This content can't be printed from the browser. Use Export PDF with Pro for an offline copy.
IB Syllabus Requirements for Identity
HL.5.1
Identity consciousness and political change
HL.5.2
Cultural and religious identity after 9/11
HL.5.3
Gender, minority identity and the public sphere
HL.5.4
Identity-based violence and international justice
HL.5.1
IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL CHANGE
Greater interconnection can sharpen people's awareness of what sets them apart. Identity becomes political when governments, movements or communities draw on religion, ethnicity, class, gender or nationality to justify authority, demand recognition or decide who belongs.
Bhutan's shift from absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy shows that a state can change its political institutions while preserving a dominant religious identity. King Jigme Singye Wangchuck began constitutional planning in 2001, after executive powers had been devolved to elected ministers by 1998. He abdicated in 2006 and was succeeded by Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. In 2008, Bhutan held its first National Assembly election as part of the transition to constitutional monarchy; the Constitution was formally adopted later that year.
For many years, Bhutanese national identity has been tied to Drukpa Buddhism, the monarchy and the protection of a small Himalayan society from outside pressures. The 2008 Constitution describes Buddhism as the country's spiritual heritage. At the same time, it protects freedom of religion and names the king as protector of all religions. Religious institutions and personalities must remain outside party politics, so religion is presented as a source of shared values rather than electoral competition.
Using its legitimacy, the monarchy introduced competitive elections without a violent collapse of the regime. Constitutional protections paired democratic institutions with continuity in national symbols. This reduced fears that political reform would destroy Bhutanese identity.
Institutional change was peaceful, though identity-based tensions did not disappear. When judging whether the national identity is equally inclusive, earlier citizenship policies, cultural assimilation and the displacement of many Lhotshampa people in the 1990s still matter. Bhutan shows how a shared identity can support political stability while privileging the majority culture.
When developing laws on education, language or worship, Bhutan could establish deeper, structured consultation with minority religious and cultural communities. Independent review of discrimination and citizenship decisions could also be strengthened. Resistance would be likely if these measures were presented as weakening national cohesion or importing external political values.
The case connects to Equality because formal religious freedom doesn't automatically provide minority communities with equal influence or recognition. It also connects to Borders: citizenship disputes and the earlier displacement of Lhotshampa people linked domestic identity policy to refugee movements involving neighbouring states.
HL.5.2
CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AFTER 9/11
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, cultural and religious identities have often been framed in terms of terrorism, security and national belonging. Governments may use sovereign authority to defend a shared civic identity. Minority groups, however, may experience those same policies as exclusion or collective suspicion.
France illustrates the tension between religious identity, national identity and security. The republican model of laïcité aims to keep the state neutral in religious affairs, emphasizing citizenship instead of officially recognizing separate communities. Political debate increasingly linked Islamist extremism and integration with the visibility of Muslim identity after the 2015 attacks in Paris and the 2020 murder of teacher Samuel Paty.
Earlier restrictions had already shaped these debates. They included the 2004 prohibition of conspicuous religious symbols in state schools and the 2010 ban on concealing the face in public. France then adopted the Law Reinforcing Respect for the Principles of the Republic in 2021, expanding state oversight of areas including associations, education and religious organization. In 2023, the government also prohibited abayas in state schools, arguing that they counted as conspicuous religious clothing. France's highest administrative court allowed the policy to remain in force.
French policy has strengthened the state's preferred interpretation of secular national identity. It has also increased state capacity to monitor organizations considered separatist or extremist. Supporters view this as a defence of common institutions and security.
Critics argue that regulating visible religious practice can blur the line between violent extremism and ordinary Muslim identity. The political effect remains contested. These measures may reassure some citizens, yet weaken trust among others. Responses to terrorism, then, don't only address physical security. They also redistribute power over who can express an identity publicly, and on what terms.
France could introduce regular independent reviews to assess whether restrictions are proportionate, applied consistently across religions and effective against identifiable security threats. Teachers, local officials and diverse Muslim organizations could also take part in implementing secularism policy. Consultation may improve legitimacy, but governments could be accused either of compromising republican principles or of choosing unrepresentative community leaders.
This case connects to Security because counterterrorism policy affects how religious identity is treated. It relates to Equality because formally universal rules may affect groups unequally when their religious practices are more publicly visible. There is also a link to Technology: online propaganda and disputes on social media can quickly intensify cultural polarization.
HL.5.3
GENDER, MINORITY IDENTITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Gender and ethnic identity become political when public institutions enforce rules about family life, clothing, language or bodily autonomy. Issues framed as private can involve state power, equal citizenship and decisions about whose identity may appear in public.
In September 2022, the death of 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman Jina Mahsa Amini in morality-police custody sparked protests across Iran. Police had detained her for alleged non-compliance with compulsory hijab rules. “Woman, Life, Freedom,” a slogan rooted in Kurdish political movements, tied women's bodily autonomy to wider resistance against coercive government and discrimination against minorities.
The case sharply exposed the private–public boundary. Clothing may be an individual and religious matter, yet the Iranian state regulates it through law, surveillance and policing. Protesters opposed the dress rule and challenged the state's claim that its interpretation of Islamic morality was necessary for political legitimacy.
Iranian authorities restricted communications, arrested protesters and used force against demonstrations. Public claims suggested that the morality police had been abolished, but compulsory veiling remained in force and reports indicated that patrols had resumed. Official statements must therefore be separated from observable state practice.
The protests didn't bring immediate regime change or the repeal of compulsory hijab laws. Even so, they changed public behaviour, placed women's rights and opposition to compulsory veiling at the centre of opposition politics and drew international scrutiny. Their Kurdish origins also showed intersectionality: Amini's experience cannot be separated neatly into either gender or ethnicity.
Iran could repeal compulsory dress requirements while protecting voluntary religious observance, moving the issue from state coercion to individual choice. Another option would be to allow an independent investigation into deaths, detention and sexual or gender-based violence connected to the protests. Institutions that see compulsory veiling as foundational to the Islamic Republic resist both measures and fear that reform would prompt broader challenges to their authority.
The case links directly to Equality because women and minority communities have unequal political and legal power. It connects to Technology through internet shutdowns, digital surveillance and diaspora activism. There is also a link to Security: the state treated protest and non-compliance as threats to regime stability rather than solely as questions of personal liberty.
HL.5.4
IDENTITY-BASED VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Genocide and ethnic violence reveal identity at its most politically destructive: people become targets because they belong, or are believed to belong, to a particular group. International justice institutions can document abuses and assign responsibility. Their legitimacy and effectiveness, however, rely on jurisdiction, cooperation from states and the political power needed to enforce decisions.
The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar's Rakhine State. Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law denied most Rohingya full citizenship, contributing to long-term statelessness, restrictions on movement and unequal access to services. In August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army carried out attacks. Myanmar's armed forces, the Tatmadaw, then launched operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh, amid extensive reports of killings, sexual violence and village destruction.
At issue is whether atrocities occurred, but also how victims and alleged perpetrators are portrayed. Myanmar authorities have often rejected the term “Rohingya”, framing the military action as counterterrorism instead. Rohingya survivors and human-rights organizations argue that denying the group's identity is itself part of the persecution.
In 2020, the International Court of Justice ordered provisional measures that required Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts, preserve evidence and report on compliance. It rejected Myanmar's preliminary objections in 2022, so the case could proceed. The Court considers Myanmar's responsibility as a state; it does not hold criminal trials of individual leaders.
The International Criminal Court followed a separate process. In 2019, it authorized an investigation because the alleged deportation crossed into Bangladesh. In November 2024, the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for military leader Min Aung Hlaing concerning alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution. An application is not a conviction. Enforcement still depends heavily on state cooperation.
These processes have kept the issue visible and built an authoritative record, yet they have neither secured safe return nor restored citizenship. International justice can recognize victims and challenge impunity, while exercising limited immediate power over conditions on the ground.
States could give more support to evidence preservation, witness protection and cooperation with the ICJ and ICC. They could coordinate targeted pressure to restore citizenship rights and enable voluntary, safe and dignified return. Serious obstacles remain: resistance from Myanmar's military, conflict inside the country, disagreement among powerful states and the risk that premature repatriation would expose refugees to renewed persecution.
This case connects directly to Rights and justice through equality before the law, citizenship, protection from persecution and access to remedies for mass atrocities. Forced displacement into Bangladesh links it to the global political challenge of Borders. Armed violence and military rule connect it to Security, while statelessness and displacement link it to Poverty by restricting livelihoods and access to essential services.