Origins of the crisis

Abyssinia, also known as Ethiopia, and Italy were both members of the League of Nations. Benito Mussolini sought an African empire, greater military prestige and revenge for Italy’s defeat by Ethiopian forces at Adwa in 1896. Conquest might also divert attention from economic problems at home and link the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

The immediate dispute followed the Wal Wal incident in December 1934. Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed at an oasis near the disputed frontier with Italian Somaliland. Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League, but Italy used the delay in arbitration to gather a large invasion force.

Italian aggression, 1935–1936

Italy invaded Abyssinia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland on 3 October 1935. Its forces had decisive advantages in aircraft, artillery and motorized transport. They also used poison gas, despite international restrictions on chemical warfare.

In November 1935, the League declared Italy the aggressor and imposed economic sanctions. Members restricted arms, loans and several exports to Italy, but oil was excluded. Britain also kept the Suez Canal open, so Italian ships could continue supplying its forces in East Africa.

In December 1935, the British and French foreign ministers, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, secretly proposed giving much of Abyssinia to Italy in exchange for an end to the war. Once the plan became public, it collapsed. Its disclosure showed, however, that the leading League powers were willing to compromise Abyssinian sovereignty.

Italian troops entered Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936. Four days later, Italy formally annexed Abyssinia, and the sanctions were abandoned in July. Haile Selassie’s appeal to the League Assembly in June revealed the distance between the League’s promises and its willingness to enforce them.

Why the League failed

The failure came from the League’s institutional weakness and the policies of the major powers:

• The League had no army, so it depended on member states to enforce its decisions.
• Decisions were slow, and sanctions required broad international cooperation. The United States was outside the League and continued trading with Italy.
• Britain and France feared that firm action would drive Mussolini towards Adolf Hitler and damage the anti-German Stresa Front, formed in April 1935.
• Neither Britain nor France wanted to risk a Mediterranean war over Abyssinia.
• Sanctions were incomplete and delayed. Excluding oil and keeping the Suez Canal open reduced their effect and made the invasion harder to stop.
• Italy was itself a major League member. This showed how poorly collective security worked when action threatened the interests of a powerful state.

Some interpretations focus on weaknesses in the League’s structure. Others give greater responsibility to Britain and France. Stronger oil sanctions or closing the Suez Canal might have increased the cost of aggression, but both governments placed national strategy ahead of collective security.

Consequences

The crisis seriously damaged the League’s authority. It showed that aggression could succeed and weakened smaller states’ confidence that collective security would protect them. Italy moved closer to Germany, helping to produce the Rome–Berlin Axis announced in 1936.

The episode also encouraged further challenges to the interwar settlement. It suggested that treaty-breaking powers might not face effective resistance. For Africans, the conquest became a symbol of continuing European imperialism and of an international organization dominated by colonial powers failing to defend an independent African state.

Italian occupation did not end Ethiopian resistance. British and Ethiopian forces restored Haile Selassie in 1941. Even so, the League’s failure in 1935–1936 remained one of the clearest demonstrations of the collapse of interwar collective security.

Foundation and objectives

The Organization of African Unity was founded in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963 by 32 independent African states. Its creation reflected a compromise. Some governments wanted rapid political union, while others were determined to protect the sovereignty of newly independent states.

The OAU Charter established several linked objectives:

• promoting African unity and solidarity;
• defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states;
• ending colonial rule and supporting African liberation movements;
• coordinating political, diplomatic, economic, educational, health, scientific and defence policies;
• encouraging international cooperation through the United Nations framework.

These aims created a lasting tension. The OAU pursued cooperation across the continent while defending non-interference in states’ internal affairs. Governments therefore kept control over the extent of that cooperation.

Structure

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government served as the highest decision-making body. It established the OAU’s general direction, following the voting rules set out in the Charter.

The Council of Ministers, made up mainly of foreign ministers, prepared issues for the Assembly and coordinated policy. Administration fell to the General Secretariat, which was based in Addis Ababa and led by a secretary-general. It had little independent authority.

The Charter also created a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, along with several specialized commissions. Based in Dar es Salaam, the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa channelled assistance to recognized anti-colonial movements.

Successes

The OAU gave independent African governments a regular diplomatic forum. It also helped them develop common positions at the UN. Decolonization was its most important shared cause. The organization supported liberation struggles against Portuguese colonial rule and white-minority government in southern Africa, and helped isolate apartheid South Africa.

In 1964, the OAU accepted the principle that member states should respect the borders they had inherited at independence. Those colonial boundaries were often artificial, but keeping them reduced the risk that widespread territorial revision would lead to interstate wars.

The organization also tried to mediate disputes between African states. Even when particular efforts failed, its existence kept negotiation possible. It strengthened the principle that African problems should be handled through African diplomacy.

Failures and limitations

The OAU could rarely force governments to follow collective decisions. It lacked strong supranational institutions, relied on members for finance and generally operated through consensus. Divisions between conservative and radical states weakened common action, as did differences between governments aligned differently in the Cold War.

Non-interference protected newly independent states from external pressure. At the same time, it limited the OAU’s response to civil wars, coups and severe abuses by member governments. During the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970, for example, the OAU treated the conflict largely as Nigeria’s internal affair and upheld federal unity.

The organization also struggled over Western Sahara. The admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic led Morocco to leave the OAU in 1984. This exposed deep disagreement over sovereignty and decolonization. Although the OAU condemned apartheid, it did not have the military and economic power to end it independently.

One interpretation sees the OAU as deliberately cautious. Preserving borders and sovereignty helped protect fragile states during the difficult decades after independence. A more critical view argues that these same principles made the organization a club of governments unwilling to challenge one another. Both perspectives help explain why it achieved more in anti-colonial diplomacy than in economic integration, conflict prevention or protecting people within member states.

East African Community, 1967–1977

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda established the East African Community through the 1967 Treaty for East African Cooperation. The new organization took over earlier shared services, including transport, communications and educational arrangements. It aimed to build a common market and coordinate regional development.

The EAC included an East African Authority made up of the three heads of state, along with a Council of Ministers, a legislative assembly and a secretariat. Corporations managed common services such as railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications.

For a time, the EAC maintained substantial regional integration. Important services continued to operate across national borders. Several connected problems eventually brought it down:

• Kenya’s stronger industrial economy benefited more from the common market, leading to disputes about how the gains were distributed.
• Tanzania followed socialist policies, while Kenya took a more market-oriented approach.
• Relations worsened after Idi Amin seized power in Uganda in 1971; Tanzania refused to recognize his government.
• Member states could not agree on funding and increasingly put national control ahead of regional institutions.

The community collapsed in 1977. Its experience showed that inherited economic links could not survive serious disagreements between governments over ideology, security and the distribution of costs and benefits.

Economic Community of West African States

Fifteen states created ECOWAS through the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. The organization initially aimed to promote economic integration by encouraging freer trade, the movement of people and coordinated development, with a common market as a longer-term goal. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement gradually gave citizens of member states rights of entry and residence. A revised treaty in 1993 widened ECOWAS’s political and security role.

ECOWAS established an Authority of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers and a secretariat, as well as economic and judicial bodies. It offered a permanent forum that brought together Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone West African states.

Progress towards free movement was a significant achievement, even though implementation differed between states. ECOWAS later moved beyond its original economic purpose. Its Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, intervened in Liberia from 1990 and later in Sierra Leone. These operations showed that a regional organization could respond when civil wars threatened neighbouring states.

The record was still mixed. Weak transport links, similar export economies, political instability and national protectionism held back regional trade. States did not apply agreements consistently. Nigeria also carried a disproportionate share of the costs and leadership of military intervention. Supporters see ECOWAS as one of Africa’s more durable frameworks for regional cooperation, while critics point to the gap between formal treaties and practical integration.

SADCC and SADC

Nine southern African states formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference at Lusaka in 1980. SADCC aimed to coordinate development and reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa, particularly in transport, communications, energy and food production. Instead of creating a strongly centralized organization, members assigned different sectors to particular governments.

SADCC coordinated infrastructure projects and gave the Frontline States a structure for resisting South African economic and political dominance. Its effectiveness was restricted by the region’s continuing dependence on South African routes, capital and markets. Warfare in Angola and Mozambique, alongside South African efforts to destabilize neighbouring states, damaged regional projects. SADCC also depended heavily on funding from outside Africa.

The 1992 Windhoek Treaty changed SADCC into the Southern African Development Community. SADC pursued deeper economic integration and took on stronger political and security ambitions. South Africa joined in 1994 after the end of apartheid, changing the organization’s balance and its economic potential.

The 1996 Trade Protocol aimed to reduce internal trade barriers. Members also cooperated in areas such as transport, energy and water. However, the economic gap between South Africa and the smaller members remained pronounced. Disputes over regional interventions, including those linked to Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s, revealed uncertainty about collective security and leadership.

Across the three organizations, cooperation worked best when states recognized a clear shared interest and provided the necessary resources. It broke down when national rivalries, unequal gains, ideological differences or armed conflicts became more important than the benefits of working together.

Congo, 1960–1964

The UN Operation in the Congo, ONUC, began when the former Belgian Congo gained independence on 30 June 1960. Army mutinies, Belgian military intervention and Moïse Tshombe’s secession of mineral-rich Katanga all threatened the new state. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu were also locked in a struggle for power.

The Security Council authorized UN forces to restore order and secure the withdrawal of Belgian troops. At first, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld opposed using ONUC to resolve the Congo’s internal political struggle. Lumumba then turned to the Soviet Union for help, bringing the crisis more directly into the Cold War. He was removed from power and killed in 1961.

ONUC eventually used force to end Katanga’s secession, which collapsed in January 1963. When the mission withdrew in June 1964, Congo’s territorial unity had been preserved. Belgium, however, intervened militarily again in November 1964. These were important successes.

The costs were considerable. The mission became caught up in Congolese politics, suffered serious casualties and attracted criticism from both Western and Soviet governments. Hammarskjöld died in an air crash in 1961 while trying to negotiate. ONUC did not establish a stable government, and Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965.

The Congo showed that UN peacekeeping could require large forces and coercive action, rather than simple observation of an agreed ceasefire. It also revealed how difficult it was to remain impartial during civil conflict and superpower rivalry.

Mozambique, 1992–1994

The UN Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, supervised the implementation of the 1992 General Peace Agreement between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. The settlement brought a civil war to an end after years of regional and Cold War involvement had intensified it.

ONUMOZ monitored the ceasefire, supported demobilization, helped organize elections, coordinated humanitarian assistance and assisted displaced people returning home. Elections were held in October 1994. RENAMO accepted the result, despite losing to FRELIMO.

The mission succeeded because the main parties were ready to end the war. Regional conditions had also changed as apartheid and the Cold War declined, while outside governments backed the peace process. Rather than impose a settlement on factions still determined to win, the UN worked with one that had already been negotiated.

Disarmament and reintegration remained incomplete. Even so, Mozambique became an influential example of multidimensional peacekeeping that combined military observation, elections and reconstruction.

Somalia, 1992–1995

Somalia’s government collapsed after Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Rival armed groups fought over territory, while famine and insecurity blocked relief supplies. Created in 1992, UNOSOM I did not have enough personnel or authority to operate effectively.

In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the US-led Unified Task Force, UNITAF, to create secure conditions for humanitarian relief. It improved access to food and reduced immediate famine conditions in several areas. Responsibility passed to UNOSOM II in 1993. This mission had a broader mandate: disarm the factions and rebuild state institutions.

The mission became involved in the conflict itself. Fighting against forces loyal to Mohamed Farah Aideed culminated in the deaths of US soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993. The United States and other contributors scaled back their commitment, and UN forces withdrew in March 1995 without restoring a functioning national government.

Somalia was a limited humanitarian success in the early stages, but it was a political and security failure. There was no comprehensive peace agreement, no accepted government and little consent for coercive state-building. The experience made major powers less willing to send troops to African conflicts where they saw few strategic interests.

Rwanda, 1993–1996

The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR, was established in 1993 to support the Arusha Accords between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Its peacekeeping mandate was restricted, and it relied on cooperation from parties that included extremists opposed to the settlement.

After the aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down on 6 April 1994, extremist leaders organized genocide against the Tutsi. Moderate Hutu were also murdered. UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire did not have the authority or resources to stop the killings. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed, after which Belgium withdrew its contingent. The Security Council then reduced the force at the height of the genocide.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the genocidal government and captured Kigali in July. UN forces and humanitarian agencies then dealt with mass displacement and refugee flows. The international response, however, had failed in its central moral and security challenge.

The failure had several causes: a narrow mandate, inadequate troops and equipment, reluctance after Somalia, disagreement within the Security Council and the unwillingness of powerful states to regard Rwanda as a major interest. In November 1994, the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This contributed to prosecuting those responsible, but it did not repair the failure to prevent the genocide.

Wider impact

These four cases show how strongly UN results depended on political conditions. Mozambique had consent, a negotiated settlement and sustained external support. Congo achieved a limited strategic success, but at high political cost. Somalia and Rwanda showed what could happen when mandates, resources and political will failed to match the crisis.

The operations expanded the meaning of peacekeeping to cover elections, humanitarian relief, demobilization and state reconstruction. Somalia also encouraged caution at the very moment when Rwanda required rapid action. Rwanda then intensified the debate over whether sovereignty and neutrality should prevent international action during mass killing.

World Health Organization

The World Health Organization was established in 1948. It supported African governments with disease surveillance, vaccination, training, research and coordination across borders. Its influence was most visible when a disease could not be brought under control by one state acting alone.

The global smallpox eradication campaign was a major African success. WHO helped coordinate surveillance and targeted vaccination, including in remote and conflict-affected areas. Somalia recorded the last naturally occurring case of smallpox in 1977. The disease was declared eradicated globally in 1980.

WHO also took part in the Onchocerciasis Control Programme, launched in West Africa in 1974 with other international partners. The programme coordinated insect control, treatment and long-term monitoring across several states. As a result, it reduced the transmission of river blindness and made affected land safer for settlement and cultivation.

Its impact still depended on national health services. Shortages of trained staff, weak transport networks, conflict and irregular funding hindered vaccination and monitoring. Disease-specific programmes could produce measurable gains without fixing the wider weaknesses of public-health systems.

Food and Agriculture Organization

The Food and Agriculture Organization was founded in 1945 to improve nutrition, agricultural productivity and food security. In Africa, it offered technical advice, agricultural information, training and emergency assistance. It also coordinated responses to pests and animal diseases that crossed national borders.

FAO programmes supported crop improvement, irrigation, soil conservation, fisheries and livestock management. Its early-warning work helped governments and relief organizations spot threats from drought, crop failure and locust outbreaks. During emergencies, this information could direct food assistance and agricultural recovery.

The agency’s impact was limited by the scale and political character of African food insecurity. Technical assistance alone could not end war, unequal access to land, weak rural infrastructure or government policies that disadvantaged farmers. Projects designed outside local communities could also encourage methods poorly suited to particular environments.

Overall assessment

WHO achieved its strongest results through concentrated campaigns with clear targets, international funding and methods that could be used across borders. FAO tackled a wider range of structural problems, so its achievements were harder to separate from national policy, climate and conflict.

Both agencies provided knowledge and coordination that many governments could not supply independently. Their limitations came from their reliance on cooperation from sovereign states. Technical programmes could reduce particular problems without removing their political and economic causes.

Africa within the Cold War

African conflicts rarely arose from superpower rivalry alone. Decolonization, disputed borders, competition for state power and unequal access to resources all had local roots. The Cold War increased the scale and length of these conflicts by giving governments and armed movements weapons, money, advisers and diplomatic support.

African leaders were not simply controlled by outside powers. They used Cold War competition to gain aid, protect their regimes and defeat domestic rivals. The relationship worked both ways: external powers shaped African conflicts, but African actors also manipulated the international rivalry.

Angola

Portugal’s 1974 revolution hastened Angolan independence, but three armed movements were left competing for power: the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. The transitional arrangements collapsed, and civil war began before independence on 11 November 1975.

The Soviet Union supplied the MPLA, while Cuba sent troops to help it retain Luanda and establish the People’s Republic of Angola. The United States secretly supported the FNLA and UNITA, while South African forces invaded from the south. Zaire also backed opponents of the MPLA.

Cold War assistance allowed the MPLA government and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA to keep fighting after their domestic resources might otherwise have run out. Oil revenue strengthened the government. UNITA relied on foreign support and control of diamond-producing areas. Civilians faced displacement, destroyed infrastructure and the spread of landmines.

The conflict also became tied to the struggle over Namibia and apartheid South Africa. Fighting around Cuito Cuanavale in 1987–1988 did not produce an uncontested military victory, but it helped create conditions for negotiation. The 1988 New York Accords linked Cuban withdrawal from Angola to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, which provided for Namibia’s transition to independence.

As the Cold War ended, the MPLA abandoned Marxism-Leninism, and the 1991 Bicesse Accords provided for elections. War resumed after UNITA rejected the 1992 election results. Superpower rivalry had intensified the conflict, but it was not the only cause: struggles over political power and resources continued after the Cold War.

Congo and Zaire

The Congo Crisis began immediately after independence from Belgium in 1960. When Katanga seceded, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba sought outside assistance because Western governments appeared unwilling to restore Congolese unity on his terms. His appeal to the Soviet Union led the United States and Belgium to regard him as a Cold War threat.

Colonel Joseph Mobutu first intervened in politics in September 1960. Lumumba was transferred to Katanga and killed in January 1961, with the involvement of Congolese opponents and Belgian officials. Competing governments and foreign patrons turned the struggle for control of the new state into an international crisis.

Mobutu seized power permanently in 1965 and renamed the country Zaire in 1971. The United States and other Western states supported him as an anti-communist ally despite his authoritarian government, corruption and repression. Western backing helped preserve the regime and gave Mobutu a regional role, including support for anti-MPLA forces in Angola.

The Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 showed how dependent Zaire was on external military assistance. Foreign intervention saved Mobutu’s government, but it did not repair the army, economy or administrative system. State resources increasingly benefited the ruler and his allies instead of public institutions.

When the Cold War ended, Mobutu’s strategic value declined. External support weakened while the Zairian state was already deteriorating. Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s forces, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew Mobutu in 1997, and the country became the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A second regional war began in 1998.

Comparing the two cases

In both Angola and Congo/Zaire, external involvement militarized political struggles and protected favoured allies. Angola became a prolonged proxy war involving rival African states, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States. In Zaire, Western support mainly sustained an anti-communist ruler whose regime became increasingly personalized and corrupt.

One interpretation emphasizes superpower responsibility: outside aid prolonged wars and protected governments from the consequences of domestic failure. Another focuses on African agency and local causes. Angolan movements pursued their own objectives, while Mobutu exploited Western fears to secure assistance. The Cold War therefore acted as an accelerator and a source of resources, rather than providing a complete explanation for either country’s instability.