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IB Syllabus Requirements for Equality
HL.3.1
Equality across political relationships
HL.3.2
Institutional inequality and vulnerable groups
HL.3.3
Economic inequality and instability
HL.3.4
Equality, rights and diversity
HL.3.1
EQUALITY ACROSS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS
Equality affects whether states, groups and individuals can access political influence, public resources and protection. Unequal relationships shape development and security within states. At the same time, interdependence allows discriminatory practices—and campaigns opposing them—to spread across borders.
Case study: Black Lives Matter, 2013–present
Black Lives Matter began in the United States in 2013, after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the killing of Trayvon Martin. The phrase grew into a decentralized movement that challenged racial inequality, police violence and the limited accountability of security institutions. Protests intensified following police killings in Ferguson and New York in 2014. After a Minneapolis police officer murdered George Floyd in May 2020, the movement became a global mobilization.
This case illustrates why equality involves more than identical legal rights. Activists argued that formally equal citizenship existed alongside unequal exposure to police force, imprisonment, poverty and exclusion from decision-making. Their argument linked security policy with broader questions about development and economic opportunity.
Actors, positions and power
- Local organizers, families of people killed by police and community groups organized demonstrations, pursued litigation and gave public testimony. They lacked formal authority, so their power relied on mobilization, moral claims and an ability to attract media attention.
- The wider Black Lives Matter movement included autonomous local groups alongside named organizations. Decentralization helped it expand rapidly, though it also made a single programme or leadership difficult to establish.
- Municipal governments, police departments, courts and police unions held legal and coercive power. Some negotiated reforms; others imposed curfews, made arrests or defended existing police practices.
- The US federal government could regulate federal law-enforcement bodies and investigate rights violations. Much policing, however, remained under state and local jurisdiction.
- Businesses, sports organizations and cultural institutions endorsed racial-equality claims after 2020. Supporters viewed this as normalization of the movement's message. Critics questioned whether corporate statements led to meaningful redistribution or institutional change.
- Outside the United States, demonstrators adapted the movement to local concerns, including deaths in custody, colonial legacies and discrimination against minority communities.
Action and effects
Campaigning moved racial inequality to the centre of national and international debate. Some US cities revised use-of-force rules, restricted particular restraint techniques or redirected parts of public-safety funding. At the federal level, President Joe Biden issued an executive order on policing in 2022. However, the proposed George Floyd Justice in Policing Act had not become federal law by 2024.
In 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on racism and law enforcement. A campaign triggered locally had reached global institutions. Policy outcomes remained uneven, partly because policing is divided across thousands of US agencies. Political disagreement also continued over crime, public order and police funding.
Possible courses of action
- Governments could require independent investigations into deaths involving police, then publish comparable data on stops, force and disciplinary outcomes. Implementation may be obstructed by police unions, privacy rules and differences between jurisdictions.
- Local authorities could pair accountable policing with sustained investment in housing, education, health and violence-prevention services. Key challenges include funding, disagreement over the causes of insecurity and the time social policies need to affect outcomes.
Links to other HL topic areas
- Identity: racial identities shape political experience, solidarity and claims for recognition.
- Security: the case raises questions about whose security policing protects and whose it may threaten.
- Technology: smartphone recordings and social media allowed rapid documentation and transnational mobilization. They also spread misleading material and intensified polarization.
HL.3.2
INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND VULNERABLE GROUPS
Inequality has particular force when it is built into citizenship law, public institutions and security policy. Institutions can convert social prejudice into enforceable restrictions. A vulnerable group may then be left with little legal or political power, raising the risk of exploitation, displacement and conflict.
Case study: Institutionalized inequality against the Rohingya in Myanmar
The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim minority linked mainly to Rakhine State in western Myanmar. In practice, Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law rendered most Rohingya effectively stateless, while subsequent discriminatory laws, policies and local orders restricted movement and access to education, employment and public services. Myanmar authorities generally reject the term Rohingya and refer to the group as “Bengali”, while Rohingya communities assert a longstanding connection to the region.
Attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in August 2017 were followed by extensive military operations. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh after killings, sexual violence and the destruction of villages. The scale and character of the violence have led to separate legal proceedings concerning alleged genocide and crimes against humanity.
Actors, positions and power
- Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw, held overwhelming coercive power and presented its operations as a response to terrorism. The 2021 military coup further reduced the prospects for accountable civilian government.
- Without secure citizenship, Rohingya civilians lacked political representation and effective state protection. Refugees and diaspora organizations have instead used testimony, documentation and international advocacy.
- The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army used armed violence, but its power was not comparable to that of the Myanmar state. Its attacks served as justification for a much broader military campaign that affected civilians.
- Bangladesh admitted large numbers of refugees, particularly to camps around Cox's Bazar, while maintaining that Bangladesh alone should not bear permanent responsibility.
- The United Nations, humanitarian organizations and human-rights groups delivered relief and documented abuses. Their work, however, depended on state permission and donor funding.
- In 2019, The Gambia brought a case against Myanmar under the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice. The Court ordered provisional protective measures in 2020, but it has no enforcement body of its own.
Action and effects
International humanitarian assistance has protected many refugees from immediate destitution. Even so, camp residents face restricted movement and insecurity, with limited opportunities for education or employment. Efforts to arrange repatriation haven't resulted in large-scale voluntary returns because questions of safety, citizenship and rights in Myanmar remain unresolved.
In 2022, the International Court of Justice rejected Myanmar's preliminary objections, allowing the genocide case to proceed. Separately, the International Criminal Court has investigated alleged crimes linked to deportation into Bangladesh. These processes preserve evidence and add diplomatic pressure, but they haven't removed the military's domestic coercive power.
Possible courses of action
- Any repatriation arrangement should guarantee voluntary return, monitored safety, freedom of movement and a credible route to citizenship. Myanmar's continuing conflict and military rule make such guarantees difficult to secure.
- States could coordinate targeted sanctions against military leaders and military-linked businesses, while increasing humanitarian support for refugees and Bangladeshi host communities. Sanctions may have little influence on insulated leaders and could create unintended economic costs.
Links to other HL topic areas
- Identity: denying Rohingya identity supports their exclusion from citizenship and political membership.
- Borders: mass displacement has shifted part of Myanmar's political crisis into Bangladesh.
- Security: state claims of counterterrorism clash with the human security of civilians.
- Poverty: statelessness and restrictions on work leave Rohingya communities especially vulnerable to deprivation and exploitation.
HL.3.3
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND INSTABILITY
Economic inequality puts resources and influence in the hands of a few, while other groups face insecure work, poor services and limited opportunities. Inequality does not automatically lead to unrest. It can, however, weaken a political system’s resilience when an economic shock, disputed decision or security crisis provides the trigger. In an interdependent region, the effects may then spread through migration, trade and transport networks.
Case study: Inequality and the July 2021 unrest in South Africa
South Africa’s democratic constitution brought formal apartheid to an end, yet income, wealth, land and employment remain deeply unequal. These divisions still follow strong racial and geographical patterns. The COVID-19 pandemic made conditions worse, increasing unemployment, food insecurity and pressure on households that already relied on insecure work or social grants.
The immediate trigger for the July 2021 unrest was the imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma for contempt of court. Looting and violence then spread across parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Several factors contributed: Zuma’s imprisonment, factional conflict within the African National Congress, criminal opportunism, and failures in intelligence and policing. Inequality cannot be treated as the sole cause.
Actors, positions and power
- The national government and security services had formal authority and coercive resources. They were criticized, however, for responding slowly and failing to anticipate the scale of the disorder.
- Zuma’s supporters presented his imprisonment as politically unfair. The judiciary and government argued that constitutional law had to be followed.
- Poor and unemployed residents did not form a single political bloc. Some took part in looting; others set up community patrols or defended local businesses.
- Retailers, logistics companies and informal traders faced destruction and disrupted supplies. Large firms had better access to insurance and greater capacity to recover than small businesses and workers who depended on daily earnings.
- Trade unions and civil-society organizations called for job creation and stronger social protection. Fiscal authorities focused on the cost and sustainability of permanent spending commitments.
- Migrant workers and neighbouring states also had a stake in the crisis because South Africa is a regional economic centre linked to cross-border labour, ports and supply chains.
Action and effects
The government deployed police and military personnel, investigated instigators and offered recovery assistance. The special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress grant, introduced in 2020, continued as a temporary income measure. It also became part of a broader debate about creating a permanent basic-income grant.
People died during the unrest, businesses were damaged, and transport and commercial activity around major economic centres were interrupted. Disruption to routes linked with the port of Durban showed how instability within South Africa could affect regional trade. The losses were also absorbed unevenly: major firms could recover more easily than informal traders and low-income workers.
Possible courses of action
- South Africa could create predictable minimum-income support linked to employment services and accessible public services. Fiscal pressure and limited administrative capacity would pose major challenges, alongside disagreement over whether grants alone can reduce structural unemployment.
- The government could pair vocational training and support for small enterprises with reforms to electricity, transport and municipal services. These measures target productive capacity, but they need long-term investment and stronger control of corruption.
Links to other HL topic areas
- Poverty: unemployment and insecure income left people more exposed to the initial shock and to the consequences of the unrest.
- Security: socioeconomic exclusion combined with weak intelligence, policing failures and community self-protection.
- Borders: because South Africa plays a major role in the regional economy, the disruption affected migrants and cross-border commerce.
- Technology: online communication spread information and mobilizing claims, along with rumours whose influence is difficult to separate from organized political action.
HL.3.4
EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY
Equality matters to rights, social justice and development because exclusion restricts political participation and access to services. It doesn’t always mean treating everyone in exactly the same way. Policies may recognize cultural differences or create targeted institutions when formally identical arrangements lead to unequal outcomes. Political disputes often centre on who has the legitimate authority to decide what that recognition involves.
Case study: Māori health equality in Aotearoa New Zealand, 2022–2024
Across several measures, Māori have poorer health outcomes than the non-Māori population. These inequalities are linked to colonization, socioeconomic disadvantage, unequal access to services and limited Māori authority within public institutions. The case connects the right to health and human development with cultural identity and interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi.
The Labour government created Te Aka Whai Ora, the Māori Health Authority, under the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act 2022. It began operating in July 2022 as part of the wider restructuring of the health system. Rather than assuming that one uniform system would serve every community equally, the authority aimed to commission services and give Māori greater influence over health priorities.
Actors, positions and power
- The Labour government argued that targeted structures were necessary to achieve equitable health outcomes and honour Treaty responsibilities.
- Māori health professionals, iwi and advocacy organizations supported greater Māori participation and culturally appropriate provision, though they held different views on institutional design and priorities.
- Te Aka Whai Ora had statutory and commissioning powers. However, it depended on legislation, public funding and cooperation across the health system.
- Opposition parties, particularly the National Party and ACT, argued that a separate authority duplicated services or divided them according to ethnicity. Instead, they emphasized common public institutions and equal citizenship.
- After taking office in 2023, the National-led coalition had the parliamentary power to legislate for the institution’s disestablishment. Its government disestablished Te Aka Whai Ora in 2024, transferring its functions into the general health system.
- Health workers and patients were practical stakeholders, as institutional restructuring affected funding routes, accountability and continuity of services.
Action and effects
The creation of Te Aka Whai Ora followed an equity-based approach. A distinct institution was designed to address unequal outcomes and allow greater cultural participation. Because it existed for only a short time, there was limited evidence for assessing its long-term effects on health. Political claims about its success or failure therefore emerged more quickly than reliable outcome data.
Its disestablishment in 2024 demonstrated how legal recognition of diversity can remain vulnerable to a change of government. Supporters of repeal described integration as fairer and more efficient. Opponents argued that removing independent Māori authority weakened partnership and failed to address structural inequality. At stake were both the policy’s effectiveness and the legitimacy of competing interpretations of equality.
Possible courses of action
- The government could create durable Māori co-design and commissioning powers within the national health system, supported by transparent measures of access and outcomes. The challenge would be to protect meaningful authority rather than offer consultation without influence.
- Parliament could require an independent long-term evaluation before any major institutional restructuring. This could strengthen evidence-based policy, although future governments would retain sovereign legislative power to change the system.
Links to other HL topic areas
- Health: unequal access and outcomes make health a public-policy issue and a measure of substantive equality.
- Identity: Māori cultural recognition and political status affect how institutions are designed and whether they are seen as legitimate.
- Poverty: socioeconomic disadvantage contributes to unequal health outcomes and restricts access to care.
- Technology: health-data systems can expose unequal outcomes, but control over Indigenous data creates questions about consent, authority and cultural sovereignty.
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