Borders can mark territorial boundaries between states. They can also be less visible, separating people by characteristics such as social class, ethnicity or gender. Both types shape who belongs, who holds authority and who can access rights, land and political representation.

Case study: Jammu and Kashmir since 2019

The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir involves both a physical border and boundaries of identity and citizenship. India and Pakistan each claim the region, while the Line of Control separates the territories under their administration. In Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, religious, regional and ethnic identities influence competing views of belonging and political legitimacy.

In August 2019, India's government revoked the special constitutional status provided through Article 370. The former state was then divided into two union territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. The Indian government described these measures as constitutional integration and a route to security and development. Critics saw them as a centralization of power that weakened regional autonomy and took place alongside communications restrictions and preventive detentions.

The main actors and stakeholders include:

• India's central government, which holds constitutional, military and administrative power and emphasizes sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Pakistan, which contests Indian sovereignty over the whole region and supports international attention to the dispute.
• Political parties and communities within Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, which hold different views on autonomy, statehood, representation and relations with India.
• Civil society groups, journalists and human-rights organizations, which have challenged restrictions on expression, movement and political participation.

After 2019, India introduced new administrative and domicile arrangements. These led to arguments over whether people from outside the territory could gain access to employment and land. The debate shows how a legal border around membership can matter just as much as a territorial line. In December 2023, India's Supreme Court upheld the constitutional change, directed that elections be held by 30 September 2024, and directed that statehood be restored as soon as possible. Regional elections followed in 2024 and restored an elected government. However, authority remained divided between local institutions and the centrally appointed lieutenant governor.

One defensible course of action would be to restore statehood, give clear powers to the elected legislature and safeguard regional land, employment and cultural rights. This would be difficult because the central government may see extensive autonomy as a security risk, while communities within the territory don't agree on a single political settlement. Another option would be sustained India–Pakistan dialogue, combined with local consultation and continued observance of the 2021 Line of Control ceasefire. Militant violence, distrust and the wider rivalry between the two nuclear-armed states continue to threaten this approach.

This case connects to identity, as religious and regional belonging shapes claims to the territory; security, since counterterrorism and military rivalry affect governance; and technology, because communications restrictions show how digital access can become a political boundary.

A border doesn’t have to be physically weak to create a political challenge. Sometimes, the problem is that no effective border exists at all. Capital and corporate activity can move across jurisdictions faster than governments can tax or regulate them. This creates conflict over sovereignty, fairness and which state should receive the revenue.

Case study: the OECD global minimum corporate tax

Digitalized and multinational businesses may earn income in one country, register intellectual property in another and report profits in a low-tax jurisdiction. Because they can move activity in this way, national economic borders matter less in practice, while companies can organize their affairs across several legal systems. Governments still have formal sovereignty over taxation. Yet their choices depend on one another: a low tax rate in one state can reduce the revenues of many others.

In 2021, members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework reached a political agreement on a two-pillar approach to international corporate taxation. Under Pillar Two, the Global Anti-Base Erosion rules established a 15% minimum effective tax framework for large multinational groups. The aim was to discourage profit shifting into low-tax jurisdictions and limit competitive reductions in corporate tax rates.

The principal actors and positions are:

• National governments want revenue, but they disagree over tax rates, investment strategies and where profits should be taxed.
• The OECD and G20 use technical expertise and agenda-setting power to coordinate rules, though they don’t operate as a world tax authority.
• The European Union adopted legislation requiring member states to implement the minimum-tax framework.
• Multinational corporations and business associations hold significant financial and lobbying power. They seek predictable rules with lower compliance costs.
• Tax-justice organizations and lower-income states include some critics who argue that the reforms don’t give enough taxing power to countries where production and consumption occur.

Implementation began in a number of jurisdictions from 2024. Recording profits in a jurisdiction where they face very little tax becomes less attractive under the framework, since another participating jurisdiction may collect a supplementary charge. Even so, uneven implementation limits its effect. Complex exemptions and differences between domestic legal systems create further constraints. States that rely on low corporate taxation may redesign their incentives instead of abandoning tax competition.

One course of action would give stronger taxing rights to states where economic activity takes place, allowing them to tax more of the profits made by multinational companies. Revenue could then be distributed more fairly. However, states disagree over the formulas, and established financial centres may resist losing income. A second option would combine public country-by-country reporting with administrative support for lower-income tax authorities. Greater transparency would help enforcement, although corporate confidentiality claims remain an obstacle, as does limited regulatory capacity.

This case links to equality, since tax avoidance can shift the burden from mobile corporations to workers and consumers. It also connects to poverty, because lost public revenue restricts governments’ ability to fund services, and technology, as digital business models make the location of taxable activity increasingly difficult to identify.

Migration is closely tied to globalization. Regional integration, transport networks and cross-border markets can make territorial boundaries less significant in practice. Yet state sovereignty remains: governments still decide who can enter, work and stay, sometimes through shared regional arrangements.

Case study: movement across the Kenya–Uganda border

Kenya and Uganda both belong to the East African Community. Its Common Market Protocol, which entered into force in 2010, provides a regional framework for the freer movement of people, labour, services and capital. At the busy Busia and Malaba crossings, migration is closely linked with trade and transport as part of regional globalization.

The actors and stakeholders include:

• The Kenyan and Ugandan governments retain control over immigration, customs, policing and national security.
• The East African Community creates common rules and promotes integration among member states.
• Workers, students, families, small-scale traders and transport operators benefit from easier movement, but they also experience delays or inconsistent enforcement directly.
• Border communities often maintain economic and social relationships across the official territorial line.
• Employers and trade associations support mobility when it provides labour and lowers transport costs.

The two governments and the East African Community have introduced one-stop border posts, regional travel documents and arrangements designed to recognize the rights of East African citizens. As a result, some duplication in customs and immigration procedures has been reduced. Practice doesn’t always match formal promises of free movement, however. Work authorization and professional recognition can still create barriers, as can unofficial charges or security checks. Pandemic-era restrictions showed how quickly states can reassert territorial controls when health is treated as an emergency.

One possible course of action is to harmonize work-permit procedures and the recognition of qualifications across the East African Community. Legal labour migration could then become more predictable, though governments may fear domestic opposition where employment is scarce. Another option is to improve one-stop border administration and create complaint mechanisms for traders and migrants. Digital processing may cut delays and corruption, but it depends on reliable infrastructure and the protection of personal data.

The case connects to poverty because cross-border work and trade support household incomes. It also relates to equality, since informal traders and low-income migrants face greater exposure to arbitrary treatment. Health matters when disease-control measures interrupt mobility, while technology increasingly shapes border access through digital identification and customs systems.

Immigration often becomes politically controversial when the economy is uncertain. Newcomers may be blamed for competition over jobs, housing and public services, even when these perceptions don't match the available evidence. Political actors can then channel such anxieties into calls for tighter territorial control.

Case study: Venezuelan migration and backlash in Chile

During the late 2010s and early 2020s, Chile became an important destination for Venezuelans fleeing political repression, insecurity and economic collapse. Some used official routes. Others crossed the northern border irregularly after visa requirements and pandemic restrictions reduced lawful pathways. At the same time, Chile faced pressure on housing and services, alongside broader concerns about inflation, insecure employment and crime.

The main actors and stakeholders include:

• Chile's national government and border authorities, which try to balance immigration control with legal and humanitarian obligations.
• Municipal governments in northern cities, which must respond to immediate demands for shelter, sanitation and public services despite having fewer resources than the central state.
• Venezuelan migrants and refugees, who prioritize legal status, employment, family unity and protection from removal or exploitation.
• Chilean residents, whose views range from solidarity to concerns about economic competition and public security.
• Political parties and media organizations, which shape whether migration is presented as a humanitarian issue, an economic contribution or a security threat.
• International organizations including UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, which provide assistance and call for coordinated responses.

In 2021, anti-immigration protests in Iquique included the burning of migrants' belongings. The incident showed how fears about the economy and security could turn into hostility toward a visible out-group. Chile's Migration and Foreigners Law was enacted in 2021 and implemented through later regulations. It emphasized organized entry, visas and removal procedures, while the state also tightened control of its northern border. Although these policies asserted sovereignty, they did not remove the causes of migration. Stricter entry rules could instead drive people toward dangerous informal crossings and make undocumented migrants more vulnerable to exploitation.

One practical course of action would pair security screening with accessible regularization for migrants who meet transparent conditions. Gaining legal status would improve access to formal employment and reduce vulnerability. Opponents, however, may argue that this encourages further irregular entry. Another option would provide more national funding to border municipalities for housing, schools and health services. This could ease local resentment, though it would require sustained finance and might not satisfy groups that want lower immigration overall.

This case links to poverty, since economic insecurity shapes migration decisions and public reactions; identity, as national belonging can separate insiders from outsiders; security, because political debate frequently associates migration with crime; and equality, since irregular status restricts access to work, protection and services.

Conflicts can involve territorial boundaries, but they may also create ethnic or citizenship borders that shut groups out of political membership. During conflict, people who cross borders face detention, forced return, exploitation and trafficking. The danger is especially severe when no safe legal routes are available.

Case study: Rohingya movement from Myanmar through Bangladesh

The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim minority from Myanmar's Rakhine State. Myanmar's citizenship system has generally denied them full membership, creating both a legal and ethnic border within the state. After the Myanmar military's 2017 operations in Rakhine State, a large refugee population crossed the physical border into Bangladesh.

The actors and stakeholders include:

• Myanmar's military authorities, which exercise coercive power and have rejected or disputed many allegations of abuse.
• Rohingya communities, whose priorities include safety, citizenship, freedom of movement and return with enforceable rights.
• Bangladesh's government and host communities. They have sheltered refugees while arguing that Bangladesh shouldn't bear the long-term responsibility alone.
• UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and humanitarian organizations, which provide protection and essential services but rely on access and donor funding.
• Smuggling and trafficking networks that profit when refugees seek routes to Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere.
• Accountability efforts include proceedings before the International Court of Justice and an investigation by the International Criminal Court.

Bangladesh set up large refugee settlements around Cox's Bazar. International agencies supplied food, shelter, education and health assistance. Attempts to arrange repatriation haven't led to substantial voluntary return because refugees lack confidence that Myanmar will guarantee citizenship and security. Conditions for safe return weakened further after the 2021 military coup and renewed fighting in Rakhine State during 2023–24.

Because lawful movement is severely restricted, some Rohingya have turned to smugglers for sea journeys across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Passengers may face trafficking, exploitation, extortion, sexual or gender-based violence or death. Trafficking, then, isn't simply a border-policing problem. Conflict, statelessness and closed migration routes increase vulnerability by leaving people dependent on criminal intermediaries.

One possible course of action is a coordinated regional search-and-rescue and disembarkation arrangement, with UNHCR supporting screening and protection. It could prevent deaths and identify trafficking victims. Governments, however, may resist commitments that seem to make them responsible for settlement. A second option would make repatriation conditional on verifiable citizenship rights, physical safety and international monitoring in Myanmar. This standard protects the principle of voluntary return, although Myanmar's conflict and military rule make it extremely difficult to implement.

The case connects to identity because ethnic and religious exclusion underpins statelessness. It also links to security, as military violence and criminal networks shape movement, and to poverty, since dependence on aid and smugglers increases vulnerability. Denial of citizenship creates unequal access to legal protection and political rights, linking the case to equality.