held religious and dynastic importance, but provincial rulers controlled armies, taxation and territory. To unify the country, rulers had to defeat regional rivals while also building workable relationships with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and provincial elites.

Tewodros II, 1855–1868

Kassa Hailu rose from the north-western borderlands by defeating regional nobles in battle. After a series of victories, he was crowned Emperor Tewodros II in 1855. His aims were to restore effective imperial authority, create a disciplined national army and reduce the autonomy of provincial rulers.

Tewodros sought to replace unreliable feudal levies with soldiers who depended on the crown. At Gafat, he established workshops to manufacture artillery and employed European artisans. He also tried to reform taxation and restrict the extensive landholdings of the Church.

These policies met strong resistance. A permanent army placed heavy demands on local communities, while nobles and clergy defended their privileges. Rebellions weakened Tewodros’s effective control, and he became increasingly severe in his treatment of opponents.

A diplomatic dispute with Britain resulted in Tewodros detaining the British consul and other Europeans. In 1868, a British expedition led by Robert Napier advanced to Maqdala. After his defeat and the fall of the fortress, Tewodros took his own life. His centralizing programme failed in the short term, but he made reunification the central objective of Ethiopian government.

Yohannes IV, 1872–1889

Kassa Mercha of Tigray defeated his rivals and was crowned Yohannes IV in 1872. He pursued unity more cautiously than Tewodros. Powerful regional rulers kept considerable autonomy in return for tribute and military support. The result was a looser, negotiated political structure centred on the emperor’s authority.

Yohannes also defended Ethiopia against repeated external threats. His forces defeated Egyptian invasions at Gundet in 1875 and Gura in 1876. These victories protected Ethiopian independence and supplied captured modern weapons. In 1878, Yohannes forced Menelik of Shoa to recognize his authority, although Menelik kept substantial regional power.

Religious unity provided another means of rule. At the Council of Boru Meda in 1878, Yohannes promoted doctrinal conformity within the Orthodox Church and pressed Muslim and other communities to convert. This strengthened one basis of imperial identity, but it also produced coercion and resentment.

Under the Hewett Treaty of 1884, Ethiopia helped the withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons threatened by the Mahdists. Conflict with the Mahdist state followed. Yohannes was mortally wounded at the battle of Metemma in 1889, giving Menelik the opportunity to claim the throne.

Menelik II to 1900

Menelik, king of Shoa and emperor from 1889, combined conquest and diplomacy with access to imported firearms. Even before becoming emperor, he had expanded south and east into Oromo, Sidama and other territories. His forces brought fertile land, trade routes and tax-paying populations into an enlarged empire.

Addis Ababa, established as a permanent capital in the 1880s, became the political centre of the expanding state. Menelik ruled through appointed officials, allied regional rulers and tributary arrangements. Control remained uneven. Many subject peoples experienced conquest through taxation, land alienation, forced service and, in some areas, slavery, alongside new commercial connections.

Menelik signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Italy in 1889. Italy interpreted the Italian version as making Ethiopia an Italian protectorate, while the Amharic version did not require Menelik to conduct foreign relations through Italy. Menelik rejected the Italian interpretation, and war followed.

At Adwa on 1 March 1896, Menelik’s large, well-armed army decisively defeated the Italian invasion. Empress Taytu and major regional commanders played important roles in mobilization. Later that year, the Treaty of Addis Ababa recognized Ethiopian sovereignty.

The character of Ethiopian state building

Tewodros pursued direct centralization but provoked resistance. Yohannes maintained unity through negotiated regional authority. Menelik combined regional alliances with territorial expansion and greater access to imported arms. Together, they transformed Ethiopia from political fragmentation into a larger and internationally recognized empire.

The process can be understood both as national unification and as imperial conquest. From the viewpoint of the Christian highland monarchy, it restored and defended an Ethiopian state. For many southern communities, however, it imposed new rulers, tribute and military occupation. Both perspectives are needed to understand the consequences of expansion.

Origins of the Mahdist movement

From approximately 1821 to 1885, the Turco-Egyptian regime governed much of Sudan. It had been established after Muhammad Ali’s conquest, which began in 1820. Egyptian officials imposed taxes and interfered with local power structures. At different times, they profited from slave trading while also trying to restrict it. Corruption and the behaviour of some officials intensified hostility towards the government.

Muhammad Ahmad, a religious teacher born in 1844, proclaimed himself the Mahdi in 1881. In Islamic belief, the Mahdi is a divinely guided leader expected to restore justice and true religion. Muhammad Ahmad denounced the Egyptian administration and called for Islam to be purified.

His message attracted a wide range of supporters. Religious followers viewed him as a reformer. Tribal leaders wanted to regain autonomy, while merchants and slave traders opposed Egyptian policies. Ordinary communities were angry about taxes and official abuses. Religious expectations therefore combined with political, social and economic grievances.

Military rise

The government’s first attempts to arrest or defeat Muhammad Ahmad failed. His followers, known as the Ansar, seized weapons and gained prestige through victory. In 1882, the Mahdists captured El Obeid. They then destroyed an Egyptian army commanded by William Hicks in November 1883.

These victories brought much of western and central Sudan under the movement’s control. British policy favoured evacuating exposed Egyptian garrisons rather than reconquering Sudan. General Charles Gordon was sent to organize the withdrawal, but he became besieged in Khartoum.

On 26 January 1885, Mahdist forces captured Khartoum and killed Gordon. The victory destroyed Egyptian authority in the capital and established an independent Mahdist state. Muhammad Ahmad died in June 1885, only months after the city fell.

The Khalifa’s state

Abdallahi al-Ta’aishi, usually called the Khalifa, succeeded Muhammad Ahmad. He made Omdurman the capital and tried to transform a revolutionary movement into a functioning government. The state was divided into administrative regions. The bayt al-mal, or public treasury, collected taxes and controlled resources.

The Khalifa depended on the Ansar army and promoted supporters from western Sudan, especially the Baqqara. This reinforced his position, but it also created rivalry with the Mahdi’s relatives and early followers. The government dealt harshly with rebellions and suspected opposition.

The state faced prolonged warfare, disrupted cultivation, epidemic disease and famine. Maintaining a large army placed greater demands on the population. Trade continued, although external conflict and internal controls restricted economic recovery.

Mahdist forces fought neighbouring Ethiopia and defeated an Ethiopian army at Metemma in 1889, where Yohannes IV was killed. They also faced Italian forces and threatened Egypt. These campaigns extended the state’s military commitments beyond its resources.

Defeat and significance

In 1896, an Anglo-Egyptian army under Herbert Kitchener began the reconquest of Sudan. Railways, river transport, artillery and machine guns provided major logistical and technological advantages. At Omdurman on 2 September 1898, the Mahdist army suffered a decisive defeat. The Khalifa escaped but was killed at Umm Diwaykarat in 1899.

The Mahdist state ended Turco-Egyptian control for more than a decade and established a government independent of direct European rule. It also provided a powerful religious language for uniting diverse grievances.

Historians interpret its character in different ways. One view emphasizes an anti-imperial struggle against foreign government. Another sees it mainly as an Islamic revival and revolution. A third focuses on competition among Sudanese groups and the coercive nature of the Khalifa’s rule. The movement combined all three elements: a religious revolution, a revolt against Egyptian domination and a state-building project that created its own conflicts.

Mandinka Empire under Samori Toure

Samori Toure built a Mandinka empire, often known as the Wassoulou Empire, in the western Sudan during the second half of the 19th century. His rise rested on commercial experience, military organization and control of routes linking the interior to sources of firearms near the West African coast.

Samori organized a standing army that included sofa infantry soldiers. Commanders and provincial authorities governed conquered territories, collected tribute and supplied troops. He also used Islam to strengthen the government. However, efforts to impose stricter religious practice sometimes provoked resistance among subject communities.

French expansion from Senegal led to sustained conflict. Samori responded with a mixture of battles, negotiation, territorial retreat and the eastward relocation of his state. During withdrawals, he sometimes destroyed crops and settlements so French forces could not use them. His mobility delayed the conquest, but local populations paid a heavy price. French troops captured him in 1898, ending his empire.

Lozi kingdom under Lewanika

From 1878, with interruptions, Lewanika ruled the Lozi kingdom in the upper Zambezi region. Lozi political authority centred on the Litunga, the king, and on the Barotse floodplain. Royal officials collected tribute, supervised labour and governed communities beyond the centre.

Lewanika regained power in 1885 after internal conflict. He strengthened the monarchy by appointing loyal officials, although his authority still depended on negotiation with established elites and subordinate peoples. The kingdom supported itself through cattle, agriculture, fishing and regional trade.

Ndebele pressure, European missionaries and competing colonial interests led Lewanika to seek external protection. In 1890 he signed the Lochner Concession, believing that an agreement with the British South Africa Company would make his kingdom more secure. Company representatives interpreted it as permission for extensive commercial and political control. Lewanika kept his throne, but the agreement weakened the kingdom’s sovereignty and shows how differently colonial treaties could be understood by the parties involved.

Ndebele kingdom under Mziklikazi and Lobengula

Mziklikazi broke with Shaka in the 1820s and led his followers north through the interior. After fighting African rivals, Boer commandos and other migrating groups, he established the Ndebele kingdom in south-western Zimbabwe during the late 1830s and early 1840s.

The state relied on age-based regiments and settlements shaped by Nguni political practice. Conquered and incorporated peoples provided tribute, cattle and military service. The kingdom was not ethnically uniform. Its strength lay in organizing several communities around the king and the regimental system.

Lobengula became king in 1870. He maintained trade and diplomacy with hunters, missionaries and concession seekers, while pressure from the British South Africa Company continued to grow. In 1888 he signed the Rudd Concession. The company used its wording to claim extensive mineral rights.

Company forces invaded in 1893. Their firearms, including machine guns, defeated Ndebele regiments. Lobengula disappeared while fleeing and is generally believed to have died in early 1894, although the exact circumstances remain uncertain. Ndebele and Shona resistance resumed in 1896–1897, but company control survived. The state fell because of deceptive concessions and a severe imbalance in military resources, not because its leaders lacked diplomacy.

Asante Empire under Osei Tutu

Osei Tutu’s foundational reign came before the section’s main 19th-century period, but it is the prescribed starting point for understanding the Asante state inherited after 1800. He ruled around the turn of the 18th century, allied Kumasi with neighbouring Akan chiefdoms and, together with the priest Okomfo Anokye, connected the union with the Golden Stool. The stool represented the collective authority and identity of the Asante political community.

Asante forces defeated Denkyira in 1701, gaining access to trade routes and tribute. The empire combined the authority of the Asantehene with the continued rule of member chiefs. Councils, oaths and obligations of military service connected the provinces to Kumasi.

This arrangement allowed 19th-century Asante rulers to mobilize armies, tax trade and challenge control of the coast. Its durability came from combining central leadership with established local authorities. Provincial revolts and repeated wars with Britain, however, placed the system under increasing pressure.

Nyamwezi under Mirambo

Mirambo emerged during the 1860s as a ruler and trader in the Nyamwezi region of central Tanzania. The region stood across caravan routes carrying ivory and other goods between the interior and the Indian Ocean coast. Control of this trade brought wealth, firearms and followers.

Mirambo built a mobile military force that included ruga-ruga, professional or semi-professional warriors whose loyalty rested on successful leadership and access to plunder. He combined warfare with alliances, tribute arrangements and diplomacy. Centred on Urambo, his state expanded beyond the authority of a single inherited chiefdom.

From 1871, Mirambo fought Arab and Swahili merchants based at Tabora, challenging their influence over the caravan trade. He also negotiated with some foreign traders and missionaries. His state relied heavily on his personal authority and commercial networks, and it lost cohesion after his death in 1884.

Hehe state under Mkwawa

Mkwawa became ruler of the Hehe in the late 19th century and expanded a state in the southern highlands of present-day Tanzania. He strengthened central authority, demanded tribute and organized disciplined forces that could conduct raids and defend strategic routes.

The Hehe challenged German colonial expansion. At Lugalo in 1891, Mkwawa’s forces ambushed and defeated a German column. The victory showed that local knowledge, surprise and concentrated attack could overcome a European force despite differences in weaponry.

Germany answered with a sustained campaign. German troops captured Mkwawa’s fortress at Kalenga in 1894, but he continued guerrilla resistance. Surrounded and facing capture, he took his own life in 1898. The Hehe state was defeated, yet its prolonged resistance made Mkwawa an enduring symbol of opposition to colonial conquest.

Patterns of rise and decline

These states arose in different environments, but several recurring factors can be identified:

• leaders turned personal military followings into durable political authority;
• control of cattle, ivory, palm oil, gold or caravan routes financed expansion;
• firearms changed warfare but worked effectively only when supported by organization and supply;
• rulers incorporated conquered peoples through tribute, local officials or military service;
• diplomacy and treaties could preserve autonomy temporarily, but they could also open the way to colonial intervention.

Their decline did not result from one universal weakness. Some, such as Mirambo’s state, depended too heavily on an individual ruler. Others faced internal opposition from incorporated peoples. By the late 19th century, expanding European states and chartered companies brought sustained military pressure, superior logistics and deliberately unequal treaties. African rulers responded through resistance, migration, negotiation or accommodation, often using several strategies at once.