This content can't be printed from the browser. Use Export PDF with Pro for an offline copy.
IB Syllabus Requirements for Interactions of political stakeholders and actors in peace and conflict
4.2.1
Parties to conflict
4.2.2
Violent and non-violent actors
4.2.3
Third parties and conflict processes
4.2.4
Marginalized and conflict-affected groups
4.2.1
PARTIES TO CONFLICT
Parties to a conflict are individuals or organized groups that directly pursue incompatible political goals. They might fight, negotiate, exercise authority or claim to speak for a particular population.
States, governments, armed forces and rebel organizations can all be parties. So can political movements, communities or influential individuals. States usually act as the principal parties in an interstate conflict. In an intrastate conflict, a government may face several armed or political groups, each with different objectives.
A party isn’t always a single, unified actor. Rival institutions may exist within a government, and armed movements can split into factions. As the conflict develops, alliances and goals may shift.
Parties are different from the wider stakeholders. Stakeholders have an interest in the conflict or feel its effects, but they may not directly pursue one of the central incompatible goals. For example, humanitarian organizations and neighbouring states can be important stakeholders without becoming conflict parties.
Parties rarely have equal capabilities. Their bargaining power depends on factors such as military resources, territorial control, international recognition, public support and access to finance. Formal state sovereignty can give a government international standing, but it doesn’t automatically create domestic legitimacy.
Representation is often disputed. An armed organization may claim to defend an ethnic, religious or regional community even when members of that community reject its methods or political programme. Recognizing an armed group as a negotiating party may help end the violence. However, it can also seem to reward coercion and push peaceful representatives aside.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia and Ukraine became the principal state parties in an interstate conflict. Their incompatible positions involved territorial control, Ukrainian sovereignty and competing interpretations of regional security. Both governments depended on external partners, though this did not make every supporting state a direct party to the war.
A realist interpretation focuses on military power, deterrence and the security interests claimed by states. A liberal interpretation places more weight on sovereign equality and international law, as well as the role of institutions in coordinating support, sanctions and possible negotiations.
War broke out in Sudan in 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Both had emerged from the country’s coercive state structures. Their fight over military integration and control of the state shows how former partners can turn into rival conflict parties.
Sudanese civilian coalitions and local resistance committees remained major stakeholders, even though they controlled neither of the two principal armed forces. A feminist perspective draws attention to the way a focus on armed leaders can shut women’s organizations and civilian peacebuilders out of decisions about Sudan’s political future.
4.2.2
VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS
State actors are governments and public institutions that wield authority on a state’s behalf. Non-state actors work outside formal state government, though they may control territory, receive support from states or carry out government-like functions.
Violent actors use physical force, or credibly threaten it, to pursue political objectives. Non-violent actors seek political objectives without physical violence. Their methods include protest, civil disobedience, diplomacy, monitoring or humanitarian action.
| Actor type | Typical forms of action |
|---|---|
| Violent state actors | Armed force, policing, detention and coercive security operations |
| Non-violent state actors | Diplomacy, legislation, negotiation and administrative action |
| Violent non-state actors | Insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla warfare or organized communal violence |
| Non-violent non-state actors | Protest, advocacy, humanitarian assistance, dialogue and peacebuilding |
These categories describe how actors behave, not fixed identities. A state might negotiate even as its armed forces fight. Likewise, a movement may conduct peaceful political activity while maintaining an armed wing. Judgements about whether violence is legitimate can depend on legal authority, proportionality, political identity and the observer’s perspective.
Realists usually focus on states and organized armed groups because they hold coercive power. Liberals give more attention to civil society, international organizations and the institutions that enable cooperation. Constructivists look at how labels such as “terrorist”, “resistance movement” or “security force” affect legitimacy. Feminist approaches ask whose insecurity gets overlooked when analysts focus only on armed elites.
When Myanmar’s military seized power in 2021, the Tatmadaw operated as a violent state actor through armed repression and military operations. People’s Defence Forces emerged as violent non-state actors. By contrast, the Civil Disobedience Movement challenged military rule through strikes and non-cooperation, without relying principally on violence.
The National Unity Government blurred the line between state and non-state actor. It claimed legitimate national authority but lacked conventional control of the state. This case shows that recognition, territorial control and legitimacy don’t always rest with the same actor.
Following the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, Colombia’s government and security forces remained state actors. The National Liberation Army and dissident armed groups continued to operate as violent non-state actors. Their activity showed that reaching an agreement with one organization doesn’t automatically end a conflict involving several parties.
The Indigenous Guard offers a different model of non-state action. Through unarmed community organization, it has worked to protect Indigenous territories. Its work shows how affected communities can exercise political agency and local authority without adopting the methods used by either the state or armed groups.
4.2.3
THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING MEDIATION PROCESSES, NEGOTIATION PROCESSES AND INTERVENTIONS
Third parties are actors that aren't principal parties to a conflict but become involved in managing, limiting or resolving it. They can be states, international or regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, community leaders or prominent individuals.
Negotiation occurs when conflict parties communicate in an attempt to reach an agreement. Talks may cover a ceasefire, humanitarian access, political participation, territorial arrangements or a final settlement.
Mediation is assistance from a third party that helps conflict parties communicate and negotiate an acceptable agreement. A mediator may organize talks, carry proposals between the parties or help them identify a compromise. Normally, however, the mediator cannot impose a binding outcome.
Either process needs credibility. This depends on who participates, whether the parties negotiate in good faith and whether the agreement can be monitored. If women, minorities or civil society are excluded, the result may be an elite settlement that stops some violence but leaves its underlying causes unresolved.
Intervention is external involvement that aims to alter the conduct, balance or outcome of a conflict. It can range from observation and diplomatic pressure to economic coercion and military action.
Third parties can use measures such as:
Each tool creates political dilemmas. Targeted sanctions may put pressure on leaders while limiting harm to civilians, although restrictions can be evaded or redirected onto vulnerable populations. Military intervention can protect people or enforce an agreement. Yet it may also undermine sovereignty, escalate violence or be seen as serving the interveners’ interests.
Realists explain third-party action through strategic interests and shifts in the balance of power. Liberals focus on institutions, negotiated rules and collective responses. Postcolonial perspectives instead question why powerful external actors often decide which conflicts justify intervention and whose preferred settlement counts as legitimate.
The African Union mediated talks between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, producing the Pretoria agreement in 2022. The parties accepted a permanent cessation of hostilities, along with provisions on disarmament, humanitarian access and the restoration of federal authority.
AU involvement gave the process regional ownership. Even so, implementation depended on the parties and the monitoring arrangements. The case shows how a mediator can facilitate an agreement without having direct control over compliance.
Türkiye and the United Nations helped broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative between Ukraine and Russia in 2022. Despite the continuing war, the arrangement enabled commercial food exports from specified Ukrainian ports. It showed that limited negotiation can tackle a shared practical problem without resolving the wider conflict.
Russia withdrew from the initiative in 2023, exposing the weakness of agreements that rely on continuing consent. The case also demonstrated interdependence: a regional war and the success of third-party diplomacy affected food security far beyond Europe.
4.2.4
MARGINALIZED, VULNERABLE AND MOST AFFECTED GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING NON-COMBATANTS
Marginalized groups and individuals have been pushed to the edges of political, economic or social decision-making. Vulnerable groups and individuals face a greater risk of harm due to circumstances such as displacement, age, disability, gender, legal status or poverty.
The most affected experience the conflict’s most direct or severe consequences. Non-combatants are people who do not take part in hostilities. This includes civilians, as well as members of armed forces who are no longer fighting because they are wounded, detained or have surrendered.
Conflict doesn’t harm everyone equally. Non-combatants may experience death, injury, displacement, family separation, destroyed livelihoods and loss of access to food, education or healthcare. Existing inequalities often shape who can escape, obtain assistance or influence negotiations.
Marginalization, vulnerability and exposure overlap, but they are not the same. A politically marginalized minority may be deliberately targeted. A child can be vulnerable regardless of identity, while a resident of a besieged city may be among the most affected despite previously being socially privileged.
Affected people aren’t simply passive victims. Local organizations document abuses, distribute assistance, organize evacuations, resist recruitment and take part in peacebuilding. Yet governments, armed groups and external agencies often speak for them without allowing them meaningful influence over decisions.
A feminist perspective considers gendered exposure to conflict, including conflict-related sexual violence, unpaid care work and women’s exclusion from formal negotiations. A postcolonial perspective questions how racialized or externally imposed assumptions shape whose suffering receives attention and whether international responses respect local political agency.
The treatment of non-combatants directly connects peace and conflict with rights and justice. When essential services are destroyed, conflict also becomes linked to development and sustainability, since the effects may continue after organized fighting has declined.
The Israel–Hamas war that escalated in 2023 put non-combatants in Israel and Gaza at severe risk. Hamas’s attacks included the killing and abduction of civilians. Israel’s military campaign and restrictions affecting Gaza exposed Palestinian civilians to displacement, destruction and disrupted access to essential services.
Children, displaced families, hostages and people requiring medical treatment faced different forms of vulnerability. Disagreement over responsibility, proportionality and security did not make it any less politically important to distinguish combatants from non-combatants or include affected people in plans for a sustainable settlement.
From 2023, conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces displaced communities and disrupted food supplies, healthcare and civilian protection. People in Darfur faced particular exposure as current violence interacted with earlier patterns of ethnic persecution and political marginalization.
Even so, women’s groups, neighbourhood committees and local emergency-response networks organized assistance and documented civilian needs. Their work challenges an actor-centred account that treats only armed organizations and international diplomats as politically significant.